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In the realm of political theory, absolutism has largely dictated the conception of 
bureaucratic duty.  Thus the ideal has seen bureaucrats as bound to obey the dictates 
of the sovereign, usually seen as the body that makes law.  Empirical approaches to 
public administration have, quite naturally, pointed out that human beings, even 
bureaucrats, do not merely follow orders.  Yet, even if one adopts an approach that 
sees the problem in terms of principle and agent, the concern remains of ensuring that 
the sovereign controls the official.  I argue that this perspective has overshadowed the 
republican tradition, which saw magistrates as citizens first.  In other words, there is a 
long tradition in political theory that offers scope for officials to exercise discretion 
on behalf of their political communities through acts of positive resistance.  Mere 
passivity in the form of resignation or non-compliance is sometimes insufficient.  A 
republican conception of magistrates has long afforded these officials the capacity to 
act on how they see things.  The need for an emphasis on this approach increases as 
the political community itself becomes increasingly incapable through lack of 
knowledge or information of acting in its own interests.  In fact, it sometimes happens 
that officials alone possess the knowledge necessary to take action on behalf of the 
community.  The republican tradition provides a basis for rationalizing this in 
theoretical terms once we accept that all officials today are both citizens and 















BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: CITIZEN OFFICIALS AND 









Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 














Professor C. Alford, Chair 
Professor C. Butterworth 
Professor A. Eckstein 
Professor M. Rozenblit 
Professor I. Ward
 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1: Bureaucratic Discretion ………………………………………………....1 
 
Chapter 2: Bureaucracy in the Polis, Real and Imagined…………………………..35 
 
Chapter 3: Bureaucracy in the Res Publica, Real and Imagined…………………...75 
 
Chapter 4: Modernity and Bureaucratic Servility………….……………………...109 
 
Chapter 5: The Discretion of Citizens as Officials………………………………..163 
 





































In the modern world, where there is a state, there is bureaucracy.1  For more 
than a century, the nature of bureaucracy has been seen something somehow contrary 
to the nature of democracy; this has been called “the democratic paradox.”2  This is 
basically a question of which body, the legislature or the bureaucracy, is the senior 
partner within the state.  Legislature, as the locus of popular sovereignty and the 
means for expressing popular will is theoretically supreme, yet a number of issues, 
such as bureaucracy’s relative permanence vis-à-vis the legislature, or the imbalance 
in expertise between administrator and legislator, suggest that bureaucracy may not 
be responsive, or may even dominate that relationship.  While conceived in terms of 
democracy, it is quite possible for such an imbalance to occur in other regimes as 
well.  This is because this really is a matter of the relationship between sovereign and 
servant, be the sovereign legislature or king.  Stated simply: is bureaucracy 
independent or subordinate?  The normative answer to this question, which is derived 
from robust conceptions of sovereignty, generally insists that the bureaucracy should 
be subservient.  Such a position has implications for the individual bureaucrat’s role. 
For individual officials, particularly those of middle and lower ranks, the 
subordination instantiated by the relationship between bureaucracy and sovereign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Cf. G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, 
Stanford, 1978, p. 1 
2See, for example, W. Choung, Control Mechanisms Over Bureaucratic Power 
Expansion and a Tentative Model for the Comparative Study of Bureaucracy, Temple 
University, dissertation, 1980, pp. 1-7; McGregor, “Great Paradox of Citizenship and 
Public Personnel Administration,” Public Administration Review 44 (1984), pp. 126-
35; B. Karl, “The American Bureaucrat: A History of a Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing,” 
Public Administration Review 47 (1987), pp. 26-34 
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produces a tension between an official’s potential exercise of private morality and his 
institutional or functional obligation to carry out the instructions of legitimate 
superiors. It has long been recognized, however, that this surrender of personal will 
has its own consequences: it can lead to the claim that one is but a cog in a giant 
machine, implying that the lowly official has no moral responsibility for his role in 
implementing decisions of higher authorities, who ostensibly bear the responsibility.3  
Instituting specific regulations and instructions to make explicit in legal form the 
ethical obligations of individual public servants is one method of addressing this 
problem.  This approach, however, only serves to make more complete the 
subordination of individual will within the bureaucratic context, as it relies upon and 
confirms a principle of subordination in order to create within the public servant a 
thoughtless habituation grounded in fear of punishment rather than a capacity for 
discernment and judgment on the basis of any particular or coherent moral system.  
Formal law, after all, is a means for minimizing an official’s discretion, which, to 
some extent, is the crux of the matter.  Moreover, there is something dubious about 
regulation as an ethical method because ethics by rule or rote is really a kind of non-
ethics, or it is the appearance without the substance.  For ethical practice itself is built 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3This essentially is Weber’s formulation: “When, despite the arguments advanced by 
an official, his superior insists on the execution of an instruction which the official 
regards as mistaken, the official’s honour consists in being able to carry out that 
instruction, on the responsibility of the man issuing it, conscientiously and precisely 
in the same way as if it corresponded to his own convictions.” (emphasis in original) 
“The Profession and Vocation of Politics” in P. Lassman and R. Speirs, Weber: 
Political Writings, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2010 [1994], pp. 309-69, quotation at pp. 
330-1 Cf. Schumpeter’s comments on the relationship between a citizen’s “effective 
will” and responsibility.  J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New 
York, 1976 [1942], pp. 261-2. 
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upon thought and judgment, not habit and fear.  Regulation is the opposite.  It is itself 
a means to subordinate the official to higher authority. 
Until relatively recent times, political theory has not devoted much energy to 
bureaucracy itself or the ethics of individual officials.  Indeed, the views that have 
shaped and continue to inform the ideology of the subordinated bureaucrat as servant, 
have tended to downplay or disregard the role of an individual’s morality in deciding 
whether or not to execute policy.  Classical theory did not address bureaucracy 
explicitly even though Athenians and Romans had public officials and bureaucracies; 
its focus was more on the power of the state given the condition of ambitious men in 
the service of the good life.4  When the ethical actions of political agents within the 
government come in for discussion, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero focused on the 
characters and behaviors of the elite, not generally, and certainly not systematically, 
on subordinates whose task was to carry out the will of their masters: the lowly 
underling was not an ethical agent as his master’s judgment was what mattered.  
Modern and contemporary political theory, when contemplating the role of officials, 
often focuses on those of the highest rank and their subordination, collectively or 
individually to the sovereign, be it the prince, the legislature, or the people.  At every 
step, the concerns range from depoliticizing administration, to limiting bureaucratic 
discretion, to increasing the principle of rationality.  Awareness that bureaucracy may 
compete with the sovereign for power suggests the importance of ensuring a proper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Obviously, it matters a great deal what period of time is being considered.  The 
Athens of Pericles had public slaves, but not a fully developed system of 
administration comparable in scale or complexity to what existed in the Rome of 
Constantine.  But these distinctions are not important for present purposes.  Ancient 
bureaucracy will be addressed in Chapters 2 (Athens) and 3 (Rome). 
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relationship between sovereign master and bureaucratic servant, but frequently 
modern political theory has not weighed the ethical choices or discretion of lower or 
middle ranking officials.5  It is important to note that the generalizations made so far 
concern normative political theory, not the kind of empirically informed approaches 
that has come to the fore in fields such as public administration or sociology.    
Weber, of course, is something of an éminence grise in the literature.  
Whether one endorses his idealized conception of bureaucracy or opposes it, his 
approach overshadows much of the literature on bureaucracy in the modern state.  
Empirically motivated, sociologists, for example, have argued against Weber’s ideal 
by offering up the behaviors of flesh-and-blood bureaucracies; and it has been 
relatively easy to make the case that officials are not simply mindless robots, dutifully 
carrying out orders to the letter.  Actual human beings, after all, are variable, mostly 
unpredictable, and far from mechanistic.6  But it is worth stressing the distance 
between political theory and sociology.  The former is normative, the latter, 
ostensibly scientific.  Thus, sociological scholarship’s normative commitment is to 
observation, that is, the avoidance of an overt display of values in its analysis: it aims 
to describe behaviors, not ethics.  In public administration, which has laid claim to 
science as a model, empiricism has similarly become the dominant method.  Some 
have drawn on economic theories of principal and agent as a framework for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Protestant thinkers of the 16th century are a notable exception in that they made the 
case strongly for magisterial independence. R. Benert, Inferior Magistrates in 
Sixteenth-Century Political and Legal Thought, U. of Minn., dissertation, 1967; J. 
Franklin, ed., Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three 
Treatises by Hotman, Beza, & Mornay, New York, 1969 
6If it were otherwise, rational choice would be far more effective than it is at 
explaining voter behavior. B. Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter, Princeton, 
2007 
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explaining the actions of officials.7  Others have collated measures of various sorts to 
test bureaucratic responsiveness.8  Even these and similar approaches, while all aimed 
at formulating and testing hypotheses about the real world, or gathering data about 
actual human beings, nonetheless quite frequently display a debt to Weber: 
fundamentally, they often either seek to disprove Weber’s ideal concept, or test its 
validity.9  In this way, he continues to cast a long shadow over subsequent students of 
bureaucracy. 
While the present study fits within the tradition of those scholars who have 
written about the ethical behavior of officials, its contribution consists in its focus on 
the basis provided by political theory for the exercise of discretion by mid- and lower-
ranked officials using moral systems external to the institutions where they find 
themselves.  That is, individual citizens serving the public as members of the 
bureaucracy need not check their status as citizens at the door once they become 
public servants.  The aim, however, is not to prescribe the content of that morality or 
declare what particular conceptions of right should sway an official’s actions, but 
rather to argue that, whatever the content, individual morality can serve to temper 
pressures to conform and serve: an official cannot be a mere instrument of authority, 
even legitimate authority.10  This is a normative argument grounded in traditional 
views about magistrates, not a set of hypotheses designed to explain observed official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7For example, W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, New 
Brunswick, 2007 [1971] 
8B. Wood and R. Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review 85.3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 801-28  
9See, for example, A. Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, New York, 1964 
[1954] 
10Cf. Rousseau’s concept of volonté de corps, Ch. 4, infra. 
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behavior, and it posits that the beneficial role of individual ethics rests on two 
principles: first, the importance of the official’s status as a citizen and his connection 
to his fellows within a political community; second, the centrality of individual 
thought and judgment to the application of personal morality in specific 
circumstances. 
Ancient political theory and practice draws our attention to a role for ethics 
within a political context that took as a given the individual’s relation to others, that 
is, the condition of plurality.  The social nature of the political community leaves an 
individual not unbound, but tied specifically to his community.  Ethics and duties are 
social.  This emphasis on the individual actor as a person linked reciprocally to those 
around him stands partly in contrast with the modern condition where these bonds are 
frequently broken or mitigated, partly as a reminder of the important role that social 
connection plays in mediating, expressing, and reifying ethical conduct.11  Modern 
theorists, Machiavelli, most famously, have despaired of thinking about the moral 
content that ought to motivate men in a polity, gradually segregating ethics from 
politics because, perhaps, of the inability to define morality; speaking in broadest 
terms, modern theory has focused on power and authority in conceiving political 
relations, first among individual leading men, later among institutions.12  Seeing 
officials as moral agents in the manner advanced here represents a devolution of the 
ethical dimensions of sovereignty to those middle and low ranking functionaries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Cf. B. Constant’s analysis of the difference between ancient and modern liberty. 
“The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,” in B. Fontana, 
Constant: Political Writings, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2006 [1988], pp. 308-28  
12Consider Rawls who posits justice as fairness ex nihilo, but more or less declares off 
limits in political discourse much of what motivates most people to have an opinion 
in the first place: morality. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1999 [1971] 
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tasked with executing policy.  On this understanding, the modern practice of 
delineating ethics for officials through regulatory means, because it relies upon fear 
of punishment, represents not true ethics, but a continuation of the ancient idea of 
superstition as a technique of control.13  This is a denial of ethics in any meaningful 
sense of the word as it maintains the sovereign’s monopoly of moral agency.  The 
present study is a denial of that monopoly. 
Scholars of bureaucracy often cite Weber as a kind of metonym for their topic 
without much further explication.14  Given the broad acceptance of Weber’s 
comments as a starting point, this is both convenient and reasonable.  Yet, before 
considering what he says, it is useful to offer a few comments regarding the word 
itself and its history. Weber’s purpose is to analyze bureaucracy in the value-free 
manner of a sociologist, but language as it is actually used is often more explicit 
about its value judgments.  First, bureaucracy is about power.  The word enters 
English in the 19th century as a foreign import with largely negative implications.15  
On the one hand, the Oxford English Dictionary’s earliest citation is John Stuart 
Mill’s use in the mid-19th century; on the other, the Historical Thesaurus of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Superstition (deisidaimonia) was originally a pejorative word, indicating an 
excessive fear of the divine.  Theophrastus presents the locus classicus for this in 
Characteres 16. H. Diels, Theophrasti Characteres, OCT, Oxford, 1909  Polybius, 
however, identifies superstition as a positive means of social control.  Histories 
6.56.6ff. Paton, W., trans., Polybius: The Histories, LCL 138, Cambridge, 1979 
[1923], p. 394ff. 
14But see Choung’s very useful discussion of the word.  See, op. cit., pp. 11-3 and 38.   
15The negative valence is not a modern phenomenon, pace W. Niskanen, op. cit., p. 6; 
for the history and various meanings, see C. Emge, “Bürokratisierung,” Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpscyhologie (1950-1), pp. 179-95 
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Oxford English Dictionary dates an unattributed citation even earlier, to 1818.16  Both 
books make clear that the connotation was largely negative, with its emphasis on the 
bureaucrat’s arbitrary use of power or on bureaucracy’s power to obstruct.  Perhaps, 
this reflects a particularly English conception.  The OED’s spare definition glosses 
over the connotations of its citations thus: “government by bureaux.”  The New 
Oxford American Dictionary, however, defines bureaucracy in terms of the balance of 
power between officialdom and legislature by characterizing it as a governmental 
system in which decisions are made by “officials rather than by elected 
representatives.”17  This emphasis on power is integral to the origin of the word itself, 
with the etyma, bureau and cratia, making it clear that bureaucracy is fundamentally 
an expression of power wielded by bureaux.18  Furthermore, the term suggests a 
realization or, perhaps, frustration with the status of administrators as an independent 
body of actors within a government.  This is, after all, the fairly general view of many 
in France during the period immediately preceding the revolution and after.  Indeed, 
the term was coined to highlight the idea that bureaux had replaced one man 
(monarchy) or the people (democracy) with their own rule.  And this concern remains 
to this day. The comparatively recent appearance of the word means that earlier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 1981, svv.. bureaucracy 
and bureaucrat; Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 
2009, sv., office, 3.04.07 (18) and holder of office, 3.04.07.01 (24).  F. Riggs, 
“Introduction: shifting meanings of the term ‘bureaucracy’,” International Social 
Science Journal/Revue international des sciences sociales 31.4 (1979), pp. 563-84 
The word makes its first recorded appearance in mid-18th century French, perhaps 
with Vincent de Gournay; it migrates into German towards the end of the 18th 
century.  See F. Kluge and A. Götze, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen 
Sphrache, Berlin, 1953, s.v., büro. 
17New Oxford American Dictionary, New York, 2001, sv., bureaucracy. 
18The word’s polemical connotation is noted by F. Morstein-Marx in The 
Administrative State, Chicago, 1957, pp. 17-8. 
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writers in thinking about bureaucracies will have referred by other means to this body 
of officials working on behalf of the government.   
Prior to the appearance of bureaucracy, theorists might speak magistrates, 
ministers, or officials.19  To get at the idea of officialdom itself, writers either focused 
rather neutrally on the collective body of officials itself, e.g., administration, or the 
individual offices and persons who carried out the duties required of them by their 
position in government.  Now, the French word, administration, does not suggest the 
same ideas that bureaucracy does, nor does gouvernement.  Indeed, whereas 
bureaucracy evinces a sense of power, perhaps even illegitimate power, 
administration incorporates the very idea of servitude.  In Classical Latin, 
administratio refers simply to the carrying out of functions without any stress on the 
power involved.20  This relatively neutral sense, retained in English and French, 
sometimes requires characterization as bad or good administration to make clear a 
thinker’s particular attitude towards a given situation.21  But who but ministers would 
carry out these tasks of administratio?  Hence the idea of subordination that is built 
into the concept.  The word, minister, originally applied to the minion of a superior, 
that is, someone who served as an instrument of his superior’s will.  The idea that 
administration was about subservience is paralleled elsewhere. In German, for 
example, the word, Beamter, has this idea at its origin.22 This merely serves to 
highlight the fact that individuals, who were part of government’s administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Of course, such terms continue to exist side by side with bureaucracy itself. 
20See, for example, Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford, 1982, sv., administratio.  To be 
sure, the word, minister, implies a power relationship, but administratio as an abstract 
noun does not directly convey this as a review of the OLD entry shows. 
21Cf. H. Horwill, Modern American Usage, Oxford, 1946, s.v., administration. 
22Götze, Wörterbuch, s.v., Amt. 
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staff, were generally seen as servants.  Magistrates, of course, originally were 
officials: free citizens of the Roman Republic with specific authorities.  But this word 
too eventually comes to refer to officials within the government, and they too, 
according to Bodin, following a tradition of Roman imperial law when the offices of 
the Republic were vestigially retained under the empire, were subject to sovereign 
authority.  But the interesting development here is the split between magistrates, to 
whose duties ancient political theory did turn its attention, and their servants whom it 
generally ignored.  Both these categories collapsed under the Roman Empire so that 
Bodin, for example, could make of them servants to the sovereign. 
Weber’s conceptualization of bureaucracy, the one most frequently used 
implicitly or explicitly as modern scholarship’s starting point, is most fully stated in 
Economy and Society.23 Consciously using modern bureaucracy as an ideal type 
against which others are compared,24 Weber emphasizes several features as the marks 
of true bureaucracy, variously described as the “institutional-legal,” “rational-legal,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23G. Roth and C. Wittich, edd., Economy and Society, Berkeley, 1978, v. 2, Ch. 11.  
Weber writes of bureaucracy elsewhere.  See, for example, “Parliament and 
Government in Germany under a New Political Order” and “The Profession and 
Vocation of Politics” in Lassman, op. cit.  Weber is so well-know that scholars often 
glibly refer to his model.  Cf. J. Huber and C. Shipan, Deliberative Discretion?, 
Cambridge, 2002, pp. 17-8.  
24On this method, see Aron’s discussion of Weber’s methodology in R. Aron, Les 
étapes de la pensée sociologique, Paris, 1967, p. 511ff.  He notes the problem with 
extracting a type from historical sources and then reapplying it to history.  But it is 
more interesting to note that Aron does not point out the methodological incongruity 
between the use of history to say something about past human behavior and the 
modern practice of turning to mathematics for contemporary sociological analysis.  
At some level, these are incompatible methods, yet generalizations for comparison 
emerge all the same. 
 11 
or “formal-legal” model.25 Accordingly, Weber identifies the following criteria for 
bureaucracy: 1) abstract law; 2) consistency; 3) hierarchy; 4) impersonality; 5) 
specification of competence; 6) salaries; 7) writing; 8) career; 9) discipline; 10) 
expertise; and 11) formalism.26  In sum, Weber says, bureaucracy is “fundamentally 
domination through knowledge.”27   
Weber’s use of the modern condition, characterized above all by the fact of 
capitalism, to put forward an ideal type urges upon him a distinction between the 
modern, rational-legal bureaucratic system, and its historical antecedents.28  The 
relationship between the modern economy and bureaucracy is so central to his 
approach that he as at pains to explain, or explain away, ancient bureaucracies, such 
as the Egyptian, which he was forced to concede, however reluctantly, was nearly 
bureaucratic.29  Elsewhere, he introduces the idea of patrimonialism as a category for 
classifying earlier systems as other than modern.30  This typology emphasizes the role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25On Weber’s use of the modern system as a point of comparison, see, Economy, p. 
217.  For “institutional legal,” see J. Dobel, Bureaucratic Integrity, Baltimore, 1999, 
p. 10; “rational legal,” see Suleiman, op. cit, p. 27; “formal legal,” see J. Burke, 
Bureaucratic Responsibility, Baltimore, 1986, p. 10.   Of course, “rational-legal” is 
Weber’s own formulation. 
26Economy, pp. 217-26.  Identifying a number of these features with bureaucracy is 
not unique to Weber.  Although he might have, Weber does not cite Mill on the topic, 
but in his discussion of the political executive the latter’s exposition of how the civil 
service ought to function anticipates much of Weber. Considerations on 
Representative Government, Chicago, 1962, Ch. 14, p. 259ff.  Weber does reference 
Mill in his essay, “Between Two Laws,” in Writings, pp. 78-9. 
27Economy, pp. 227 and 956ff. 
28Economy, p. 964.   
29ibid. 
30By arguing that bureaucracy existed and grew as a strategy to bolster central 
authority, Strayer implicitly sees bureaucracy differently than Weber.  J. Strayer, On 
the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton, 2005.  While Weber 
emphasizes the role of technology and economy in the rise of bureaucracy, Strayer 
emphasizes the monarchy’s competition with rival estates. 
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of sociologically private relations in earlier administrative arrangements, unlike 
modern, rational-legal systems that are marked by impersonality and formality.31  
Thus, the modern official surrenders his will to legitimate authority (sovereignty) as a 
matter of political duty or mere professionalism, while his earlier analogue, to the 
extent that he actually did what he was told, performed his duty because of a social 
relationship with his superior.   One might paraphrase by saying that under traditional 
systems, officialdom was an organization of clients serving patrons: “…the position 
of the official derives from his purely personal submission to the ruler…. it is rather a 
servant’s loyalty based on a strictly personal relationship to the ruler and an 
obligation of fealty….”32 
Whatever Weber’s theoretical limitations, he was quite correct to emphasize 
the modern problem of bureaucratic subordination.  At any rate, Weber’s typology is 
a useful point of departure, although not all of his criteria are necessary to thinking 
about bureaucracy as a problem of political theory.  To know a bureaucracy, one need 
only recognize that it is an organization of people built on the principle of hierarchy 
and oriented towards the execution of governmental tasks to be carried out by 
officials whose duty it is to perform them.  Obviously, corporations and other bodies 
can have bureaucracies, but the interest here are bureaucracies that reify for most 
citizens the world over their government.  After all, where the sovereign cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Economy, p. 1028-31 Curiously, Weber characterizes the administration of 
Ptolemaic Egypt as a “coincidence of bureaucracy and natural economy” only later to 
insist that the Egyptian system too is patrimonial, functioning, even at this late date, 
as the “royal oikos.” op. cit, p. 964 and 1047. 
32op. cit., pp. 1030-1.  And yet, once the nation seizes the throne, the notion of 
democratic control, despite concepts of meritocracy and professionalism, still 
demands the loyalty due the “royal oikos.” 
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everywhere at once, he must depend upon officials to carry out his will.  Organized in 
a body, these officials are bureaucracy, however nascent or inchoate by modern 
standards. Whether an official’s obligations are personal or legal makes little 
difference as in either case he is theoretically bound to fulfill duties imposed on him 
by someone else.33  In other words, bureaucracy’s operative principle, modern or not, 
is servility, that is, service to a master.  To be sure, this notion has been challenged in 
various ways.  Sociologists, with Weber specifically in mind, have shown that 
bureaucracy in practice does not faithfully adhere to a mechanistic ideal.  Gouldner, 
for example, in his study of bureaucratic control at an American gypsum plant, 
showed that bureaucracy actually runs into all kinds of trouble when workers are 
unwilling to follow procedures deemed inappropriate to their circumstances.34  Burns 
in his examination of Scotland’s post-war electronics industry reported that non-
technical factors such as status or “turf” could affect a company’s ability to operate 
according to purely hierarchical methods.35  Political scientists too have also taken 
their crack at Weber’s ideal type.  Warwick examined how US State Department 
officials could undermine and undo programs introduced by their superiors.36  Zegart 
emphasized the lack of legislative incentives to oversee an intelligence community 
that succeeds in getting perhaps too much of what it wants.37  Carpenter traced the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33The sovereign may be unbound, but the official in theory was not.  On the theory of 
the sovereign legibus solutus, see J. Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self, New 
York, 2008, pp. 61-2. 
34Gouldner, op. cit. 
35T. Burns, The Management of Innovation, Oxford, 1961  
36D. Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and 
Organization in the State Department, Cambridge, 1979. 
37A. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, Stanford, 
1999, and Eyes on Spies, Stanford, 2010. 
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historical development of bureaucratic independence as the result of a variety of 
factors, including the recruitment of the citizenry over and against the legislature.38 
From a different perspective, Kingsley argued that bureaucrats in the United 
Kingdom reflected their masters, not because of Weberian duty, but because they 
were drawn from the same social strata.39  Niskanen, taking economics as a reference, 
argued that bureaucrats engage in rational choice and strive for utility maximization.40  
It turns out, unsurprisingly, that the real world is more complex and varied than the 
ideal.  Nevertheless, while these and other approaches do say something of value 
about how bureaucracy is actually practiced, each simply reflects a particular focus 
whether it be the relation between official and superior or bureaucracy and overseer, 
and, in the end, they do not invalidate Weber as a useful starting point.  Indeed, only a 
rational choice theorist could fault Weber for not being one as well.  To some extent, 
these studies of actual practice are interesting precisely because they use Weber as a 
basis of comparison.  Without the Weberian type, their results might simply be 
puzzling and solipsistic.  Therefore, it is worth stressing that Weber animates the 
literature, attesting to the value of what he proposed, whether as an object of criticism 
or a basis of understanding.41  Furthermore, to argue that Weber’s basic points were 
invalidated by actual practice would be akin to suggesting that the ideal democracy 
loses its value, the less it resembles actual democracies.42  Clearly the communis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38D. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, Princeton, 2001. 
39J. Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil 
Service, Yellow Springs, 1944. 
40Niskanen, op. cit. 
41This is the Bakhtinian dialogic at work. 
42Indeed, for all the emphasis Bauman places on the centrality of the German 
bureaucracy to the holocaust, one would expect that it too functioned imperfectly.  Z. 
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opinio, evident to even the casual observer of scholarship in actual practice, is that 
Weber got something right in his articulation, and the investigation of actual practice 
is interesting precisely because it differs from the ideal.43  For the present purpose the 
basic implication of Weber’s ideal, subordination organized for the accomplishment 
of tasks defined by an authority, will do.44  This means that servility is a bureaucratic 
virtue. 
Calling servility a bureaucratic virtue may at first glance appear objectionable.  
In particular, the modern West with its emphasis on equality and liberty would 
suggest an explicit opposition to the notion of slavishness within its officials.45  But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Ithaca, 1991. The incommeasurability 
problem that exists in using the real to invalidate the ideal will be taken up below. 
43To the extent that bureaucracies have an initial moment, it is clear that they take on 
a life of their own and remain fundamentally undesigned.  They respond to and 
interact with their environments.  This is one of the points made by Burns.  Thus, if 
even the founding moment represents an ideal from the perspective of the founder, it 
is clear that with the passage of time practice and circumstance will produce an 
unintended kind of organization, one that is not ideal by the standard of its originator. 
44At one level, much modern scholarship, with its reliance on quantitative analysis, is 
incommeasurable with Weber’s approach.  It is not as though the sociological 
statements of Weber or others of his genre could be subject to falsification in the 
manner that Popper finds to be the hallmark of true science: the laws of human 
behavior remain to be discovered. 
45Cf. the opposition between the principles of a democratic society and bureaucratic 
duty discussed in K. Denhardt, “The Management of Ideals: A Political Perspective 
on Ethics,” Public Administration Review, 49.2 (1989), pp. 187-93.  J. Worthy 
argued this very point in Big Business and Free Men, New York, 1959.  He is perhaps 
the most blunt exponent of what seems a Zeitgeist of the 1950s, namely, a desire to 
argue for individuals in the face of collectivities.  This is no accident in the context of 
the Cold War. Cf. Stahl’s observation that “[t]he government employee’s democratic 
impulses can hardly be strengthened if undemocratic practices govern his life….” O. 
Stahl, “Democracy and Public Employee Morality,” Annals of the Academy of 
Political and Social Science 297 (Jan., 1955), pp. 90-7, quotation at p. 95a.  In fiction, 
the protagonist of The Shrinking Man (1956), Scott Carey, simply wonders as he 
heads towards oblivion: “Was he a separate, meaningful person; was he an 
individual? Did he matter? Was it enough just to survive?” R. Matheson, The 
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this is perhaps only because it too bluntly states what, in fact, is required by a 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  The very idea, frequently put forth, that the legislature should 
wield the bureaucracy as an instrument of its will suggests as much.  Otherwise the 
idea of a paradox between bureaucratic independence and legislative authority has no 
meaning: the concern is to rein in bureaucracy for the faithful execution of what the 
legislature as the people’s representative decides.  Linguistically speaking, this aspect 
was not always so hidden or troubling.  In the late Roman empire, the bureaucracy 
was often referred to as militia, a military service.  The word, service, itself is cognate 
with the Latin word for slave, servus.  It is only over time that the implicit idea of 
slavery or slavishness has been masked in practice; it lingers all the same.  Citizens 
mostly want their public servants to carry out policy as directed, not according to 
their individual whims, no matter how problematic this might be.46  That modern 
states no longer rely upon slaves or freedmen to staff government represents a social 
change of great importance, but the principle not only survives, it is a necessary 
condition, however etiolated, to the function of bureaucracy. 
This principle of servility exists in tension with two related aspects of 
bureaucracy, delegation and discretion. It is not necessary to enter into the legal 
aspects of delegation in the sense of what a legislature can or cannot delegate to the 
executive within the context of separation of powers, usually expressed as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Shrinking Man, in G. Wolfe, ed., American Science Fiction: Four Novels 1953-1956, 
Library of America, New York, 2012, p. 634 
46“I insist on subservience,” writes Finer.  His article about administrative 
responsibility is filled with the language of mastery and subservience.  H. Finer, 
“Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government,” Public Administration 
Review 1.4 (1941), pp. 335-50, quotation from p. 339b. 
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principle of non-delegation.47 It is enough to acknowledge that the very idea that the 
sovereign or legislature decides and the administration executes entails an act of 
delegation, this is the basic idea that a principal assigns tasks to a subordinate agent.  
Bureaucrats thus tasked are fiduciaries with an obligation to fulfill the tasks assigned 
to them as explicitly directed either by the superior assigning the task or according to 
abstract standards whether articulated by rules and regulations, oaths, community 
standards, or other means.   In essence, the principal cannot be everywhere at once 
and cannot perform all tasks himself.48   Therefore, if he is sovereign, he turns to his 
government; if he is a senior official, he turns to a staff of subordinates, assigning 
them what he cannot carry out by himself.   In the execution of these tasks, officials 
may or may not exercise their discretion.  The degree of discretion employed 
doubtless relates to the level of detail contained in the instructions describing the task. 
Yet in the Weberian conception, the ideal official or staffer, who advises before the 
decision is made, carries out his superior’s will with as much conviction as if the 
course of action were the result of his own decision.49  He becomes a pure instrument 
of the superior’s will.  Although discretion must, as a practical matter, enter into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47This doctrine finds a historical origin in Roman law, but its political source for 
American jurisprudence is Locke.  H. Ehmke, “‘Delegata Potestas Non Potest 
Delegari:’ A Maxim of American Constitutional Law,” Cornell Law Quarterly 47 
(1961-2), pp. 50-60; Mistretta v. United States, 488 US 361, where the Supreme 
Court held that the legislature’s delegation is subject to the “intelligible principle” 
test, meaning that the legislature must provide a minimum of guidance for the 
executor of delegated authority (p. 372ff.); A. Ziaja, “Hot Oil and Hot Air: The 
Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine through the New Deal, A History 1813-
1944,” Hastings Con. Law Quarterly 35 (2008), p. 921ff..   
48Principal in the present context is not meant to imply the sense used in principal-
agent theory as derived from economic analysis of the firm. K. Eisenhardt, “Agency 
Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14.1 (1989), 
pp. 57-74. 
49See, fn. 3, supra. 
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execution of any policy, the ideal takes the principal to be the one exercising 
discretion, the subordinate serving as his instrument.  This is why the principal, 
according to Weber, has the responsibility: it is he who must answer, not the 
subordinate.  Now, the real world discretion of officials poses a problem precisely 
because it can result in choice wrongly exercised.  When officials use discretion for 
their own ends, this is often seen as corruption.  But one need not focus on corruption 
for the moment: rather, it is worth noting that acts of misused discretion may be 
addressed by social, i.e, personal, means in those organizations identified by Weber 
as pre-bureaucratic, or legally and impersonally in those identified as rational-legal.50  
Both cases reaffirm the principle of subordination within the hierarchy.  
Appropriateness is judged on the basis of acts in relation to delegated authority: one 
may not do other than what is authorized.  The principle of servility is reinforced, and 
it is integral to the assumed operation of bureaucracy, whether as generally conceived 
or as posited by theorists concerned about legislative control in democracies.51  
Indeed, the desire for the perfectly reliable performance of tasks finds its day-to-day 
culmination in the use of red-light cameras, which automatically, meaning without 
any discretion at all, ticket drivers who fail to stop.  While in each individual case a 
police officer tasked with issuing tickets will, in fact, use his discretion, perhaps 
ticketing one driver, but letting another off with a warning, the red-light camera, 
which can only function on the basis of rules that are so decontextualized that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50On discretion as a problem, see S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 
Cambridge, 1999, pp. 39 and 62; M. Warren, “What Does Corruption Mean in a 
Democracy?,” American Journal of Political Science 48.2 (2004), pp. 328-43. 
51This is the oversight problem taken up by Zegart, for example.  See also Huber and 
Shipan, op. cit., pp. 18-22 and E. Suleiman, Dismantling Democratic States, 
Princeton, 2003, pp. 32-8. 
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allow for no mitigating factors, succeeds in eliminating completely any such 
messiness, ensuring that all drivers are equally subject to its ever-watchful eye.  The 
camera is the ideal official.52 
The red light camera that automatically issues tickets impersonally and 
without discrimination is a mechanical official, who under no circumstances 
introduces private values into the execution of duty.53  Where the human official, be 
he an actual slave in the ancient world, or an agent tasked with carrying out 
instructions faithfully and in obedience to superiors in the modern, may experience 
his subordination in relation to legal or social strictures, but always filtered through 
his own will to act, the machine is all the more faithful as a bureaucratic instrument 
precisely because it removes any risk that considerations exterior to the bureaucracy 
itself as expressed in rules might deflect the execution of policy from its generally 
defined and originally conceived purpose.  The machine’s and the bureaucracy’s 
morality are one.  The machine’s subordination is organic to its nature.  The human 
being in actual practice, no matter his bureaucratic rank or social status, always 
threatens to introduce personal considerations -- not to mention his level of 
competence and expertise -- that may contaminate his sense of duty, as a subordinate, 
to carry out his tasks.  While this is frequently seen as a problem, the present study 
argues that this circumstance is a theoretical desideratum for bureaucratic practice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Cf. L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in 
Political Thought, Cambridge, 1992 [1977], pp. 20-1; W. Wallach and C. Allen, 
Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, Oxford, 2009 
53Comparing kamikazes with armed drones, G. Chamayou observes, “Ce que les 
premiers (sc., les japonais) espéraient atteindre par l’entraînement psychologique, il 
va s’agir pour les seconds (sc., les américains) par des procédés purement 
techniques.” “A chacun son arme: drone et kamikaze, jeu de miroirs,” Le monde 
diplomatique, April 2013, p. 3. 
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within democracy despite the fact that bureaucratic subordination is seen as 
something integral to sovereignty.   
But what is meant by morality, and what is its relationship to ethics?  The two 
concepts can easily become muddled, but perhaps their relationship to each other can 
provide a basis for distinguishing.54  Ethics is the specific, morality the general.  On 
this understanding, ethics is casuistry, although not in the pejorative sense.  Rather, 
individuals may apply morality, whatever its content, to specific cases: that 
application is realized as ethics.55  Indeed, absent specific cases, morality may 
actually be of little relevance to anyone’s life.  Ethics are the practical and real 
expression of private, if not universal, morality within the context of a human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54M. Midgley explicitly refrains from distinguishing morality from ethics in her 
article, “The Origin of Ethics.” (p. 3) in P. Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics, 
Oxford, 2000, pp. 3-13.  Others may speak of morality without making clear the 
distinction between principle and practice. See, for example, S. Wolf, “Moral Saints,” 
Journal of Philosophy, 79.8 (1982), pp. 419-39.  Also, M. Quinlan, “Just Intelligence: 
Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory,” in P. Hennessy, ed., The New Protective State: 
Government, Intelligence, and Terrorism, London, 2007, pp. 123-41.  Quinlan, who 
admits to lacking specific expertise in ethics, nonetheless, is useful in showing how 
even in circles outside moral philosophy, the distinction between morality and ethics 
all but disappears. 
55Making a universalist claim about the content of morality is not only difficult, it 
may simply be impossible in the present day.  G. Anscombe, “Modern Moral 
Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-19; K. Appiah, Experiments in Ethics, 
Cambridge, 2008; B. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, Cambridge, 2012, Ch. 
4.  Indeed, the vast number of modern approaches, many incommeasurable with each 
other, speak to a kind of aporia in determining the nature of morality. In public 
administration scholarship, it becomes very unclear where morality, even institutional 
morality, ends and ethical practice begins. Consider the use of “ethics” in, for 
example, P. Douglas, “Improvement of Ethical Standards in the Federal Government: 
Problems and Proposals,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science  280 (1952), pp. 149-57; P. Monypenny, “The Control of Ethical Standards in 
the Public Service,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
297 (1955), pp. 98-104.  Nor is it enough to say that ethics is about doing the right 
thing.  What is the right thing in a plural society which lacks a common moral 
language?  
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community.  Thus, morality is to the self, what ethics are to the other.  The former, 
inward-looking, the latter outward.  This is the understanding here. 
Leaving aside, then, the particular morality held by any one individual, the 
application of that morality to a particular case, the ethical act, implies a number of 
instrumental preconditions.  For one must know when and how to apply a moral 
principle.  Ethics thus presupposes the use of discernment and judgment.  One must 
hold a conception of what the particular case is, engage oneself inwardly about its 
nature, and judge the application of morality to it.56  This is what Arendt means when 
she speaks of thought.57  To exercise thought requires the conscious analysis of 
circumstances, both as they are outside the individual and as they relate to the 
individual within.  This is distinct from groupthink, in which the individual is 
suppressed by the leveling effects of the team where he plays a role, or the 
organization as tribe.58  For an official within a bureaucracy, this is not merely a 
matter of using criteria supplied by the organization itself, but also the decision to 
participate in the application of those criteria.  To implement those criteria without 
considering what it means personally for the official himself as a human being or 
even as a citizen within a polity where they are applied, is an act of thoughtlessness.59  
This is what Arendt had in mind when she famously and controversially judged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56A. Applebaum, Ethics for Adversaries, Princeton, 1999, p. 219. 
57Thought has a complex role and at times a slippery meaning in Arendt’s work.  Yet 
its interiority and its relation to activity are consistent themes.  The Human Condition, 
New York, 1959, pp. 4, 82-3, and 147-51; “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A 
Lecture,” Social Research 38.3 (1971), pp. 417-46. 
58On the ideology of the team and its effects, see W. Whyte, The Organization Man, 
New York, 1956. 
59Access to information is critical to this process, and the more fragmentary the 
information, the more limited the capacity to exercise judgment as there may end up 
being little to judge.  See, Winner, op. cit., pp. 301-5. 
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Eichmann to have been a fundamentally thoughtless person.60  This thoughtlessness, 
triggered in part by a modest conception of the bureaucratic self as being of 
insufficient rank to challenge the decisions of superiors, or, as Weber would have it, 
of being obliged to carry out one’s tasks regardless of whatever reservations an 
official may have, is, in fact, a necessary component of an official’s self-
instrumentalization within the hierarchical strictures of bureaucracy.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60Arendt has come in for a great deal of criticism for her treatment of Eichmann.  But 
focusing on whether or not she was wrong about this or that historical detail, or 
whether she attended the entire trial, or sufficiently acknowledged Eichmann’s 
agency is really to miss completely or consciously to disregard her broader and more 
interesting point about the importance of thought as an ethical component of 
bureaucratic action.  For Arendt, Eichmann as a historical figure is secondary to her 
theoretical concerns about moral agency.  After all, even accepting every criticism 
leveled at her reportage leaves unaddressed the philosophical and ethical importance 
of her analysis.  Eichmann and the Holocaust, Harmondsworth, 2006; D. Cesarani, 
Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer”, 
Cambridge, 2004; B. Gewen, “Becoming Eichmann by David Cesarani; The 
Everyman of Genocide,” New York Times, May 14, 2006.  Cesarani faults Arendt for 
a number of reasons, including her philosophical commitments, but does not seem to 
see his own commitments as a problem.  This also leads him to dispose of Bauman by 
vaguely arguing against the validity of Stanley Milgram’s famous experiments, yet 
Bauman’s argument does not hang solely on Milgram. (p. 354) Cesarani’s own 
understanding of the role of thought within Arendt’s philosophy appears rather 
incomplete: his various comments suggest that he understands it only in the ordinary 
sense of common speech. (see p. 11, for example) In other words, whatever subtlety 
there is in Arendt on this matter, the significance of “thoughtlessness” for her is for 
him boiled down to “unthinking” nearly in the sense of being careless or distracted: 
this misses the point, as though she meant that Eichmann just failed to notice what 
was happening.   That is not what she means by thoughtlessness. More importantly, 
his approach allows him to sidestep the role of obedience in bureaucracy.  To be sure, 
there is an important point here: the relationship between obedience and 
responsibility, and it seems clear that Cesarani’s project is to assign responsibility.  
But there is an unacknowledged incompatibility of approaches: the real and the ideal.  
Arendt’s concerns are fundamentally on the level of the ideal, Cesarani’s the real.  
And yet, Cesarani veers into generalization himself: “Nor were the Nazis merely 
taking orders.” (p. 355)  “Every single one of them?  Without exception?,” one might 
ask. So general a proposition is impossible to make in any zealous commitment to 
“facts.”  Such a commitment leaves this question open to the investigation of each 
individual.  
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bureaucratic principle is that one’s moral agency is proscribed by one’s subordinate 
role.   In this sense, private morality and private ethics theoretically have no actual 
place in a servile conception of bureaucracy.  Morality and ethics are for superiors, or 
perhaps a legislature, but not for simple officials whose duty consists in the faithful 
implementation of policy.  Again, the red-light cameras appear as a perfect 
technological realization of bureaucracy in that such devices are amoral and non-
ethical.  The ethics of the camera are the responsibility of those who determine 
policy, not the device that carries it out, just as Weber’s superior official, when 
disregarding the advance of his staff, retains responsibility for decisions.  But this is 
the level where ethics can actually take on greater significance: the lower the rank of 
the individual official, potentially the greater the direct impact to be had on behalf of 
his fellow citizens.  
An important aspect of the distinction between morality and ethics arises in 
relation to society.  Here the point is that morality remains entirely private until it 
becomes a source of action.  And action, in an ethical sense, relates to one’s condition 
as a member of a social group.  Ethics derive their meaning in relation to another 
person: the other person is constitutive of the case to which morality is applied.  An 
individual could remain moral, if he remained entirely by himself, unconnected to his 
fellow human beings.61  But, as Aristotle observed, human beings live in 
communities, or, to follow Arendt, in a condition of plurality.  To put it differently, 
morality applied to human interaction and relationships is the substance of ethics.  If 
morality was once divine whereas now it is merely set of abstract preferences, ethics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61This is not a reference to some hypothetical state of nature.   
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remains human.  In this way, ethics fundamentally relates to one’s connections within 
society. Kant urges that people should be treated as ends rather than means; ethics 
constitutes how that works out in individual cases.  Thus, ethics are the stuff of 
human relations.  An obvious implication is that conditions of alienation or social 
fragmentation undermine ethics.62 
Of course, when ethics are framed in these terms, being, as they are, 
dependent on thought as an activity within the sphere of human relations, the question 
naturally arises as to whether true ethics can arise from habituation.  Is ethical 
behavior ethics?63  Is ethics purely a matter of the act itself?  The perspective taken 
here is that true ethics must involve thought.  In other words, it is the result of a 
process internal to the individual that is evaluative, and not the product of mere habit.  
To be sure, the distinction between a truly ethical act and one that appears to be so 
may, in fact, be something that makes no difference to the outside observer, or to a 
political community.  It may be that training individuals to behave in a particular 
manner, as though they were ethical by virtue of that behavior, would be sufficient, 
and that, indeed, is the approach taken in modern bureaucracies.  Indeed, it evokes the 
utility of superstition that Polybius highlighted in his discussion of the Roman 
Republic.  It is possible that an official’s sincerity or understanding or intelligence 
may generally be of little immediate significance, but within the bureaucratic context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62Cf. “It is a tragedy of moral history that the expansion of the area of the moral 
community has ordinarily been gained through the sacrifice of the intensity of the 
moral bond, or…that all men have been becoming brothers by becoming equally 
others.” B. Nelson, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal 
Otherhood, Chicago, 1969 [1949], p. 136. 
63Behavior is used pointedly because of its conceptual relationship to outward 
appearance. 
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the result of this state of affairs may be the opposite: the absence of sincerity or 
intelligence may be very significant.  This is because training individuals to behave in 
accordance with regulations runs into the problem of habitually applying seeing the 
problem in terms of learned particulars.  On the one hand, habituating officials to 
appear ethical in their actions actually reinforces their subordination to the 
organization because it is the organization that itself provides the ethics.  On the other 
hand, it fails to equip officials for the application of general principles to the 
particular cases that cannot be comprehended in advance by kinds of general rules as 
articulated in formal codes of ethics, regulations, and the like.  This is the distinction 
that Ricks makes between education and training, where the latter prepares 
individuals only for specific problems, but the former provides the necessary mental 
equipment to think about the application of abstract principles to cases as they arise.64  
Under the conditions of bureaucracy, habituation is the problem; it certainly is not the 
exercise of judgment. 
Habituation to rules, of course, is a standard method for ensuring ethical 
action in rational-legal bureaucracies.  But what exactly is habituation if not a 
melding of ritual and superstition?  Normally, ritual and superstition have mystical 
connotations, and, therefore, perhaps nothing to do with bureaucracy, particularly of 
the rational-legal type described by Weber.  Yet the repetitive nature of habituation 
aimed at producing some good both for society at large, and particularly for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64His book is in many ways a tale about the bureaucratization of the American 
military following World War II.  T. Ricks, The Generals: American Military 
Command from World War II to Today, New York, 2012.  On the training education 
distinction, see Ch. 23. 
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bureaucratic group itself, does suggest a kind of ritual performance.65  Every year, 
thousands of officials in the US government fill out forms detailing their finances.  
This is an ethical duty imposed upon them, but they do it, not in contemplation of the 
ethical principles underlying this act of self-reporting, but under threat of punishment 
for failure to comply.  This procedure is a kind of impersonal ritual that only has the 
potential to take on meaning, beyond reinforcing the official’s relationship to the 
government, if and when these forms are retrieved as part of a process that may 
culminate in punishment.  This fear of potential punishment that lingers and pervades 
is superstition, and that superstition is an important component of bureaucratic 
control.  Here superstition is meant in the utilitarian sense described by Polybius, who 
had argued the benefits of superstition on the grounds that it helped to control Rome’s 
unreasoning mob.66  For him, the ordinary masses were kept in check by this 
salubrious fear.  In a similar fashion, bureaucratic habituation frequently relies on 
fear, a fear of the punishment that is promised to follow for the violation or disregard 
of rules.67  Seen in this way, habituation becomes to thought what the cliché is to 
literature, a stereotyped substitute and, consequently, the antithesis of genuine and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65Cf. M. Gluckman, Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society, New Brunswick, 
2009 [1965], p. 251. Ritual is a slippery term.  Gluckman distinguishes ritual and 
ceremonial, and he might suggest that ceremonial would be more apt here.  But see R. 
Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” Social Forces 18.4 (1940), pp. 560-
8, esp. p. 565, and C. Goodsell, “Administration as Ritual,” Public Administration 
Review, 49.2 (1989), pp. 161-6.  Goodsell rightly observes that a negative aspect of 
ritual is its capacity to render bureaucrats “too docile to authority.” p. 165. 
66Histories, 6.56.6-11 If the modern concept of sovereignty is truly a desacralized 
religious concept, the literal meaning of deisidaimonia becomes all the more 
fortuitous. S van Duffel, “Sovereignty as a Religious Concept,” Monist 90.1 (2007), 
pp. 126-43. 
67Finer, op. cit., pp. 335b and 341b. 
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meaningful ethical practice.   Instead, it is a tool of subordination, a means to 
reinforce the official’s status within an organization. 
While the preceding does not represent a comprehensive tally of all the 
concepts that are important to the present study, they do represent a kind of explicit 
statement about what is understood and meant regarding particularly fundamental 
ideas.  Of course, they will be further developed subsequently within the context of 
the overall argument, which, while composed of many disparate parts, culminates in 
the proposition that individual officials within modern bureaucracies must have space 
to function as independent and thoughtful moral agents.68  At this point, some 
comments regarding the methods and sources will be offered.  It should be admitted 
first that the orientation here is towards the ideal.  Like much political theory, a 
degree of generalization is employed so that the discussion largely takes place at the 
level of abstractions and types even though real experiences of actual people may 
differ.  This approach has its problems and is not satisfying to everyone, but a 
complete devotion to real, particular cases brings its own problems as well.  It is 
important, however, to acknowledge this state of affairs at the outset because it seems 
often that those who are concerned with the real may criticize others who emphasize 
the ideal under the false impression that an assessment of claims about the ideal 
somehow operates under the same criteria of evaluation that would apply to claims 
about the real.69  This is not true.  While the real might be subject to falsification, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68This echoes the concept of jury nullification in American law or civil disobedience 
in political theory.   
69Cesarani’s reaction to Arendt represents a failure or a refusal to read her as an 
idealist: in many respects they are talking past each other.  See fn. 60, supra.  
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ideal operates according to the criteria of persuasion or utility in the sense of having 
explanatory power.  In other words, it is assessed on its merits as satisfying narrative. 
The ideal simplifies where the real finds complexity.  Thus, ideal types only work to 
the extent that they offer some insight or help, but they are not subject to falsification 
in any meaningful sense of the term: general statements about man or society could 
never survive such a standard as the particular always defeats them.  Of course, even 
the empirical approach engages in simplification: the alternative is to acknowledge 
that nothing is truly identical with anything else, which would allow for no 
generalizations at all: the real world, in fact, is excessively complex.  At any rate, this 
is not a science, nor does it pretend to be.70  This approach is eclectic, but primarily 
grounded political theory.  Among the ancients, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero will 
figure prominently.  Polybius, who has not always received his due as a political 
thinker in his own right, will be used for his ideas about superstition.71  Modern and 
contemporary thinking about bureaucracy and officials presents an interesting 
situation because, as empiricism has come into its own, addressing these issues has 
undergone to some extent a division of labor.  Thus, while Machiavelli, Bodin, 
Montesquieu, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Constant, and Mill, for example, address in 
various ways how bureaucracies should function or how officials should behave in 
relation to the sovereign, the more one wishes to engage modern thinkers about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Winner’s comments on criticisms of Ellul argument about la technique echoes this 
point. op. cit., pp. 64-5 
70 A. Gouldner, “Industrial Sociology: Status and Prospects: Discussion,” American 
Sociological Review, 13.4 (1948), pp. 396-400.  
71 Eckstein’s work is a refreshing exposition of Polybius as an international relations 
theorist. A. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, 
Berkeley, 2009. 
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bureaucracy, the more one feels compelled to draw on a range of scholarship that 
includes political theory, comparative politics, public administration, management, 
sociology, law, ethics, or philosophy.  A number of these disciplines have only come 
into being fairly recently.   This means that using modern scholarship to think about 
bureaucracy invites a kind of eclecticism that would not have existed with earlier 
thinkers.  In the present case, then, modern scholarship that helps to advance or 
illustrate the argument is used whatever its formal discipline.  For example, J. Wilson 
is a professor of management;72 Tilly, of comparative politics;73 MacIntyre, of 
philosophy;74 Gouldner, of sociology.  They all contribute to the issues raised here.  
Moreover, although this is not a history of bureaucracy, history plays a subordinate 
role, serving to illustrate issues in concrete terms where appropriate, particularly 
when providing context for the ancient world.  Thus, while the orientation is towards 
political theory, the infrastructure is more diverse.  
The argument itself unfolds as follows.  Chapter 2 focuses on the Greek 
thought about officials and their duties, particularly in light of conditions in Classical 
Athens.  Chapter 3 engages in he same exercise, but from the perspective of Classical 
Rome.  Several claims will be made.  First, classical political thought does not 
specifically conceive of a bureaucracy, but does address the role of magistrates, who, 
in many ways, were government’s senior officials.  It is taken for granted these 
generally are social elites, although it must be acknowledged that this is not an 
absolute rule, especially at Athens where the democracy left posts open to all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72J. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New 
York, 1991. 
73 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, New York, 1992 
74 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, 2003 [1981]. 
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citizens.75  These citizens are the political actors of the ancient world, and their 
subordinates do not much enter into discussions about how, for example, political 
policy ought to be carried out in deontological terms.  These are individuals who bear 
responsibility and are seen as moral actors within government.  The reason for this, 
and this is the second claim, is because those who were subordinate to these 
magistrates were frequently conceived as either free dependents or slaves outright.  
And, when the state employed staff directly, they were frequently public slaves. 
History, of course, records significant exceptions to this claim. Many officials of the 
Roman empire, for example, were not slaves.  But, at least in theory, imperial 
officials were subordinate to the sovereign or dominus as the source and arbiter of 
policy, as their master.  Whether or not individuals in actual practice were faithful is 
immaterial just as practice in a variety of domains is not always consonant with 
theory.  After all, the ability of the sovereign to monitor the fidelity of distant officials 
was seriously hampered by the level of technology: in practice, such officials would 
have enjoyed great discretion.  At any rate, the point to bear in mind is that the focus 
on magistrates takes for granted servants, an assumption that has carried over into 
later conceptions of bureaucracy despite the fact that in the modern period those 
servants have, in fact, become full citizens themselves, each sharing in the 
sovereignty once enjoyed exclusively by monarchs.  Finally, the third claim is that 
man’s condition as the member of a community bears directly on the ancient concept 
of ethics.  Ethical duty is substantiated by the social condition of reciprocity.  What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75Athens and Rome are quite distinct from each other, yet there is a continuity to 
ancient political theory that allows one to synthesize the Greek and Roman worlds in 
this context. 
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one owes and what one deserves turns on one’s social standing and his horizontal and 
vertical relations.  In a world where an official could turn to clients, or slaves, or 
friends for the execution of his duties, the relative status of the individuals involved 
would have a bearing on their reliability. 
 Chapter 4 examines bureaucracy and officials in modern and contemporary 
thought.  The central theme here is the formal importance of sovereignty to 
conceptions of bureaucratic subordination and the resulting attenuation of official 
discretion.  This is most simply expressed in Weber’s ideal formulation of the 
rational-legal bureaucracy, which calls for the official to do the bidding of the 
superior, but the problem of how to get magistrates to act for the community surfaces 
as early as Machiavelli.  It is, however, with Bodin that a full statement of 
sovereignty and its implications for the administration finds expression. Sovereignty, 
whether of the one, the few, or the mass, is developed as an expression of power 
outside of law to which officials are subordinate.  Officialdom, which is sometimes 
socially, sometimes legally subordinate, becomes something other than the citizen 
body.  Once the people as nation supplanted the monarch, the tradition simply 
supported the people’s authority: Rousseau pointed the way towards an even more 
exactly control of the people’s government, but Saint-Just, who saw that there was a 
contradiction between the nature of the citizen and the nature of the subordinate 
official, argued that bureaucrats were apart from the polity and in need of control 
through law and institutions.76  Furthermore, this is a period that witnesses a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Perhaps the idea of ressentiment explored by Nietzsche is at work in this 
movement. K. Ansell-Pearson, ed., On the Genealogy of Morality, CTHPT, 
Cambridge, 2004 [1994] 
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transition from the social to the legal as a means of control of the administration.  
Whereas for Machiavelli officials are subordinate in social terms to the prince, who 
selects them as dependents, modern thinkers sees this subordination as a consequence 
of institutional arrangement and law.  This represents an abstraction and reification in 
legal terms of formerly social subordination.  But where law and institutions only 
provide part of the key to bureaucracy’s subordination, the idea that administration 
itself concerns the impersonal discovery and tallying of facts suggest that the ideal 
official is a kind of scientist, merely giving expression to the public will in the context 
of objective reality.  Discretion transforms into impartial rationality and loses its 
dangerous aspect.  But this very aspect, the disparity of knowledge between sovereign 
and servant and the development of corporate interest (Rousseau’s volunté de corps) 
potentially at odds with that of the polity remains a problem for a democratic regime.  
This is all the more threatening wherever the sovereign’s capacity to exercise 
oversight, that is, control over the bureaucracy, diminishes.  A bureaucratic other, 
separate from society and inadequately subject to the sovereign’s will, which is the 
basis for the legal-rational ideal, raises serious problems for the society it ostensibly 
serves.  And here official discretion can help. 
Chapter 5 argues for the positive role of discretion, informed by an official’s 
private morality.  This represents a devolution of the classical ideas about moral 
agency among the elite down to the low ranking individuals who today constitute the 
staffs.  Political theory about the polis, res publica, or reppublica, was only 
concerned with leaders, not lowly individuals tasked with carrying out their decisions.  
Yet, in the modern era, all are citizens: morally and politically equal.  This suggests 
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that officials, particularly in a democracy, must be seen in the same way as 
magistrates.  Chapter 5 also engages the traditional thinking about magisterial dissent 
on the basis higher law as articulated by 16th century protestant theorists, who went as 
far as to argue that magistrates by virtue of their public role were bound to act on 
behalf of their communities.  Moving beyond those arguments, the present study 
foregrounds the role of officials as citizens, not as impersonal others within society, 
by arguing that they do not cease to become citizens simply by assuming a particular 
role within governmental hierarchy.  The independence advocated here also serves as 
a positive, internal check on the public will, which, if conceived strictly as the 
sovereign, can lead to tyrannical policies, particularly in a mass society.  Whereas 
Rousseau saw this as a corporate activity, the argument here is that individuals 
themselves are in the position to know and to act. There is room for abuse, and one 
can easily object that this opens the door for rampant corruption or, as Bodin 
suggested, chaos and anarchy.  Possibly.  But it is important to examine the slippery 
nature of corruption, and the way that it draws meaning from communal values.  
Corruption is what a given polity makes of it, not an objective reality.  What is useful 
for this analysis is the ways that corruption reflects the social connection or social 
embeddedness of officials, and here an important distinction is made with 
kleptocracy, which represents a crucial shift of duty away from communities and 
towards the self.77  This latter phenomenon proves to be more serious in terms of 
ethical conduct because it represents a denial of reciprocity that lies at the heart of 
true ethics.  But there is no conception of discretion that eliminates risk.  Saint-Just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 A concept borrowed from K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, 2001. 
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saw this problem and conceived of a machinelike structure of laws to address it.  Yet 
there is a limit to rules, and if the official is the living law as he goes about his 
business, he must have the discretion to fit generals to particulars and to decide, in the 
first place, whether or not a given act is the right thing to do.  This is what the citizen-
official does.  In a sense, the tension between Chs. 4 and 5 represents a 
reconsideration of the famous debate between C. Friedrich and H. Finer about official 
responsibility.78  On the one hand, Friedrich felt that professional ethos would serve 
as a check on discretion; on the other hand, Finer argued that the bureaucrat must be 
answerable to an authority outside himself.  An internal sense was insufficient.  
Where this study differs in its consideration of this problem is in resuscitating a 
tradition in political theory that has been displaced by absolutist ideas about 
sovereignty.  Citizen-magistrates are particularly well placed to counter negative 
tendencies within bureaucracy, should they choose to.  Ironically, although he was 
not a theorist of democracy, Rousseau saw this as well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78C. Friedrich, “Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,” 
Public Policy 1 (1940), pp. 3-24; H. Finer, “Administrative Responsibility in 




Bureaucracy in the Polis, Real and Imagined 
 
Traditionally, bureaucracy is not a philosophical concern.  More precisely, 
much Western political theory has tended to think indirectly, latently, haphazardly, or 
inadvertently about how the state is organized for the implementation of policy.  
Greek and Roman theorists, such as Plato, Aristotle, or Cicero, for example, although 
they were interested in law and institutional arrangements, did not directly address the 
way a government is staffed and made to function for the delivery of services, 
however limited those services may have been in the ancient world.   In short, they 
did not anticipate public administration.  Thus, while they do think about institutions 
and magistracies, and, it could be argued, even write about office as an abstract 
position independent of the office holder, they do not generally acknowledge the 
existence and role of subordinate staffs, tasked with carrying out the instructions of 
citizens office-holders.  To some extent this is understandable: the decisions and acts 
of magistrates – men of their own social milieu – mattered to them; how the 
underlings, be they slaves or mere social inferiors, would have done their bidding, 
was something assumed and natural.  Moreover, what underlings did was act on the 
decisions of superiors who wielded real power.  In addition, their theories – it is a 
common place to say so – recapitulated their own social outlook, which took for 
granted a society animated by dependency among unequals, reciprocity among 
equals.  This does, however, not mean that the ancients have nothing to say about 
bureaucracy.  Indeed, ancient political theory has significant implications about 
bureaucracy, whether that of the polis or the republic.  In brief, when speaking of 
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Greek and Roman political theory, agency and duty are conceptualized at the level of 
the magistrate, the political actor, who for the execution of his will could turn either 
to his social network of peers or to his subordinates whose labor he owned or rented.  
This is key for understanding the implications of the classical view for bureaucratic 
theory because the idea of staffs as subordinates bound to serve the responsible 
master persists to the modern period.  It is worth acknowledging too that modern 
theory has long labored under the idea of the simple polis or respublica.79  At any 
rate, the point is that moral agency within a regime is traditionally seen in terms of 
the citizen as magistrate or office-holder, not the staffs engaged in the drudgery of 
quotidian governmental activity, not that such staffs did not exist. 
Ancient states of any size often relied upon officials to carry out the 
government’s administrative tasks.  The Athens of Plato and Aristotle, for example, 
despite being undeveloped by modern stands, nevertheless, would have provided 
them with examples of state-owned slaves carrying out the state’s will; furthermore, 
they would also have been aware of other, imperial states with more developed 
administrations such as Egypt.  Yet Greek and Roman political theory generally tends 
to take little notice of these foreign administrations and what implications they might 
have for theorizing about the nature of the state, even an ideal one. The traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79On the reception of the democracy, see A. Saxonhouse, “Athenian Democracy: 
Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists,” Political Science and Politics 26.3 (Sep. 
1993), pp. 486-90; D. Held, Models of Democracy, Stanford, 1996, pp. 33-4.  On the 
republic, see F. Millar, The Roman Republic in Political Thought, Hanover 2002.  
Millar’s project is to examine the reception of the republic by political thinkers in 
view of the republic as it was.  A. Ryan rightly observes that much of the language of 
modern political thinking uses ancient words for modern ideas to which they may 
bear little resemblance.  On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus 
to the Present, New York, 2012, v. 1, p. xxiii. 
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focus on the conceptually small polis and res publica makes all the difference: these 
are constructs envisioning office-holding, free citizens with the mechanics of how 
records are to be kept, taxes collected, and streets kept clean left behind, so to speak, 
a veil of ignorance.  But to some extent this is the point: the writers were not 
concerned with staffs who would simply do whatever magistrates or the consultative 
bodies decided: their subservience was taken for granted because that is, in fact, what 
they observed in their own communities. 
Before turning to Athens, it should be acknowledged that there were other 
traditions in the ancient world regarding the behavior of bureaucrats and holders of 
high office.  Both Egyptian and Mesopotamian literature offer examples that, if not 
explicating systematic political theory, are clear in expressing ideas about the proper 
behavior of government officials.  Weber conceded that in Ancient Egypt there was 
perhaps a level of systematic organization that could in his sense be called 
bureaucracy.  The historical record itself, even if we lack a complete understanding of 
the Egyptian bureaucracy’s numerous offices, makes it clear that functionaries 
abounded.80  Critically, the Egyptians were not insensitive to the fact that holding 
office gave one opportunities to abuse power and build personal influence.  Not only 
is there a body of literature enjoining the kings to behave as benevolent and upright 
rulers, but there is also the famous inscription from the tomb of the vizier, Rekhmire, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80This is a simplification: there are significant differences between, for example, the 
Old and New Kingdoms, not to mention other periods.  For an overview of Egyptian 
officialdom in the Middle Kingdom, see W. Grajetzki, Court Officials of the Egyptian 
Middle Kingdom, London, 2009.  It must be admitted there that numerous titles refer 
to various offices, the function of which is poorly understood, if at all. op. cit., p. 4.  
S. Finer, The History of Government: Ancient Monarchies and Empires, Oxford, 
1997, v. 1, pp. 156-60. 
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which warns the incumbent against a variety of abuses, including making “of anyone 
a client.”81  The situation in Mesopotamia is similar.  For, despite the difficulties 
associated with the translation and determination of specific functions, it is clear that 
the states, at times, possessed extensive bureaucracies.82  And there too may be found 
a tradition of the king’s right behavior towards subjects.  For example, the Advice to a 
Prince, admittedly a late document, admonishes the king to respect “due process” in 
order to avoid popular discontent.83  These few comments serve merely to suggest 
that other traditions existed within the context of ancient bureaucratic societies 
regarding the proper exercise of official power.  To be sure, they do not necessarily 
represent part of a larger, systematic political theory, nor do they have any direct role 
in the development of the political theory to be treated here, but they do serve to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81For an example of injunctions for the king’s behavior, see the Instruction of King 
Amenemhet I for his Son Sesostris I in M. Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, 
Berkeley, 1975, v. 1, pp. 135-9; for the inscription of Rekhmire and commentary, see 
R. Faulkner, “The Installation of the Vizier,” Journal of Egyptian Archeology 41 
(Dec., 1955), pp. 18-29, with comment at p. 23, and an excerpt of the inscription in 
Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Berkeley, 1976, v. 2, pp. 21-4.  A complete 
translation of this and additional inscriptions of Rekhmire’s tomb is provided in J. 
Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, Urbana, 2001 [1906], v. 2, p. 266ff.  The word, 
mrw, rendered in Lichtheim as “client,” is rendered in Breasted as “brethren.”  In his 
grammar, A. Gardiner translates as “friends” and “partisans.” Egyptian Grammar, 
Oxford, 1964 [1927], p. 491 (N36).  Faulker’s dictionary adds “servants, underlings” 
and “supporters.”  A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, Oxford, 1981 [1962], p. 
111.  Finally, R. Hannig’s dictionary provides the more general, “die Gehörige,” with 
the additional explanation: “die auf Verwaltungsbefehl zu staatlichen Arbeiten 
eingezogen werden können.”  Großes Handwörterbuch Ägyptisch-Deutsch, Mainz, 
1995, p. 345b.  All of this suggests that it is unclear whether or not mrw should be 
rendered here as “client”  “Dependent” might be the more conservative alternative. 
82See, for example, J. Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, London, 1994, p. 153.  On the 
Assyrian empire, see Finer, op. cit., pp. 224-32. 
83Foster suggests that the purpose of this text is uncertain, but the advice itself seems 
clear enough.  For the text, see B. Foster, Before the Muses, Bethesda, 1996, v. 2, 
745-7.  One need not follow J. Keane’s enthusiasm in finding here some 
Mesopotamian antecedent of democratic sentiment. The Life and Death of 
Democracy, New York, 2009, p. 119.  
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acknowledge the existence other ancient traditions.  Interestingly, they also parallel 
the Greco-Roman tradition in that whatever thought they devoted to office-holders, 
they did not think much about the petty underlings whose duty consisted in carrying 
out the master’s instructions.  
In Greece, the Classical Athenian democracy functioned through magistracies 
held by citizens themselves as amateurs.  Obviously, neither the democratic 
institutions nor the magistrates were up to the task of running Athens by themselves.  
Consequently, Athens did have, for lack of a better term, an administration that grew 
in response to the civic communities needs.  The government itself consisted of more 
than 400 offices filled annually by citizens, and those positions not held by citizens 
were sometimes staffed by state-owned slaves, or demosioi, who served as, among 
other things, file clerks and sergeants-at-arms.84  The later Roman empire, by way of 
contrast, possessed an extensive administration, and it was staffed by slaves, 
freedmen, and men who, like John Lydus, hoped to make their way through the ranks 
of government and on to a comfortable retirement.85 These cursory observations 
highlight the backdrop of growth in formal and informal administration against which 
political theory continued to be written as though the polis, or, later, the res publica 
were a constant.  Put differently, the practicalities of administration lurked in the 
background, while political thought perpetuated the story of magistracies held by free 
men of quality and rank.  This discontinuity between theory and practice is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84D. Stockton, The Classical Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1990, pp. 111-2; s.v., 
demosioi, H. Cancik and H. Schneider, edd., Brill’s New Pauly,  Leiden, 2004, v. 4, 
p. 291a, and s.v., public administration, v. 11, pp. 478b-9a.  On state-owned slaves, 
see O. Jacob, Les esclaves publics à Athènes, New York, 1979 [1928] 
85A. Bandy, ed., Ioannes Lydus: On Powers or the Magistracies of the Roman State, 
Philadelphia, 1983; C. Kelly, Ruling the Later Roman Empire, Cambridge, 2004. 
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significant.  For it highlights an unremarked divide between those who rule and are 
ruled in turn, to paraphrase Aristotle, and those socially subordinate men, who, as 
dependents and property, were expected to carry out the will of their masters.  These 
preliminaries in mind, it is now possible to turn to a fuller consideration of Plato, 
Aristotle, and the Athens with which they were familiar.   
The general features of the Athenian democracy and how it operated are 
uncontroversial.86  A restricted group of males enjoyed the status of citizens, which 
entitled them to full political participation, including the holding of office.  Thus, 
apart from participation in the assembly (ekklesia), citizens at Athens also stood a 
reasonable chance of serving as juror-judges at trial (dikastes), or on the assembly’s 
executive council (boule), or, in some cases, of taking part in the boule’s rotating 
executive committee (prutaneia).  Of the more than 400 magistracies available, the 
overwhelming majority was filled through a lottery system.  There were a few 
exceptions, such as serving as general (strategos), but it is mostly true that the willing 
citizen was in a position to serve as legislator, executive, judge, or magistrate at any 
given time.  This means that in most respects, and to the dismay of some, such as 
Plato or the so-called Old Oligarch, the democracy was characterized by rank 
amateurism.87  Holding office at Athens was generally a matter of citizenship and 
luck: one had to be a citizen and the lottery bestowed office.  The democracy was 
characterized by the notion of isonomia, or equality of citizens before the law, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86Stockton provides a good overview. 
87Tocqueville might have seen in this a kind of habituation to public life that was 
something more than simple amateurism. 
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isegoria, or the equal rights of citizens to express their views on political matters.88   
In short, these ideas meant that being a citizen per se was what mattered: all citizens, 
being equal before the law and equally entitled to speak freely, were politically 
fungible.  In some domains, there was a concession to actual expertise: for office 
holding, know-how sometimes mattered more than a putative concept of civic 
equality.  Hence, generals were subject to election and able to hold office in 
consecutive years.  Moreover, character mattered: would-be officials were subject to 
the dokimasia, an examination of their eligibility and character, and upon leaving 
office they had to account for their official conduct through a process known as the 
euthuna.89  While these mechanisms might ensure to the political community’s 
satisfaction an incumbent’s suitability to hold office and confirm that he had fulfilled 
his term in a minimally correct fashion, it is important to note that expertise is 
generally not at issue: amateurism was the rule. 
It is important to admit that, although these amateurs performed functions 
carried out today by bureaucrats, they did not themselves constitute a bureaucracy, 
properly speaking.  At any rate, the range of tasks covered by these magistrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88On these concepts, see K. Raflaub, “Democracy, Oligarchy, and the concept of the 
‘Free Citizen’ in Late Fifth-Century Athens,” Political Theory 11.4 (Nov. 1983), pp. 
517-44; C. Rowe and M. Schofield, edd., The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Political Thought, Cambridge, 2005, p. 47.   S. Todd argues that isegoria is a 
collective concept. The Shape of Athenian Law, Oxford, 1993, p. 312; Ober suggests 
that it is individual, meaning that each citizen had the right to speak. It may be too 
much to insist one way or the other, although Ober’s view seems most natural.  J. 
Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, Princeton, 1989, pp. 78-9. 
89Although the dokimasia was supposed to focus on strict eligibility, it often invited 
questions of character.  See D. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, Ithaca, 
1978, pp. 167-9 and (euthuna) pp. 170-2.  Aristotle describes the dokimasia and 
euthuna as he knew them in the 4th century.  See S. Everson, ed., Aristotle: The 
Politics and The Constitution of Athens, CTHPT, Cambridge, 1996 [1984], pp. 252-3 
(55), 247-8 (48), and 251-2 (54). 
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included, for example, conducting naval inventories, maintaining streets, supervising 
police and prisons, and letting public contracts: all domains deemed by modern 
governments to be within the purview of the professionalized bureaucracy.90  If the 
ancient system at Athens leaned in any way towards a measure of professionalism in 
government, it was in those positions that were filled by some 2,000 public slaves 
(demosioi) because these were the individuals who, unlike magistrates, were not 
subject to term limits: in other words, their assured continuity guaranteed a measure 
of useful expertise.91  Slave status in itself did not preclude acquiring skills necessary 
to keeping the wheels of government in motion.  As Stockton points out, “[t]he boule 
could also call on the services of a number of public slaves (demosioi) for various 
tasks requiring some considerable degree of literacy and numeracy….”92 In addition, 
their roles, while supportive of citizen office-holders, surely offered some scope for 
the development of expertise and, perhaps, something approaching professionalism.   
To maintain security, state slaves known as Scythians functioned for roughly 
as century as a kind of police force or sergeant-at-arms.93 In Aristophanes, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90This amateur management of the state’s business was not unique to Athens.  See, 
for example, the law governing the duties of the gymnasiarch at Beroia, whose only 
qualification, judging from the law itself, seems that the incumbent be of a certain 
age.  I. Arnaoutoglou, Ancient Greek Laws, London, 1998, pp. 117-23 (98).  
91For 2,000 as the number of public slaves, see P. Ismard, “Public Slavery, Politics 
and Expertise in Classical Athens.” Center for Hellenic Studies, Research Bulletin 1, 
no. 2 (2013). Finer suggests “merely a few slaves,” but this appears to be incorrect.  
op. cit., p. 345.  His acknowledgement of the “hyperetes, freedmen or slaves, who 
manned the offices as clerks, secretaries, or archivists” speaks to more than “a few.” 
p. 349.  On the number of police alone, see Jacob, op. cit., p. 64-73. 
92op. cit., p. 94.  Cf. Jacob’s comments, op. cit., pp. 185-6. 
93See, for example, discussion of sources in S. Olson, ed., Aristophanes: Acharnians, 
Oxford, 2002, p. 87.  According to Andocides 3.5, they were initially purchased in the 
5th century.  M. Gargarin and D. MacDowell, Antiphon & Andocides, The Oratory of 
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example, they are called upon to arrest Lysistrata and her companions who had seized 
the acropolis.94  In the Knights, they are drag an exasperated and sputtering Cleon 
from the Assembly during debate.95  In both cases, they are state agents commanded 
to lay hands upon Athenian citizens, a point to which Lysistrata objects when she 
threatens, “if he so much as touches me, I’ll teach him to know his place!”96  In the 
realm of city maintenance, the astunomoi, officials whose tasks included keeping the 
city’s public areas clean and ensuring that buildings did not have overhangs in the 
street, relied upon the assistance of publicly-owned slaves to remove the corpses of 
people abandoned in the street.97  Slaves were also used for the physical toil of 
repairing roads, no doubt, under the supervision of the hodopoioi.98 In the courts, 
slaves played a mechanical role during the selection of judges.99   Having non-citizens 
carry out the physical arrest of persons might have relieved some of the tensions that 
might otherwise have arisen from citizens laying hands on each other, and using 
slaves to clean up the dead helps to distance citizens from ritual contamination; in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Classical Greece, v. 1, Austin, 1998, p. 150; Todd, op. cit., p. 79; Jacob, op. cit., ch. 
2. 
94Lysistrata l. 433ff. A. Sommerstein, trans., Aristophanes: Lysistrata, The 
Acharnians, The Clouds, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 197. 
95Knights l. 665.  D. Barrett and A. Sommerstein, Aristophanes: The Knights, Peace, 
The Birds, The Assemblywomen, Wealth, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1978, 
p. 61. 
96Lysistrata, ll. 435-6 (ibid.)  Note the emphatic placement in Greek of the words 
indicating that he is a state slave (demosios on), rightly pointed out by Henderson.  J. 
Henderson, Aristophanes: Lysistrata, Oxford, 1990 [1987], p. 124 (ad loc. 435-6) For 
the benefits of using slaves in this context, see Todd, op. cit., p. 192.  
97Aristotle, op. cit., p. 249 (50.2)  Perhaps using slaves for this function relates to the 
pollution that comes from contact with the dead.  On the dead and pollution, see, R. 
Parker, Miasma, Oxford, 1996 [1983], pp. 33-42. 
98Aristotle, op. cit., p. 251 (54.1). Cf. Politics, p. 46 (2.7 [1267b16-9]) 
99Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 259-61 (63.5; 64.1; 65.1; 65.4).  The word rendered as 
“servant” is huperetes. 
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courts, perhaps, it was their status as slaves that reinforced an atmosphere impartiality 
in the process.  Slaves also served as public heralds as, for example, in the famous 
Athenian tribute assessment where they summoned members of the prutaneia before 
the boule for judgment.100  Athens also used slaves to serve as coin-testers 
(dokimastes) to guarantee the soundness of the Athenian silver coinage.101  Anyone 
refusing the slave’s judgment as to a tested coin’s validity was subject to prosecution.  
But, as mentioned earlier, the slaves were employed not only for their physical 
capacities, but also for tasks that would have required greater intellectual training.  
Thus, a slave was used by the boule to keep track of accounts and maintain the list of 
debtors.102  At any rate, the foregoing is not a comprehensive catalogue of positions 
held by state-owned slaves, but a brief overview to illustrate the range of tasks 
fulfilled by slaves to keep the machinery of government in motion.103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, edd., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 
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Histories, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1996 [1954], p. 364 (6.121) 
101R. Stroud, “An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage,” Hesperia 43 (1974), pp. 157-88.   
102Aristotle, op. cit., p. 247, (47.5-48.1).  Identified as “state secretary” in the 
translation, the word in Greek is demosios.  The adjective, demosios, is ambiguous.  It 
frequently is used to denote state-owned slaves, but it can also mean simply, “of the 
demos,” and it can be applied to officials who are not slaves.  The standard Greek 
dictionary, for example, offers Demosthenes 19.129 as an example of “public 
notary.” H. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1983 [1843], s.v., 
demosios, II.a.  Similarly, the word huperetes, which means an assistant, is frequently 
used to designate state-owned slaves, but sometimes only designates a helper.  See, 
for example, Plato’s Statesman 289c where slaves (douloi) and assistants (huperetai) 
clearly represent two distinct, but similar, categories.  J. Annas and R. Waterfield, 
edd., Plato: Statesman, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2005 [1995], p. 51 
103It is possible that some of these slaves enjoyed an actual status somewhat above 
that of the household slave’s.  The evidence, however, is ambiguous, as Todd points 
out, when he considers the possibility that Pitallakos might have been roughly on par 
with a resident alien (metic). op. cit., p. 192-4; discussed by Jacob, op. cit., 147-50.  
In this regard, it is worth recalling that manumitted slaves became metics.  R. Sealey, 
The Justice of the Greeks, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 65.  On the other hand, it is also worth 
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While slaves were available to help with the execution of state functions, 
citizens holding office had others to whom they could turn as they carried out their 
duties.  Those who might help them could be friends or dependents.  In this context, 
“friend” refers specifically to a horizontal relationship, i.e., someone who is more or 
less a social peer.  “Dependent” means not just dependency in a strict sense, but 
someone who was a social inferior, obligated socially to aid his superior, that is, a 
client.104  The impact of patronage at Athens during the period of the democracy is 
debated.  In part, this is a problem of vocabulary.  Because the words themselves, 
patron and client, come from the Roman context, patronus and cliens, and Rome had 
a formal system of clientage, it might be objected that these words, referring to a 
specific Roman institution, cannot per se be employed elsewhere.105  At Athens, the 
fact that there was no word exactly corresponding to cliens or patronus can be and 
has been used to argue that these relationships, in fact, did not exist.106  That Roman-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recalling the contempt to which they, or even their free children were subject, and the 
fact that even the coin-testers could be subject to the lash.  For lingering contempt, 
see, for example, Lysias 30.5 (Against Nicomachus), Todd, trans., Lysias, Oratory of 
Classical Greece, v. 2, Austin, 2000, p. 300.   
104It is important not to understand the idea of “obligation” as some kind of rigid, iron 
law.  Whether anyone does what he is supposed to do is always a matter of his own 
decision, and, obviously, people do not always follow the rules.  Thus a client, though 
a client, may still not be completely reliable.  Men are not machines. 
105For this reason, the words, patronus and cliens, will be used specifically in 
reference to the Roman institution.  The modern terms, patron and client, will be used 
in a more general sense, to describe asymmetrical relationships characterized by 
exchange. 
106 Plutarch, writing some five centuries after the Peloponnesian War, offers 
prostates, “protector,” for patronus in Marius (5), but it is not truly exact because 
patronus and cliens form a long established dyad in Roman culture.  Prostates, in 
fact, does not stand in the same position within Greek culture, as patronus does in 
Roman, particularly during the classical period.  R. Warner, Plutarch: Fall of the 
Roman Republic, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1983 [1958], p. 17.  
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styled patroni and clientes were not at Athens is certainly true.107  This does not 
mean, however, that the asymmetrical relationships characterized by exchange and 
identified by sociologists and anthropologists as patron-client relationships did not 
exist.  Indeed, as Finley rightly observes, “[t]o insist on restricting the terminology 
(and therefore the institution) to the peculiar Roman type is…unwarranted and 
stultifying....”108  Thus, patron-client relationships along the lines articulated above, 
namely, as sociological categories, may be used to illuminate ancient culture: in other 
words, one may reasonably focus on reciprocity “between unequals, involving not 
only a subjective element, the ‘evaluation of the relationship’ by the client, but also 
the objective one of a genuine exchange of goods or services.”109  This concept 
echoes Blok’s definition, in which he proposes a general typology of patron-client 
relationships.110  It is important to note that Blok draws attention to the impact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107The metic is a special case because he had to have a citizen sponsor (prostates).  
This relationship certainly could give rise to reciprocal obligations in which the 
citizen was the superior. 
108 M. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, Cambridge, 2002 [1983], p. 41.  
Sherwin-White exhibits a kind of willful obtuseness when he complains, “…the 
author (sc., R. Saller) regularly applies the terminology of clients and patrons to the 
whole range of senatorial society, where it is technically inadmissable.” (emphasis 
added)  This ought to lead to the question: “well, what is technical standard exactly?”  
If one is to use the standard of Roman law, that is one thing.   But it amounts to 
saying that Romans were only like Romans, and that there is no basis of comparison 
with any other culture, which is unhelpful and uninteresting, to say the least.  If, 
however, the objection is about the application of sociological terms to Romans, that 
is something quite different: in fact, Roman culture may, “technically” speaking, be 
subjected to sociological analysis just as much as any other culture. A. Sherwin-
White, “Patronage under the Principate: Personal Patronage under the Early Empire 
by Robert P. Saller,” Classical Review 33.2 (1983), pp. 271-3 quotation at p. 272.  
Saller’s “Patronage and friendship in early Imperial Rome: drawing the distinction,” 
printed in A. Wallace-Hadrill, Patronage in Ancient Society, London, 1989, pp. 49-
62, takes up the issue of technicalities.   
109Finley, ibid. 
110A. Blok, “Variations in Patronage,” Sociologische Gids 16 (1969), pp. 365-78 
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“social roles” also have on these relationships.  Specifically, the social context itself, 
according to him, will determine whether a person may serve as a patron in one 
context, or a client in another.111  Being sensitive to this dimension helps to avoid a 
counterproductive and rigid view that see patrons always as patrons, or clients only as 
clients, let alone the more “stultifying” approach of believing that one must be called 
a client to be a client: these are in many ways straw-man arguments.  Sociologically 
speaking, a patron to one person may be the client of another.  In addition, it is 
particularly noteworthy that Blok identifies “friendship” as one of the forms of 
patronage.112  Similar to “brokerage,” which may fit well in some ancient cases 
because it is marked by mediation between rural and urban communities, 
“friendship,” as he describes it, represents a category where patrons are not confined 
to a specific category, e.g., patroni, nor are they characterized by a stable clientele as 
might be the case with “brokerage.”  Being flexible, this fits nicely those ancient 
cases where friends seem to be very much in the position of a client, even if they are 
not explicitly categorized that way by the sources.113  The perspective adopted here, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111Blok, op. cit., p. 366 
112Cf. E. Wolf’s category, “instrumental friendship,” where “…each member of the 
dyad acts as a potential connecting link to other persons outside the dyad.  Each 
person is a sponsor for the other.” “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations 
in Complex Societies,” in S. Schmidt, et al., edd., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A 
Reader in Political Clientalism, Berkeley, 1977, pp. 167-77, quotation at p. 172b. 
113 Wolf’s observation is relevant: “…what may start out as a symmetrical reciprocal 
relationship between equal parties may, in the course of reciprocal services, develop 
into a relation in which one of the parties…develops a position of strength, the other a 
position of weakness.  The charge of affect which retains the character of balanced 
reciprocity between equals may be seen as a device to ensure the continuity of the 
relationship in the face of possible ensuing imbalance.” op. cit., p. 173a.  Wolf sees 
patron-client relations as a point where instrumental friendships reach an extreme or 
maximum. op. cit., p. 174b.  Gallego rightly points out that in classical Athens, 
referring to one’s clients as friends (philoi) would serve to avoid the situation where 
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then, is that these arrangements did exist in classical Athens.  To argue otherwise, 
which seems typical of some classicists, is to suggest that somehow Athens stood 
uniquely apart from all other societies where such phenomena seem to be a given, or 
to put it differently, a kind of sentimental special pleading. 
To be sure, the existence and force of patronage systems during the Athenian 
classical democracy is controversial.114  Some have argued that the pressure exerted 
by democratic ideology was such that the power of the wealthy, which formerly 
existed via these networks, was eclipsed and became less relevant.115  Others find 
patronage in a recasting of terms that see traditional relationships reinterpreted within 
the context of this “radical democracy,” the old wine of patronage in new democratic 
bottles.116  The resolution of this debate ultimately turns, if one is honest, on what one 
finds most plausible because the evidence neither speaks for itself nor is it 
unambiguous.  Those who seek to emphasize democracy’s impact on traditional 
patron-client relationships, simply find more plausible the idea that democracy so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“any mention of social subordination could be an indiscrete admission of the 
superiority of some, and of the inferiority of others….”  J. Gallego, “El Patronazgo 
rural en la democracía ateniense,” Studia Historica: Historia Antigua, 27 (2009), pp. 
163-75, quotation at pp. 168-9.  In this connection, it is worth pointing out that no 
matter one’s social status, every man in a shame culture wishes to save face.  This 
aspect is so often ignored or forgotten among those who might suggest that to be a 
client, it should always be expressed. 
114A useful survey of the arguments can be found in D. Placido and C. Fornis, 
“Evergetismo y relaciones clientarles en la sociedad anteniense del siglo IV a.C.,” 
Dialogues d’histoire ancienne (37.2) 2011, pp. 19-47 
115P. Millett’s article is frequently cited in this debate. “Patronage and its avoidance in 
classical Athens,” in Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., pp. 15-47 
116See Gallego, op. cit. 
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transformed society that patronage lost its political significance.117  But it is hard to 
picture either that democracy succeeded in completely effacing such relationships, 
particularly in a pre-industrial society, or that the Athenian project was uniquely able 
to render such relationships politically insignificant.118  The communists, who had far 
more resources at their disposal, could only dream of so complete a transformation: in 
other words, it begs credulity.  Consider, for example, the story of Cimon: here is a 
politician from the last third of the fifth century BC, frequently cited as an example of 
a politician investing personal resources in patronage for political gain. Aristotle says: 
Cimon possessed a kingly fortune, and not merely performed his 
public liturgies magnificently but also maintained many of the 
members of his deme, for any member of the deme of Laciadae 
who wished could come to him every day and receive adequate 
maintenance, and all of his estates were unfenced so that anyone 
who wished could help himself to the fruit.119 
 
The implications of this story can be interpreted as mere largesse, the kind of 
indiscriminate giving that yields no specific bond between any individual recipient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117Millett’s conclusion that patronage was “vestigial and peripheral” and “a minor 
social phenomenon, with minimal political economic implications” does not follow 
from the evidence he cites. op. cit., p. 36 
118As Finley observes, “…the Graeco-Roman world would have been unique in 
history if personal patronage…were not consciously deployed in support of the power 
structure.” op. cit, p. 45.  “Unique” indeed.   
119op. cit., p. 231 (27.3).  Plutarch writes, “Cimon’s generosity was on a scale that 
surpassed even the traditional hospitality and benevolence of the Athenians….  
Cimon turned his home into a place of public resort (prutaneion koinon) for his 
fellow citizens, while on his country estates he allowed even foreigners to take the 
pick of the ripe fruit and to enjoy the best of whatever was in season.” Cimon 10.6-7, 
in I. Scott-Kilvert, Plutarch: The Rise and Fall of Athens, Penguin Classics, 
Harmondsworth, 1970 [1964], p. 152.  At Pericles 9.2 Plutarch puts it this way: 
“[Pericles] could not compete with the wealth or the property by means of which 
Cimon captured the affections of the poor; for the latter supplied a free dinner every 
day to any Athenian who needed it, provided clothes for the old, and took down the 
fences on his estates so that anyone who wish could pick the fruit.” Scott-Kilvert, op. 
cit., p. 174.  Plutarch’s sources are Aristotle himself and Theopompus. 
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and the giver, or as a case of the actual building and reinforcing of the kinds of 
reciprocal bonds between patron and client whereby clients were later expected to 
support their benefactor, or, perhaps, more reasonably, as something in between, 
meaning a case where Cimon would know some of those to whom he had been 
generous, while others he would not know.  In any case, it is as hard to see Cimon’s 
generosity arising solely from altruism as it is to imagine that many who took 
advantage of this generosity were unaware of its source and the social debt incurred.  
After all, trespassing and uninvited gathering of fruit could give rise to a lawsuit, and 
likely would among the litigious Athenians: anyone would have known this much, 
particularly in a social world where everyone monitored everyone else.  While Cimon 
might not know specifically which fellow demesmen were benefiting from his 
plantations – perhaps this is merely largesse – it is hard to imagine that the face-to-
face interaction implicit in the report that his fellow demesmen came to him for 
assistance would not cement in the minds of both some kind of relationship.  The 
person who came to Cimon personally for assistance, necessarily felt some obligation 
upon acceptance.120  And Cimon surely expected as much, particularly if the aid 
given, as might have been the case with the destitute, was regular.  To rule out the 
idea that he might expect the recipient to express his gratitude in political terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120As Socrates argues, the failure to show gratitude would be tantamount to being 
unjust. Memorabilia, 2.2.1-2 = E. Marchant, trans., Xenophon: Memorabilia and 
Oeconomicus, v. 4, LCL 168, Cambridge, 1965 [1923], pp. 102-5  Ober concludes 
that the Athenian notion of kharis, or gratitude, animates patronage in Athens in a 
way that is similar, albeit not identical, to the Roman system.  “In classical Athens, 
the interaction between giver and recipient never developed into a formal system of 
patronage on the Roman model, but the Athenian relationship based on charis was 
overt nonetheless.”  op. cit., pp. 228-9.  Well, who knows, but surely favors entailed 
social debts.  To argue otherwise demands evidence that is not forthcoming. 
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seems a matter of special pleading and, to put it bluntly, incredible.121  Indeed, 
Plutarch’s discussion of Cimon’s generosity loses its forces precisely if it is seen as 
somehow non-political in nature.  In other words, Cimon’s political base derived, in 
part, from these acts of generosity, and Pericles, who could not match it, had to rely 
upon other means, i.e., largesse with public monies.122  And this is precisely the 
reason, according to Aristotle, that Pericles introduced a stipend for those serving on 
the courts.  In other words, Plutarch, and Aristotle, for that matter, sees this anecdote 
as a case of Pericles using public funds to counter the personal influence Cimon 
obtained through such acts of kindness.  Moreover, if there was anything striking 
about Cimon, it was the scale of practice rather than the practice itself.  Xenophon, 
for example, provides an even more explicit example of how these asymmetrical 
exchanges operated when he describes how Arkhidemos became associated with 
Krito.123 
Xenophon describes how Krito was feeling besieged by sycophants, who, 
stereotypically, would drag decent men into court in the hope that the latter would 
pay to avoid further legal trouble.  Reminding Krito that he had dogs to keep his 
flocks safe from wolves, Socrates advises him to find some men who would be 
willing and able to serve a similar function with respect to the sycophants.  “[T]here 
are,” Socrates assures him, “men of this sort here who would be very honored to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121Connor is surely right in suggesting that this generosity was converted into political 
support. W. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens, Princeton, 1971, 
p. 20. 
122Connor, ibid. 
123Memorabilia 2.9 = Marchant, op. cit., pp. 108-9 
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profit by your friendship.”124  Accordingly, he and Krito identified the “poor” 
(penetes) Arkhidemos as a suitable candidate, since he was an effective speaker, 
capable at trial, and, best of all, in need.125  His poverty is explained as being due to 
his unwillingness to sell his services in any odd job.  So, like Cimon, Krito provided 
Arkhidemos oil, wine, grain, and “…whatever other item needed for living grows in 
the field.  Furthermore, he invited Arkhidemos to sacrifices and saw to “all other 
things of this sort.”  Indeed, Arkhidemos came to view Krito’s house as a “refuge” 
and, knowing what was expected in return, eagerly took up the task of defending 
Krito.  Xenophon observes, 
And since Arkhidemos resolved this (sc., a lawsuit) and other such 
matters, it already came about that, just as when a herdsman has a 
good dog, and the other herdsmen want to locate their herds near 
him to benefit from the dog, so too many of Krito’s friends wanted 
him to provide them too with Arkhidemos as a guard.126 
 
To hostile comments that he was merely Krito’s fawning debtor, Arkhidemos retorted 
that there was nothing shameful in repaying good services in kind.  Xenophon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1242.9.3 = Marchant, op. cit., pp. 160-1  In the Phaedrus, Plato makes the point that 
men should help those most in need: “whose gratitude will be proportionate to the 
severity of the hardships (kakon) from which we relieve them.” Furthermore, the 
needy should be invited to private banquets because they too will be most grateful. 
W. Hamilton, trans., Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, Penguin Classics, 
Harmondsworth, p. 30 (233d-e)  For the dog metaphor, cf. G. Ferrari, ed., Plato: The 
Republic, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2004 [2000], p. 109 (416a) 
125Plato notes that one should be generous, not to the excessively needy, but to those 
“capable of returning the favor (kharis).” ibid. Xenophon’s Socrates notes that this 
kind of relationship is not a form as slavery, as Eutheros, reduced to menial jobs by 
penury, initially believes (2.8.4), but actually beneficial. Memorabilia 2.8 = 
Marchant, op. cit., pp. 156-9  Cf. Dem. 57.45 = A. Murray, trans., Demosthenes: 
Private Orations, v. 6, LCL 351, Cambridge, 1964 [1935], pp. 264-5, where the 
connection between penury and becoming a slave because of the need to toil for one’s 
needs is expressed.  The discomfort with dependency is foremost because dependency 
is the result. 
1262.9.7 = Marchant, op. cit., pp. 160-3 
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concludes the anecdote by saying that Arkhidemos was Krito’s “friend,” held in 
honor by Krito’s other friends.  This story is significant for several reasons.  First, it 
indicates explicitly that the relationship between Krito and Arkhidemos is 
asymmetrical.  As if the point of the latter’s poverty were not enough, Xenophon, 
first in the mouth of Socrates and then in his own voice, uses the metaphor of the dog 
to make clear the relationship and the role played by Arkhidemos.  Moreover, 
whatever motives Krito might have in seeking out Arkhidemos, it is clear that their 
friendship is instrumental in nature.127  Finally, Krito makes Arkhidemos his personal 
fixer by providing him with the necessities of life and taking care of him, both men 
understanding that by accepting this help Arkhidemos would be socially obliged to 
show his gratitude.  Xenophon himself reports that Arkhidemos, in fact, excelled 
(hedeos ekharizeto).128  Interesting is the fact that his enemies saw this as a case of 
clientage.  Although he downplayed the political significance of clientage under the 
classical democracy, Millett noted that the word with which his enemies sneeringly 
reproached Arkhidemos, “fawning” (kolakeuein), is the Greek for playing the role of 
client (kolax).129  To be sure, Krito himself had the tact to avoid calling the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127Cf. Aristotle’s observation on asymmetrical “friendships.” R. Crisp, ed., Aristotle: 
Nicomachean Ethics, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2006 [2000], p. 154 (8.8.10 [1159b]) and 
p. 163 (8.14.1 [1163b]). 
1282.9.8 = Marchant, op. cit., pp. 162-3 
129Millett on kolax, op cit., p. 33.   But, cf. the juxtaposition of akolasia, usually 
rendered as insolence, and demokratia in the Areopageticus (20) of Isocrates.  G. 
Nordin, trans., Isocrates, v. 2, LCL 229, Cambridge, 1962 [1929], pp. 114-7 This 
suggests the ideological position that democracy undermines patronage.  Millett 
remarks on this, but does not follow through on its implication. op. cit., p. 28. 
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relationship what it was, but what is related here is the technique for securing a client 
and labeling that relationship friendship (philia.)130 
Elsewhere Xenophon relates another anecdote that serves to illustrate the 
political nature of these relations between the wealthy and their fellow citizens.  In 
the Oeconomicus, he relates a discussion about the duties of the wealthy at Athens 
between Socrates and Krito’s son, Kritoboulos.131  Socrates pities Kritoboulos, even 
though the latter is far wealthier than the former.  A puzzled Kritoboulos requires an 
explanation.  Socrates obliges: 
First, you have to put on many, large sacrifices…. 132  Then it is 
appropriate for you to host many foreigners, and in grand style at 
that.  And then you have to provide banquets for citizens and render 
them good services or find yourself bereft of allies.  And I 
understand that the city obliges you to pay a lot of money for horses, 
choruses, gymnasiarchs, and acts of patronage (prostateiai)….133  
That’s why I feel sorry for you.  In my case, if I should be in need of 
anything, I know that, as you too know, there are those would help 
me….  But with your friends, though they have more than you with 
respect to their own lifestyle, nevertheless, look to you to make 
themselves your debtors.  (emphasis added) 
 
The comments of Socrates are essentially in line with what he had reportedly said to 
Krito already regarding the nature of reciprocity.  But what is significant now is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130See Wolf’s comment on masking these relationships.  Indeed, no one would have 
preferred the label kolax to philos.  For, as Theophrastus says, to be a kolax is to 
engage in a kind of “shameful companionship that benefits the kolax.” Characteres 
2.1.  But an admission of being a kolax would be an admission of dependency and, 
perhaps, penury.  Rare would be the man to declare that with pride.  Indeed, Eutheros 
himself initially recoils at the suggestion. fn. 125, supra. 
1312.4-8 = Marchant, op. cit., pp. 120-59 
132Apart from their religious aspects, sacrifices were often an important source of 
meat for both the participants and the butchers, who would sell it in the marketplace.  
L. Zaidman and P. Pantel, Religion in the Ancient Greek City, Cambridge, 1997 
[1992], pp. 29-30 and 33-6. 
133The Loeb renders prostateiai as “presidencies,” but this translation accords with 
the suggestions of Millet, op. cit., p. 35, and Gallego, op. cit., p. 168. 
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explicitly political nature of the obligations on Kritobolos, as, for example, when he 
is expected to provide sacrifices and help fellow citizens, and the fact that his friends 
still look to him for assistance.  The point, of course, is that, just as Socrates has what 
he needs for his minimal needs, the friends of Kritoboulos are less wealthy than 
Kritoboulos and seek assistance from him.  To be sure, Kritoboulos would not be so 
crass as to call these men in need his clients, but hostile individuals would likely see 
it thus, just as they had seen Krito’s relationship with Arkhidemos.  And these friends 
who turned to Kritobolos would likely be expected to support his endeavors, just like 
Arkhidemos, and just like the persons aided by Cimon a generation earlier. 
The foregoing supports the notion that Athenian citizens, wealthy ones in 
particular, could and would build relationships supportive of their public and private 
ambitions.  To argue that they might not turn to these relationships in carrying out 
their tasks as magistrates would be to suggest that, while they might use these 
“friendships” in most other contexts, in the performance of their official business 
alone they would refrain from their use.  This begs credulity as there is no evidence 
that anyone viewed a magistracy as somehow uniquely off-limits for the use of social 
relations that they self-consciously developed and accepted as normal.  In other 
words, it seems reasonable to infer – it is an inference – that citizen officials at 
Athens turned to their clients if they needed assistance in carrying out their tasks.  
And, as was the case with Krito, the herdsman who controlled the dog, Arkhidemos, 
they would have been entitled to expect some measure of loyalty and support in the 
carrying out of such tasks.  Of course, if assisted by slaves, there would be relatively 
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little question of their will being executed.134  But, assisted by clients, who obviously 
had more choice than slaves, they generally could expect support, just as Krito and 
his friends could with Arkhidemos.  Social obligations can be strong in any society, 
even if they are not completely reliable. 
It should be noted that horizontal relationships, meaning, friends in the sense 
of reciprocal relations among relative equals, could also be used for furthering one’s 
interests.  Giving voice to a general Greek sentiment, Meno tells Socrates that a 
man’s virtue consists in treating one’s friends well and harming one’s enemies.135  In 
essence, friends help each other: that is the point, as Theognis noted when advising 
Kurnos to make friends with the right kind of people.136  Nor, as Connor argues, was 
this confined to private affairs.  It was readily understood that friendships, 
functioning in this way, played an important part in political activity at Athens.137 As 
Aristotle puts it in the Rhetoric: “…we define a ‘friend’ as one who will always try, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134Of course, the idea that slaves were not particularly reliable is a comic trope. 
135Meno 71e = W. Lamb, trans., Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, v. 2, 
LCL 165, Cambridge, 1977 [1924], pp. 268-9  Cf. Solon, 12.5-6 in E. Hiller, ed., 
Anthologia Lyrica, Leipzig, 1890, p. 37; Medea notes too that this kind of reciprocity 
will show that she is not a weakling. D. Slavitt and P. Bovie, edd., Euripides, 
Philadelphia, 1998, v. 1, p. 46 (ll. 886-90 = Medea, 807-10). 
136D. Wender, trans., Hesiod and Theognis, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1984 
[1973], p. 100 (l. 87ff.) 
137Connor, op. cit., Ch. 2; G. Calhoun, Athenian in Politics and Litigation, Studia 
Historica 7, Rome, 1964 [1913].  In the famous discussion of regimes found in 
Herodotus, Darius identifies these close, political friendships (philiai iskhurai) as a 
source of mischief. Histories, p. 188 (3.82.4)  This passage is interesting also for its 
possible anticipation of the word prostates, as Connor himself notes, although the 
Oxford text has the participle, prostas, not the noun, prostates, as he quotes it.  
Connor, op. cit., pp. 114-5. The clubs, or hetaireiai, after a period of ascendency in 
the 5th century BC, appear to have faded in significance during the 4th.   See L. 
Mitchell and P. Rhodes, “Friends and Enemies in Athenian Politics,” Greece & Rome 
43.1 (Apr. 1996), pp. 11-30  But the details of this historical development are not 
critical to the discussion as people still sought to help friends and harm enemies in the 
courts and in politics generally without the clubs being the only manifestation of this.   
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for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you.”138  Indeed, the need for friends 
was clear enough to Plato who, when recalling the reasons that finally convinced him 
to abandon political ambition, noted the fact that he lacked “friends (philon andron) 
and loyal associates (hetairon piston).”139  At any rate, friends obviously were 
important socially and politically.140   
The foregoing considerations suggest several things about the background 
against which Plato and Aristotle wrote.  To be sure, their specific circumstances are 
not identical, but some general observations can be made to help in understanding the 
implications about officials within the traditional theory propounded by them.  The 
key points are as follows.  First, the Athenian polis forms the background for Plato 
and Aristotle’s political theory. Their comments about institutions, therefore, were 
informed by their direct knowledge about the functioning of Athenian government, a 
government of amateur citizens.141  Aristotle, as is well known, made a conscious 
study of various regimes, but Athens he knew from living there.  Its institutions were 
staffed by some 2,000 state-owned slaves and citizens occupying magistracies.  Some 
citizen-magistrates, as noted earlier, would have enjoyed the assistance of their own 
or state-owned slaves in carrying out their functions; and, in general, they certainly 
could have turned to their own resources whether it be through the exchange of favors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138I. Bywater, trans., The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle, New York, 1984 
[1954], p. 41 (1361b36-7). 
139Letter VII, p. 114 (325d) 
140See, for example, K. Dover, Popular Greek Morality in the Time of Plato and 
Aristotle, Oxford, 1974, pp. 180-4. 
141A. Laks, “The Laws,” in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought, Cambridge, 2005 [2000], pp. 258-92.  Laks 
endorses this very idea at pp. 268-9; G. Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political 
Theory, Oxford, 2006, p. 231ff. 
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with friends, or turning to clients as needed to assist with their tasks, or even calling 
upon slaves from within their household.   This situation creates an important 
dichotomy between subordinate helpers, slave or free, on the one hand, and superior 
office-holders, on the other.  When discussing regimes, it is the latter that concern 
Plato and Aristotle.142 
It is unsurprising that neither Aristotle nor Plato discuss in great detail the use 
of slaves, whether privately or publicly state-owned, for the execution of official 
tasks, such as they would have seen first hand at Athens.  They were concerned with 
citizens and how they organized, or ought to organize themselves in a polis.  
Tellingly, in the course of his search for the true statesmen, Plato lumped together 
slaves and assistants, including experts at particular governmental tasks such as 
scribes.143  The point is that, as slaves take their instructions from masters, so Plato 
and Aristotle focus on those masters.  For Plato and Aristotle, slaves, whether owned 
by officials or the state, are politically irrelevant.  They are theoretically not 
independent beings operating with free will because their choices are made by those 
whom they serve, necessarily citizens.  While the second-best regime described in 
Plato’s Laws presents a detailed exposition of an ostensibly practicable state, there is 
relatively little discussion of the roles to be played by slaves to support the 
magistrates in the execution of their tasks.144  Nevertheless, they are there.  Their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens is an important source for what is known about 
the public slaves, but it is self-consciously empirical, while his political theory is not.  
The Constitution is presented as description; the Politics prescription. 
143Statesman, pp. 51-52 (289c-90b). 
144T. Saunders, trans., Plato: Laws, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 2004 [1970].  
W. Westermann makes the point that the general acceptance of slavery “explains why 
Plato in his plan of the good life as depicted in the Republic did not need to mention 
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presence is remarked in his discussion of the country-wardens (agronomoi), whom he 
also calls “secret-service men” (kruptoi), and “guards-in-chief” (phrourarkhoi):145 
Wardens must assemble with the five officers and resolve that, being 
servants (oiketai), they will not possess other servants (oiketai) and 
slaves (douloi) for themselves, nor employ the attendants 
(huperetemata) of other people (the farmers and villagers) for their 
own private needs, but only for public tasks (ta demosia).  With that 
exception, they must expect to double as their own servants and fend 
for themselves….146 (emphasis added) 
 
Clearly country-wardens would be permitted to use slaves in the performance of their 
state functions (ta demosia).147  This, Plato notes, is an exception to the austere rules 
imposed upon them to ensure that during their two years in office they would know 
how to serve and take care of themselves.148  The rule articulated here emphasizes the 
point that they are to use these slaves in the course of their official duties alone, and it 
makes provision for them to use the slaves owned by the locals.149  No mention is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the slave class.”  “Between Slavery and Freedom,” American Historical Review, 50.2 
(Jan., 1945), pp. 213-27, quotation at p. 215.  
145On kruptoi, whose harsh lifestyle in Sparta is described admiringly by Megillus, 
see 633b.  Strauss implies that these men might have conducted assassinations.  L. 
Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws, Chicago, 1977, p. 89.  On 
phrourarkhoi, see a 760b.  Their various duties are described in 760a-2b, 843d, 844b-
c, and 848e. 
146763a 
147Plato envisions the country-wardens using locally-owned slaves for corvée labor.  
760e 
148Plato says that their term of office is two years.  But he also refers to “the third 
year” (760e) when the tribes choose the new country-wardens.  The significance of 
this third year is not entirely clear.  Does the term of one group expire with the 
election of their replacements occurring the very next day?  Would these 
replacements immediately begin touring their districts without any experience of the 
task at hand?  Possibly some sort of overlap is envisioned whereby the experienced 
might help the inexperienced. 
149Of these rustic slaves, there presumably would be an abundance given Plato’s 
supposition that the farms would be worked by slaves. 806d-e  Aristotle likewise 
suggests that under the best regime farming should be taken on by slaves, docile ones 
in particular. Politics, pp. 180-1 (1330a25ff.) 
 60 
made regarding the option a country-warden might have to use his own slaves for 
official business, but Plato obviously assumes that some country-wardens might have 
them.  Presumably, this would be an option.  The law’s point, though, is that for 
personal needs, country-wardens must help themselves during the two-year period.  
Apart from the restrictions, then, Plato took it for granted that slaves would be used 
by these officials to carry out their duties.150  To take another category of official, the 
city-wardens presumably would not be toiling by themselves on road maintenance 
and building construction.151  Like the Athenian hodopoioi, they too would probably 
use slaves for the heavy-lifting.152  Similarly, the market-wardens, who maintain 
order in the market where foreigners and slaves would abound, presumably would 
have at their disposal to slaves to maintain security, just as officials at Athens could 
turn to their Scythians to manhandle the rowdy.153  But Plato would have had no 
particular need to mention the obvious and does not dwell at length on what would 
have been plain to anyone reading him.154 
Plato’s Kallipolis by contrast is silent on exactly on the actual process of 
governance and execution of policy.  No particulars comparable to what is found in 
the Laws are provided.  However much the guardians resemble the country-wardens,  
for example, the stress is not on their specific tasks, but on the mechanisms, such as 
education, absence of private property, communal parenting, that would ensure their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Pace Strauss, ibid.  Plato stresses the idea that these officials would take care of 
their personal needs.  This makes clear that the issue over having slaves is not one of 
possessing slaves altogether, but one of using them as manservants. 
151763c 
152See, fn. 97, supra. 
153763e-4c 
154Similarly, Laks attributes the cursory explanation of dokimasia in the Laws to the 
idea that Plato “accepts current [sc., Athenian] practice.” op. cit., p. 282 
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continuity and their continued devotion to the city.  The official tasks for philosopher-
kings, made to rule despite their own, understandable inclinations to do otherwise, are 
essentially left out.  And those remaining citizens who make up Kallipolitan society’s 
third class, are more or less left to their own devices, lacking any real political 
responsibilities or official tasks, but devoted above all else to minding their own 
business.155  Thus, unlike the Laws, the detail of which offers some indications of 
how slaves might be used in the context of an official’s duties, the Republic sheds no 
light on this.  Indeed, as Schlaiffer points out, consideration of slavery is cursory in 
the Republic because Plato is concerned with the free, not the enslaved, although, 
unlike the Magnesians of the Laws, the third class of free citizens in Kallipolis do not 
themselves have any discernible function in the state beyond staying out of trouble.156  
They represent a kind of higher order rabble. 
Like Plato, Aristotle assumes that some slaves will assist magistrates in the 
performance of their duties.  There are two main passages in the Politics where he, 
who throughout reveals his extensive knowledge of various regimes, addresses 
magistrates at some length.157  In making the arrangements of a state, he argues, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155434c.  Plato’s lack of concern for the third, economic class of citizens is made clear 
at 421a and 434a.  Schlaifer remarks that Plato essentially groups them with the 
banausoi, or tradesmen, who were generally viewed with contempt, as Plato himself 
suggests (Republic, p. 310 [590c]; Laws, p. 416 [918c]). R. Schlaifer, “Greek 
Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 
47 (1936), pp. 165-205, at p. 173.  Cf. Dover, op. cit., p. 40.  Tellingly, Plato’s 
second-best regime would forbid citizens from engaging in trades because of their 
corrupting potential. (pp. 250, 303-4, and 417-8 [806d; 846d-e; 918d-20c])  Similarly, 
Aristotle warns about the morally and physically degrading effects of working in the 
banausic arts, and suggests that “the best form of state will not admit them to 
citizenship.” Politics, p. 68 (3.5 [1278a8]) and p. 196 (8.2 [1337b10-2]) 
156Schlaifer, op. cit., p. 191   
157Politics, pp. 114-8 (4.15 [1299a1-1300b12) and pp. 162-6 (6.8 [1321b1-23a11]) 
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must tend to the distribution of offices (arkhai), which are indispensible because “no 
state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered 
not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order.”158  On that 
basis, he proceeds to identify various necessary magistracies, such as those found in 
Athens, summarized as follows: 
Offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the 
revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the 
harbours, with the country; also with the courts of law, with the 
records of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of 
prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; 
lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of 
the state.159 
 
While this summary seems detailed enough to suggest a range of domains to be dealt 
with by citizen-officials, Aristotle, in fact, uses this list to encapsulate the thrust of his 
preceding, detailed exposition of the various, specific offices that are necessary to 
governing a polis.  He does not specifically describe how the magistrates will go 
about their tasks, but, as was suggested earlier, he need not have.  That a magistrate 
might use a privately or publicly owned slave could be taken for granted.  Indeed, a 
number of the offices specifically mentioned by him in this section echo the very 
ones that are described in the Constitution of Athens as being connected with the use 
of slave labor.  For example, Aristotle references people who would tend to the 
maintenance of roads and buildings; at Athens the hodopoioi, or officials tasked with 
maintaining roads, used slaves to accomplish this task.160  Similarly, Aristotle refers 
to those who would maintain the register of public debtors; such officials were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158Politics, pp. 162-3 (6.8 [1321b6-8]) 
159Politics, p. 165 (6.8 [1322b29-37]) 
160Politics, p. 163 (6.8 -1321b20-1]); Constitution, p. 251 (54.1). 
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augmented by slaves at Athens.161  The point, however, is that he need not have 
mentioned in the Politics the idea that some of these officials relied upon slaves to 
carry out their tasks.  It was well known that they often did. 
In point of fact, however, Aristotle does mention this specific fact in the other 
passage where he describes magistracies at length.  At 4.15 he takes up the question 
of various details surrounding offices in general: their distribution, their manner of 
selection, and the appropriate length of their terms.  On the issue of what exactly is 
meant by office, Aristotle, in a way that anticipates the modern split between politics 
and administration, offers the following: 
Some duties of superintendence again are political….  Other offices 
are concerned with household management, like that of corn 
measurers who exist in many states and are elected officers.  There 
are also menial (huperetikai) offices which the rich have executed by 
slaves.  Speaking generally, those are to be called offices to which 
the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of 
judging and commanding, especially the last; for to command is the 
especial duty of the magistrate.162 (emphasis added) 
 
Of course, Aristotle does not say that all offices entail the use of slaves, but he does 
say that the menial ones (huperetikai) tend to be.163  The implication of his point that 
the rich would use slaves seems to be that at a minimum it is likely that the rich 
would use their personal slaves.164  If, as at Athens, the state provides slaves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161Politics, p. 164 (6.8 [1322a9-10]); Constitution, p. 247 (48.1) 
162Politics, p. 115 (4.15 1299a20-8]) 
163It is worth remembering that this adjective refers to the kinds of things pertaining 
to the huperetes, or servant.  In other words, it need not indicate solely physical tasks, 
but could also encompass record keeping or whatever subordinate tasks an official 
may wish to entrust to his slaves. Cf. Statesman, p.52 (290b) where scribes, for 
example, fall under this head. 
164The phrase in Greek, an euporosi, means “if they have the means,” or, perhaps, “if 
they are able,” the “they” actually being unspecified.  T. Sinclair’s translation 
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(demosioi), that simply means that even a citizen-official of lesser means could enjoy 
the kind of help a slave would provide.  It seems clear, then, that Aristotle understood 
that slaves would play a role in government, as servants to citizen-officials.  He 
simply had no more reason to detail every instance in which that would be the case 
than had Plato when he described his second-best regime.  They both largely took this 
state of affairs for granted: it was, after all, their own experience of the government at 
Athens. 
Slaves used in government service would, of course, be particularly suited to 
carrying out the tasks laid upon them by citizen-officials.  Like their Athenian 
contemporaries, for both Plato and Aristotle, after all, the distinction between slave 
and free was crucial for the state.  Citizens had a critical, mental capacity that was 
necessary to their role, a capacity that slaves lacked, by definition if not in actual fact.  
Aristotle referred to this as the deliberative capacity (to bouleutikon), Plato as a 
divine prudence (to theion kai phronimon).165   This is not, of course, the same thing 
as saying that slaves are necessarily stupid human beings.166  But there was a 
theoretical, if not ideological, distinction to be made between the free and the 
enslaved in their respective capacities to reason.  Among citizens, too, this capacity 
for reason clearly operated along a continuum that ran from those on one end who 
could master the political art and, clearly being the minority, were best endowed for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preserves this ambiguity: “when resources permit.” Aristotle: The Politics, Penguin 
Classics, Harmondsworth, 1980 [1962], p. 183. 
165Politics, p. 29 (1.13 [1260a12]); Republic, p. 310 (590d)  Cf. Plato’s suggestion in 
the Statesman that those who are sunk in ignorance (amathia) and baseness 
(tapeinotes) are worthy of slavery. p. 82 (309a) 
166Aristotle allows that slaves have some capacity to reason. Politics, p. 17 (1.5 
[1254b22]) 
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the task and to the rest, on the other end.167  At any rate, this distinction between the 
capacity of the free and slave is brought out in the Laws where Plato discusses 
doctors, who themselves could be of either status. However, Plato is here asserts that 
the slave has learned his skills through habituation, and, thus, does not explain to his 
patients the reasons why a particular treatment may be prescribed: he lacks the 
knowledge to do so.  Slave doctors learn their skills “empirically, by watching and 
obeying their masters.  They’ve no systematic knowledge (logos) such as free doctors 
have learned for themselves and pass on to their pupils.”168  Plato’s slave doctor, who 
rushes from case to case, treats slaves and does not engage in explanations.  Although 
it might be tempting to attribute the lack of explanation to the slave’s hurried 
schedule, it is clear Plato sees him as lacking the knowledge necessary to explain the 
underlying factors requiring the treatment prescribed.  The slave has only learned by 
doing and observing.  Moreover, Plato’s free doctor, who has theoretical knowledge, 
engages in explanation to his free patients.  In other words, he explains to someone 
who has the capacity to understand.  The educated educates; the habituated cannot.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167being small in number, Statesman, p. 57 (293a) and p. 63 (297b-c); this ideal 
person would remove the need for law because he could match desert to the particular 
case. pp. 58-9 (294a-b) 
168Laws, pp. 135-6 (720b)  Plato does allow in this passage that some doctor assistants 
(huperetai) may be free, but his emphasis is on the slaves (douloi).  He goes on to 
explain that the slave doctor “simply prescribes what he thinks best in light of 
experience, as if he had precise knowledge….” (emphasis added) p. 136 (720c)  Plato 
makes it clear that his focus is on the distinction between free and slave doctor when 
he resumes the point subsequently.  “Make no mistake about what would happen, if 
one of those doctors (sc., slave doctors) who are innocent of theory and practice 
medicine by rule of thumb (ton tais empeirais aneu logou) were ever to come across a 
gentleman (eleutheros) doctor conversing with a gentleman (eleutheros) patient.  
[The latter] would be acting almost like a philosopher….” p. 319 (857c-d) The phrase 
aneu logou, rendered as “innocent of theory,” brings home the point about the lack of 
reasoning in the slave doctor’s training.  Naturally, these claims reflect an elite 
ideology: Plato was a creature of his world. 
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As this comparison is used to introduce Plato’s idea that laws should contain 
preambles offering a rationale for the laws, it is clear as well that, as far as Plato was 
concerned, citizens themselves were amenable to explanation and reason in a way 
that slaves are not.  Citizen and free becomes almost a tautology here.   Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that Magnesia’s citizens are to leave manual tasks to others, 
while they devote themselves to a form of leisure aimed at physical and moral 
improvement.169  Citizens were to use slaves to serve their basic needs. 
For Aristotle, slaves are essentially animate tools, mere extensions of the 
master’s will, utterly lacking in any deliberative faculty.  As deliberation is prior to 
rational choice, they never reach the question of engaging that faculty.170  Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169Laws, pp. 250-2 (806d-8c)  Cf. Aristotle, who likewise suggests that citizens 
should not have to look after their needs in well-ordered states, those tasks being left 
to slaves and others. Politics, pp. 49-50 (2.9 [1269a34-7])  Note that even Plato’s 
prescription to treat slaves well is aimed, not so much at endearing masters to them, 
as at imbuing masters with just practices: it is a form of civic training. pp. 213-4 
(777c-8a)  Plato’s recommendation that slaves be foreigners and incapable of 
speaking the same languages is significant in that it reinforces the notion of slaves 
lacking the necessary capacities to be citizens. (777d)  Aristotle likewise recommends 
that groups of mixed foreign slaves, whether owned privately or by the state, should 
toil in the fields. Politics, pp. 180-1 (7.10 [1330a25-31])  Cf. Clytemnestra’s initial 
reaction when she believes that Cassandra cannot speak Greek. Agamemnon, ll. 1060-
1 in P. Vellacott, trans., Aeschylus: The Oresteian Trilogy, Penguin Classics, 
Harmmondsworth, 1985 [1956], p. 79  Plato connects the performance of menial 
tasks with a weak capacity for reason; the interests of a person in this state are best 
served by his being a slave to the best man, who has the “divine prudence.”  Republic, 
p. 310 (590c-d)  
170R. Crisp, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2006 [2000], pp. 40-
4 (3.2-3 [1111b-1113a]); deliberation linked with wisdom and political skill, A. 
Kenny, Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics, Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford, 2011, pp. 
81-2 (5.7-8 [1141b8-12 and 1141b30-5]) The precise relationship between the 
Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics is vexed and unsettled.  Kenny concludes that the 
case for seeing the Eudemian Ethics as an “immature” work “collapses (p.xi); Crisp 
sees the Nicomachean Ethics as “almost certainly the product of Aristotle’s 
developed intellect…a revision of his earlier Eudemian Ethics.” (p. vii)  This is not 
the place to settle a dispute of experts.  Books 5-7 of the Nicomachean correspond to 
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slaves function essentially as an extension of the master: they are the body to his 
mind, which does deliberate and reason.171  It is in this vein that Aristotle famously 
describes them as animate tools, belonging properly to the sphere of household 
management, and certainly having no proper role in the state, a sphere of life properly 
made up of equals.172  Moreover, slaves lack the independence necessary to proper 
citizens.173   Given this understanding, it is not surprising that a slave’s excellence 
(arete) consists in being “useful for [sc., the master’s] wants of life, and therefore he 
will obviously require only so much excellence as will prevent him from failing in his 
function….”174  This point gains more force when Aristotle’s thought experiment is 
recalled where he mentions that, if tools could function as pure automata, no one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Eudemian’s 4-6.  Cf. regarding choice, R. Waterfield, Aristotle: Physics, Oxford 
World’s Classics, Oxford, 1999, pp. 46-7 (2.6 [197b5-b12])  
171“And indeed the use made of slaves and tame animals is not very different; for both 
with their bodies minister to the needs of life.” Politics, p. 17 (1.5 [1254b25-6]); 
“There is a common relationship that links soul and body, craftsman and tool, and 
master and slave….  [T]he body is the connatural tool of the soul, a slave is, as it 
were, a part and detachable tool of his master, and a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.” 
Eudemian Ethics, p. 129 (7.9 [1241b17-24]) and p. 131 (7.10 [1242a28-31])  This is 
an interesting opposition that anticipates Taylor’s conception of manager and worker.  
F. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, New York, 1967 [1911] 
172animate tool (ktema ti empsukhon): Politics, p. 15 (1.4 [1253b32-3])  Aristotle 
inverts this claim in the Eudemian Ethics where he claims that “a tool is a sort of 
inanimate slave.” p. 129 (7.9 [1241b22-3])  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
concludes from this that the relationship between master and slave is like that of 
owner and ox because it takes no part of justice. p.158 (8.11 [1161b])  On the state as 
a union of equals: Politics, p. 176 (1328a35-7)   
173 Politics, p. 96 (4.4 [1291a10-1])  The more one engages in pure toil, the more 
slavelike one becomes.  Politics, p. 26 (1.11 [1258b37-8])  Lack of independence 
similarly made being a laborer problematic. Dover, op. cit., p. 40  Though a modern 
concept, Aristotle would have readily understood the implication of wage-slavery.  
Thus Aristotle argues, “[T]he artisan is less closely connected with him (sc., the 
master), and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave.  The meaner 
sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery….” Politics, p. 30 (1.13 
[1260a41-60b1])  Cf. G. Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! or Slaves Without Masters, 
Cambridge, 1988 [1960].   
174Politics, pp. 29-30 (1.13 [1260a34-6]) 
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would want slaves.175  Obviously, as real human beings, slaves posed a problem, not 
least because they could be unruly.176  But the implication is that the more the slave 
conforms to the master’s will, the more automatic he becomes, and, more 
importantly, the more perfectly he functions as the master’s extension. 
While Plato and Aristotle’s discussions of slavery do not overlap completely, 
they do offer some coherence with regard to thinking about how the amateur-officials 
of a polis would carry out their duties with the assistance of slaves.  First, it is clear 
that slaves were a given.  And they would be used, not merely for the maintenance of 
citizens in their homes, but also to help citizens holding office.  Slaves might belong 
to the state; they might be drawn from the magistrate’s household.  Because the 
office-holder was a citizen, by definition he possessed the capacity to evaluate and 
decide matters under his control.  Engaging in these deliberative activities was not a 
task for slaves.  Instead, they would provide the physical assistance necessary to the 
task.  Slaves, to be sure, could acquire skills: some, for example, had, if not 
knowledge, at least medical skill.177  So one need not assume that slaves would 
simply tasked with heaving of corpses from the side of the road or clearing of sewers.  
Presumably, they might even, as at Athens, taken part in managing the registers of 
debts.  But critically, they were extensions of the decision-making process that 
characterized the work of officials.  To paraphrase Aristotle, they were to the masters, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175Politics, p. 15 (1.4 [1253b33-4a1]) 
176Cf. Plato’s comments in the Republic that a master removed from society would be 
unable to control his slaves. Republic, p. 295 (578d)  His advice in the Laws on the 
treatment of slaves, as mentioned earlier, was oriented not so much to avoiding 
household rebellions as to the moral improvement of masters. See, fn. 169, supra. 
177Plato takes up the difference between knowledge (episteme) and skill or knack 
(tekhne) at length in the Gorgias. 
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as the body was to the mind.  Thus, to the extent possible they were to serve as mere 
instruments until the day when more unquestioning automata became available. 
The question remains: did Plato or Aristotle take up the other dimension of 
life at Athens that bore upon life there, the role of the kolax or client?  In fact, Plato 
was particularly interested to remove the conditions that led to the patron-client 
relationship; the more pragmatic Aristotle, on the other hand, acknowledges these 
unequal relations, which suggests that they were taken for granted by his theory.  In 
the Eudemian Ethics, for example, he takes up the issue of friendships among 
unequals.178  Absent from his discussion is condemnation of the relationship; most 
friendships, after all, were in his view utilitarian.179  Indeed, Aristotle highlights the 
fact that the superior derives from the relationship a sense of “being superior.”  
Nevertheless, Aristotle also recognizes the negative aspects of asymmetrical 
friendships.  They do represent, after all, a double-edged sword.  Kolakes, seen as 
flatterers or clients – the Greek does not distinguish – tended to gravitate around the 
tyrant where they doubtless would reinforce the latter’s notions of superiority.180  But 
the wealthy too could attract these kinds of men, much as Krito had drawn 
Arkhidemos into his circle.  Yet Aristotle, who contradicts Plato on this issue, is 
willing to wave aside this problem, namely, the negative aspects of an asymmetrical 
relationship because, in the final analysis, “there is the greatest pleasure in doing a 
kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178Eudemian Ethics, pp. 123-4 (7.4 [1239a1ff.]) 
179Eudemian Ethics, p. 116 (7.2 [1236a33ff.]) Note that Aristotle identifies “civic 
friendships” as a category based on utility. p. 130   
180Politics, p. 147 (1314a1-4]) 
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when a man has private property.”181  Aristotle, indeed, viewed the liberal man as one 
who “gives away his surplus.”182  But “gives” to whom, if not to friends, inferiors, or 
the state, as Krito had done, or Kritoboulos had to do?  This liberality clearly entailed 
a reciprocal obligation on the part of its beneficiaries, as was understood by 
Arkhidemos and Eutheros.  Therefore, Aristotle took for granted the kinds of bonds 
to which reciprocity among unequals would give rise.  There is no reason to think that 
officials, even in his ideal state, would not rely upon these relations in their 
capacities. 
For Plato, however, the kind of asymmetrical relationships characteristic of 
patron-client relations were objectionable, and he provided the means to prevent 
them.183  In particular, he so arranged the ownership of property that Magnesia would 
consist of relative equals, who within certain limits would be neither wealthy nor 
poor.  Poverty, after all, “drives us by distress into losing all sense of shame,” a point 
understood quite well by Eutheros in the Memorabilia, who characterized such 
dependency as “slavery.”184  Thus, Magnesia’s citizens would possess some measure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181Politics, pp. 36-7 (2.5 [1263b5-22]).  If there were any doubt about this criticism 
being leveled at Plato, Aristotle makes it clear when he refers to the abolishing of 
private property as an error of Socrates. p. 37 (2.5 [1264b30-1]) As Klosko rightly 
observed, Aristotle failed to understand that the Plato allowed private property to the 
majority, i.e., the third class of ordinary citizens. op. cit., p. 155  
182Eudemian Ethics, pp. 45-6 (3.4 [1231b28ff.])  Liberality is treated in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle states, “[t]he use of wealth seems to consist in 
spending and giving….” pp. 60-5 (4.1 [1119b-1122a]) cf. Laws, p. 158 (737d-e) 
where Plato allows in theory for a positive dimension to largesse by wealthy land-
owners, but views this positive aspect as unlikely in practice. 
183 Plato’s comments regarding these relationships suggest, pace Millett, that their 
political implications were problematic. 
184Laws, p. 417 (919b); on Eutheros, see fn. 125, supra. 
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of inalienable property to guarantee their status.185  According to Plato, oligarchic 
regimes were characterized by some accumulating property, others selling theirs and 
becoming impoverished.186  This is the kind of indigence that leads to metaphorical 
slavery, meaning dependence.187  Moreover, as Plato notes, success in oligarchic 
regimes requires spending money “in the cause of reputation” and forming alliances 
to compete.188  In short, having too much money yields “enmity and feuds in private 
and public life,” and having too little “almost invariably leads to slavery.”  Plato 
surely does not, of course, mean actual enslavement, but the kind of dependency that 
marks the status of a man who cannot provide for his own basic needs, like 
Arkhidemos.189  As he explains in his discussion of how to treat children,  
A child’s fortune will be most in harmony with his circumstances, 
and superior to all other fortunes, if it is modest enough not to attract 
flatters (akolakeutos), but sufficient to supply all his needs (ton 
d’anagkaion me endees).190 
 
The descent of oligarchy into democracy presents simply an extension of these 
principles.  For the rulers, who are presumably wealthy, not only do nothing to ensure 
that heirs with property retain some substance, but they even exploit the situation by 
purchasing property or lending money against it in order to “become even richer and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185Laws, pp. 164-5 (741a-e).  Money too is strictly limited in order that citizens may 
remain “friends,” and litigiousness not take hold.  p. 167 (744c-4a)  Recall in this 
regard that the services of Arkhidemos were required precisely because of this kind of 
problem, and his enemies identified these services as playing the role of the kolax or 
client. See, fn. 130, supra. 
186Republic, p. 262 (552a-b) 
187Laws, p. 146 (779a) 
188Republic, p. 266 (555a) 
189Cf. Millet on the similarity between slavery and dependence. op. cit., p. 29 
190Laws, p. 146 (729a-b) 
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more highly respected.”191 (emphasis added)  But as was seen earlier, this respect 
consists partly in building a retinue of friends and dependents.  Plato’s hostility to 
wealth, informed by the idea that it leads to impoverishment and dependence, leads 
him to devise for Magnesia rules to ensure that the citizens interact as relative equals 
and remain so.  Neither will they engage in trades or money-making nor will they 
perform service “for private individuals who are not his (sc., the citizen’s) equals in 
status.”192  This leads to the kind of true friendship that is characterized by horizontal 
relations of reciprocity.  To be sure, Plato has other motives for his arrangements 
beyond preventing the kinds of patron-client relationship that existed between Krito 
and Arkhidemos.  But gross inequalities also occupied his attention because it leads 
to a dependency of the poor on the wealthy, and this leads to shamelessness and 
strife.  The poor man might do almost anything to secure the basic needs of life.  
The real Athenian polis was a state characterized by citizens rotating through 
magistracies as amateur-officials.  It lacked a true bureaucracy in the modern sense, 
but records still had to be kept, streets swept, and jails guarded.   To fulfill these 
many tasks, officials had at their disposal various slaves provided by the state.  
Furthermore, it seems likely enough that in cases where such demosioi were not 
provided, officials were quite able, as Aristotle, and to a lesser extent Plato, 
suggested, to turn to their private slaves or to those bound to them because of favors 
previously bestowed: friends or clients (kolakes).   The advantage of slaves, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191This kind of analysis ought to temper views that somehow the democracy 
eliminated patronage networks.  Even if taken as the clichéd critique of the 
conservative elite, the fact is that money still meant something, even in a radical 
democracy. 
192Laws, p. 418 (919d) 
 73 
course, was that they might come closer to functioning as pure extensions of an 
official’s will.  The slave, after all, was generally in no position to question a master’s 
commands, and, though a free dependent might be choose which requests to honor, 
they were socially expected to requite through loyal service favors previously 
bestowed.  While Plato allowed for the service of slaves in Magnesia, he was keenly 
aware of the problems that dependency and economic inequality could produce 
among citizens.  To forestall that situation, he provided for an arrangement that 
would prevent a citizen from becoming a kolax.  It is worth pointing out that, if 
patronage was not a factor, why would he have bothered to devise a system aimed at 
undermining it.  Obviously, the Athens with which he was familiar, like many other 
societies throughout history, was a place where patronage was a reality, not some 
distant memory swept away by the revolutionizing spirit of radical democracy.193  For 
him, slaves sufficed to help with the duties assigned them by Magnesia’s magistrates.  
Aristotle, whose approach was vastly more practical in orientation, allowed for both 
slaves and dependents.  And he was more explicit in his understanding of the 
relationship between slave and master: it was that of body and soul, the one to serve, 
the other to command.  Seen in this light, magistrates of the polis were masters 
endowed with the power to command.  Slaves who might make up part of their staffs 
were there to serve.  Of importance for later conceptions of bureaucracy, of course, is 
the focus in ancient literature on the status of citizen as someone apart, capable of 
deliberation, and the nature of magistracies as offices held by these free citizens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193Conover seems largely to accept the disappearance of patronage, yet also 
acknowledges that wealth and, if anything, the habits of patronage still existed, even 
if, as with Cleon, that patronage came at state expense. K. Conover, Bribery in 
Classical Athens, Princeton University, dissertation, 2010, Ch.2 
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capable of making decisions and answering for their actions, their staffs simply 






Bureaucracy in the Res Publica, Real and Imagined 
 
Magistrates of the Roman republic held office by election.  They were not 
professionals, but amateurs, generally of a certain class, and endowed with wealth 
and the right amount of social support in the form of friends and dependents.  To 
carry out their functions, they had staffs of varying size, drawn from either their own 
circle or the state’s pool of lesser assistants, made up of freedmen, slaves, and free 
persons of various circumstance.  In literary and philosophical sources, these people 
barely figure, known mostly by their functions, often unnamed.  Given their 
important role as instruments of official will, it might be surprising that Roman ideas 
about the state do not address them.  In fact, it is not since, as was the case with Plato 
and Aristotle, their subordinate status could be taken for granted, and the issue of free 
citizens in a state largely boiled down to the proper structuring of the interests of the 
right kind of people: in other words, the class of persons expected to serve as 
magistrates.  Moreover, these mostly anonymous figures who supported magistrates 
did not occupy positions of political power, and that made all the difference.  Those 
positions were held by their social betters who, at least in theory, could take for 
granted that their orders would be followed. 
Although the idea of a Roman bureaucracy usually brings up images of an 
elaborate system staffed by thousands, this picture betters suits the empire of late 
antiquity, not the Republic of the second and first centuries BC.194  Nevertheless, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194On the later empire’s bureaucracy, see, for example, A. Jones, The Later Roman 
Empire 284-602, Baltimore, 1986, v. 1, Ch. 16.  Jones reckons the number of 
bureaucrats at roughly 30,000, which, being derived in part from the Notitia 
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Republican government did have staffs of officials that represent for the present 
purpose a kind of bureaucratic system, however spare.  Before turning to that system, 
however, it will be useful to sketch of the Republican government, which lasted more 
or less continuously from the fifth through the first century BC.195  To be sure, the 
Republic was subject to some changes during that lengthy period, but those details 
need not distract from the purpose at hand.196 
The Republic was made up of the assemblies, the senate, and the magistrates.  
The senate was, technically speaking, an advisory body and its acts, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dignitatum, would reflect the 4-5th century AD.  See p. 1057 with details at fn. 44 on 
pp. 1411-2.  Numbers for earlier periods are even more difficult to come by.  Duncan-
Jones suggests that paying for the bureaucracy decreased from roughly 9 to 2% of the 
budget between 150 and 215 AD as the military portion of the budget increased.  R. 
Duncan-Jones, Money and Government in the Roman Empire, Cambridge, 1998, p. 
45.  The basis of his calculations for “civilian employees” are discussed at pp. 37-8, 
but upon examination appear to reveal an inconsistency.  Thus in table 3.7 he 
estimates that the budget for civilian employees held constant at 75 million sesterces 
between 150 and 215.  Yet part of that 75 million had to include his estimate for 
citizen procurators (Table 3.4, p. 37), which he suggests ranged from 15.4 to 20.3 
million sesterces between 192 and 211.  As that forms a part of the overall, proposed 
75 million (represented in table 3.5, p. 39), it does not makes sense that the overall 
total held constant because, as he states, it varied by 5 million sesterces during the 
period 192 through 211.  At any rate, his estimates are educated guesses, and he 
offers no proposals for the actual number of persons involved.  Harl estimates that 
expenditures on civil administration between the reigns of Augustus and Septimius 
Severus might have rivaled the demands of the military, and between the reigns of 
Caracalla and Constantine he cites a ten-fold increase in the number of senior civil 
servants. K. Harl, Coinage in the Roman Economy: 300 B.C. to A.D. 700, Baltimore, 
1996, pp. 227-8.  Thus, he appears to estimate administrative expenditure as 
something like four times the estimate of Duncan-Jones.  No one ventures to guess as 
the cost of administration during the Republic. 
195The traditional date for the expulsion of the kings is 509 BC; the Republic 
experienced several interruptions of relatively brief length, such as during the period 
of the decemvirate in the mid-fifth century and the period of Sulla’s domination in the 
early 1st century. 
196For example, changes in the numbers of magistrates, the composition of the 
standing courts, the gradual opening of offices to plebeians, and other such historical 
modifications do not really need to be addressed here.  A useful overview of the 
Republic’s institutions can be found in Finer, Government, v. 1, Ch. 4, p. 397ff. 
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senatusconsulta, were not laws.  Nonetheless, it dominated foreign affairs, although 
declarations of war were traditionally matters for the popular assembly.  The senators, 
whose numbers varied over the years, typically were former magistrates, and they sat 
for life, unless expelled.197  Socially, members of the senate were wealthy and 
aristocratic.  It was not a gathering of ordinary folk, nor was it a body to which any 
ambitious person could reasonably aspire.198  Apart from the Senate, the Republic 
also had several bodies where citizens decided various matters.  These were the three 
comitia where citizens met and voted by century (comitia centuriata), tribe (comitia 
tributa), or parish (comitia curiata).  For political purposes, the comitia centuriata 
and comitia tributa were the ones that mattered. The former elected the higher 
magistrates and decided on whether or not to go to war.   Citizens, assembled as 
centuries organized on the basis of wealth and voted in century order, wealthiest to 
poorest, until a majority was reached, each century casting one collective vote 
regardless of the actual number of citizens making up each unit.  This effectively 
pushed the balance in favor of the wealthy, who voted first, and whose centuries were 
sufficiently numerous to be capable of resolving questions before the poorer centuries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197Even so-called novi homines were not ordinary bumpkins: Marius and Cicero both 
had important backing that enabled them to achieve the consulship.  To be sure, 
Catiline was able to throw Cicero’s social status in his face, calling him an 
“inquilinus,” the equivalent, perhaps of calling someone nowadays “a mere 
immigrant,” but Cicero was no prole.  S. Handford, Sallust: The Jugurthine War/The 
Conspiracy of Catiline, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1985 [1963], p. 198 
(37.1); Gaeus Julius Caesar greatly expanded the senate and enrolled persons of 
widely varying social backgrounds, including some freedmen, Gauls, and centurions. 
H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, London, 1977 [1959], pp. 151-2.  Caesar was 
apparently unbothered by criticism on this point, observing that “’If bandits and cut-
throats had helped to defend my honour, I should have shown them gratitude in the 
same way.’” (emphasis added)  R. Graves, Suetonius: The Twelve Caesars, Penguin 
Classics, London, 2003 [1957], p. 34 (Divus Iulius 72) 
198See M. Beard and M. Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic, Ithaca, 1985, pp. 40-7 
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would be called upon.  In the comitia tributa, citizens voted as tribes, with each tribe 
casting a single, collective vote.  Tribes were distinguished on the basis of being 
either rural or urban.  Because many of the urban poor were enrolled in the four urban 
tribes, while wealthy landowners, who could travel to Rome or already resided there, 
were in the 31 rural tribes, the weight again was in favor of the wealthy, although 
voting was simultaneous, not in order as with comitia centuriata.  The comitia tributa 
voted on lesser magistrates and matters put before it by the convening official.  There 
also existed a concilium plebis, the composition of which made it very similar to that 
of the comitia tributa.  Its enactments, the plebiscita, had the force of law.  All 
assemblies were limited to voting “yes” or “no” on proposals.  They were not fora for 
debate or discussion, as this function was fulfilled at gatherings known as contiones.  
Thus deliberation and voting occurred separately. 
The third component of the Republic consisted of the magistrates, officers 
elected for a year to carry out the day-to-day business of government.  There exists a 
fundamental distinction between magistrates invested with imperium, or the ability to 
command an army, and those without it.199   The senior magistrates were the praetors 
and consuls, and they were elected in the comitia centuriata; the praetors were 
judicial figures, and the two consuls amounted to the heads of state.  Both had the 
authority to command armies.  Lictors attended the consuls and praetors, bearing the 
famous rods and axes, or fasces, symbolizing their imperium.  The more numerous, 
lesser magistrates lacked imperium, had more circumscribed areas of competence, 
and served upon election by the comitia tributa.  These were the quaestors, aediles, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199s.v., imperium, New Pauly, v. 6 
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and tresviri capitales.  The sphere of competence for quaestors was finance, for the 
aediles, markets; the tresviri were concerned with maintaining security within Rome, 
although they were not policeman in any modern sense.  Thus, the tresviri, despite 
not having imperium, did have lictors at their disposal.  All told there were perhaps 
some 80 magistracies open for election every year.200  To be sure, the foregoing is a 
bear sketch of the Republic’s institutions: they were more complex and they 
underwent changes during the five centuries of their operation.  But this is sufficient 
to provide a rough outline of the Republic’s so-called “mixed constitution.”201 
To perform their duties, office holders were often helped by men made 
available to them from either their own or the state’s resources.  These assistants, 
slave and free, were known categorically as apparitores or accensi, and those directly 
in the state’s service represented something of a bureaucracy, however 
rudimentary.202  The term, apparitor, in fact, covers a wide range of skilled and semi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200Finer, Government, p. 407.  Other magistracies, such as the censorship, the 
tribunate, and the dictatorship, existed, but need not be addressed.  Similarly, the 
religious colleges can be passed over.  On religion in the late Republic, see Beard and 
Crawford, op. cit., ch. 3. 
201In the Histories, Polybius famously described the Republic as a mixed constitution, 
combining as the democratic element, the assemblies, as the aristocratic, the senate, 
and as the monarchic, the consulate.  W. Paton, trans., Polybius: The Histories, LCL 
138, Cambridge, 1979 [1923], v. 3, pp. 294-7 (6.10.11-2) 
202Finer acknowledges that these men existed, but asserts that the Republic had no 
bureaucracy. “There was no bureaucracy: it is essential to note this.  Continuity – a 
feature of bureaucracies – was provided elsewhere, by the Senate, in practice.  As for 
execution and implementation of the magistrates’ orders, each of them had a salaried 
staff of various lictors, scribes, messengers, and heralds.” (emphasis in original) p. 
406; later he writes, “Under the Republic, as we have seen, the magistrate carried out 
his duties with the assistance of his private consilium and his freedmen and slaves.” p. 
549  These two passages are contradictory, and it is clear that the permanence of the 
scribes (scribae), for example, did represent the supposedly lacking “continuity.”  
Cato Uticensis, ever fastidious, chaffed at this very thing when he sought to root out 
corruption in the treasury and found his wish to get rid of rotten staff thwarted. 
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skilled individuals permanently employed by the state.  For example, lictors 
(lictores), heralds (praecones), scribes (scribae), and messengers (viatores) are 
government-paid apparitores.203  These better known staffs were organized in pools 
or “corporations” known as decuriae that were ranked according to seniority and 
prestige; the organization of lesser bureaucrats is obscure.204  Many of these men 
were of lower social status, often being freedmen, but this was not always the case.  A 
few either had or had acquired wealth while in their post, and there are exceptional 
instances in which the odd man actually came to hold office.205  For example, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Plutarch, Cato Minor 16 = B. Perrin, trans., Plutarch’s Lives, v. 8, LCL 100, 
Cambridge, 1959 [1919], pp. 268-73  More importantly, Cicero himself explicitly 
points out the imbalance in expertise between magistrates and their assistants: 
“…most people holding office, because of their ignorance of law, are just as 
knowledgeable as their assistants want them to be.” J. Zetzel, Cicero: On the 
Commonwealth and On the Laws, CTHPT, 2008 [1999], p. 175 (Laws 3.48).  This 
disparity of knowledge between those who decide and those who execute is a 
common theme among those who worry about bureaucratic power. 
203T. Mommsen, “De apparitoribus magistratuum Romanorum,” Rheinisches 
Museum für Philologie 6 (1848), pp. 1-57; A. Jones, “The Roman civil service 
(clerical and sub-clerical grades),” Journal of Roman Studies 39 (1949), pp. 38-55; N. 
Purcell, “The apparitores: a study in social mobility,” Papers of the British School in 
Rome 51 (1983), pp. 125-73; E. Badian, “The scribae of the Roman Republic,” Klio 
71:2 (1989), pp. 582-603; J. Stambaugh, The Ancient Roman City, Baltimore, 1988, 
pp. 103-4 and 114-6  The tresviri capitales relied upon public slaves to assist them in 
carrying out executions and maintaining some kind of public order.  Stambaugh, op. 
cit., p. 125; S. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy: Books VI-X, Oxford, 2005, v. 3, p. 
621 (ad loc., 9.46.3) 
204“corporations” is from R. MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome, New 
Haven, 1988, p. 124.  The actual mechanics of scribal assignment to individual 
officials is unclear; apparently, they supported both senior and junior magistrates.  
Badian argues that Sulla retained the decuriae already in place precisely because to 
do otherwise would have meant the loss of much experience, i.e., continuity, needed 
for the Republic’s routine administration. Badian, op. cit., p. 598 
205Purcel argues that these men were “social climbers.”  op. cit.  As MacMullen 
points out, what impresses is the fact that despite their small salaries men would pay 
for the post and had the potential to end their careers as wealthy men.  Clearly they 
took for granted that these posts would be a source of rents.  op. cit., pp. 124-6; C. 
Kelly, Ruling the Later Roman Empire, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 133-6 
 81 
scriba, Gnaeus Flavius became curule aedile in 304 BC; Marcus Claudius Glicia, 
momentary dictator in 249; Gaeus Cicereius, praetor in 173.206  These cases were 
rare, nor do they represent the many nameless figures found in literature, 
anonymously and automatically carrying out the commands of magistrates.  Indeed, 
this anonymity is significant: it emphasizes that these men served, or were expected 
to serve, as mere appendages to whatever officials they served.  Their function masks 
their person, reinforcing an ideology juxtaposing named officials whose will and 
agency instantiate the Republic against their nameless helpers.  When they are named, 
the naming serves a purpose: perhaps to mark them as unusually successful or 
worthy, perhaps to mark them as particularly reprehensible or vile. 
Cicero in his prosecution against Verres, Sicily’s corrupt governor whose case 
was so hopeless that he left Rome rather than await the final verdict, preserves the 
names of several officials.  But their names survive because the acts in which they 
engaged on behalf of the governor were so utterly reprehensible.  There is Sextius, the 
lictor, for example, who unhesitatingly beat Gaeus Servilius to death at Lilybaeum 
because he had insulted the boss.207  Servilius had spoken disparagingly of Verres, 
who, upon learning this, promptly had him brought to court.  When he refused to pay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206Badian provides a prosopography of Republican scribae. op. cit.  On Gnaeus 
Flavius, see Oakley, Livy, v. 3, ad loc. 9.46.1-15, pp. 600-15.  That some scribae 
came to hold office does not say much about their social status.  Cf. the case 
preserved in the Digest (1.14.3) of Barbarius or Barbatius Philippus, a runaway slave 
who held the praetorship in the parlous 40s BC.  A. Watson, ed., The Digest of 
Justinian, Philadelphia, 1998, v. 1; R. Syme, “Who was Vedius Polio?,” Journal of 
Roman Studies, 51.1 (1961), pp. 23-30, Barbatius at pp. 24-5.  The scribae are the 
best understood of the staffs.  See also, C. Damon, “Sex. Cloelius, Scriba,” Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology 94 (1992), pp. 227-50  
207In Verrem 5.54.140-2 = L. Greenwood, trans., Cicero: The Verrine Orations, v. 2, 
LCL 293, Cambridge, 1960 [1935], pp. 620-3 
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bond, Verres set his lictors, experts at the rod, on Servilius; as the task reached a 
crescendo, Sextius joined in, until Servilius, covered in blood and lying on the 
ground, had a change of heart and agreed to pay bond.208  He later died of his wounds.  
Killing was allegedly a regular part of his duties, although, when matters were less 
impromptu, Sextius could modulate the coup de grâce, depending on what the victim, 
or the victim’s family, might pay.209  Clearly, the rods and axes borne by the lictors 
were not mere props: they were literally tools of the trade, but lictoring was not 
simply a matter of earning a living by the sweat of one’s brow.210  Lictors had other, 
less physically demanding tasks, such as running errands, clearing the way as the 
magistrate passed through a crowd, knocking on doors before a magistrate’s entry.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208Lictors normally kept order in court. Cf. Cicero’s comment about the lictor of G. 
Octavius. D. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero’s Letters to his Friends, Atlanta, 1988, p. 654 
(1.1.7.21) 
209In Verrem 5.45.118  Of course, inflicting punishment was a lictor’s duty; Cicero’s 
point is the abuse of Verres.  Cf. Pro G. Rabirio 4.13 = H. Hodge, trans., Cicero: The 
Speeches, LCL 252, Cambridge, 1966 [1927], pp. 462-5; Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 
2.3.1 = J. Rolfe, trans., The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, v. 1, LCL 195, Cambridge, 
1961 [1927], pp. 128-9 Cicero connects bribery and the use of lictors in his speech 
against Piso, although it is Piso who gets the money, leaving the dirty work to the 
lictors, presumably. In Pisonem 83-4 with comments ad loc., R. Nisbet, ed., Cicero: 
In L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio, Oxford, 1975 [1961], pp. 152-3 
210Consider, for example, the senatusconsultum de aquaeductibus of 11 BC, printed 
in V. Ehrenberg and A. Jones, Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and 
Tiberius, Oxford, 1949, p. 113-5 (278).  Technically speaking this is post-Republican, 
but interesting in particular for stating, “…since they [sc., the officials in charge of 
public waterworks] are outside the city for this business, this body has decided that 
they shall have two lictors….”  Presumably these lictors would symbolize their 
authority and, perhaps, keep locals from interfering with their tasks.  Cf. W. Nippel, 
“Policing Rome,” Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984), pp. 20-9: although lictores 
were not bodyguards, they would enforce compliance. pp. 22-3 
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all this, of course, their role was to execute their master’s will without hesitation, and, 
as Cicero advised his brother, even to serve as aids to an official’s mildness.211 
Scribes too, as mentioned earlier, generally remained unnamed figures, unless 
their identification served a purpose.  Cicero mentions the two who served him when 
he was quaestor,  Lucius Mamilus and Lucius Sergius, precisely because they were 
frugal and honorable, unlike the staff working for Verres.212  At any rate, the men 
who kept the state books and oversaw the public records were supposed to be 
honorable.213  Indeed, they probably had to swear an oath upon assuming their official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero’s Letters, p. 651 (1.1.4.13)  Plutarch reports that, when 
summoned, Fabius Maximus happily submitted to his son’s lictor, the lictor, of 
course, being merely an agent of the consul’s authority. I. Scott-Kilvert, trans., 
Plutarch: Makers of Rome, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1981 [1965], p. 79, 
(Fabius Maximus 24); Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 2.2.13 = Rolfe, op. cit., pp. 126-7 
212In Verrem, = Greenwood, op. cit., pp. 222-5  Perhaps it is something of a trope to 
claim that one’s own apparitores are frugal and honorable.  To admit the opposite 
would surely represent a failure on the part the man they supposedly served.  Cf. 
Cato’s claim that he “never gave wine money to his apparitores and friends, nor did 
[he] make them wealthy to the detriment of the state.” How unlike the staff of Verres! 
Cato 173 (De Sumptu Suo) = Fronto 1.2 = C. Haines, trans., The Correspondence of 
Marcus Cornelius Fronto, v. 2, LCL 113, Cambridge, 1957 [1920], pp. 44-7 
213De Domo Sua  74 = N. Watts, trans., Cicero: The Speeches, v. 11, LCL 158, 
Cambridge, 1965 [1923], pp. 220-3; cf. In Verrem, 3.79.183 = Greenwood, op. cit., 
pp. 224-7; Oakley, op. cit, ad loc. 9.46.1-2, pp. 615-6 On archives, see P. Culham, 
“Archives and Alternatives in Republican Rome,” Classical Philology 82.2 (Apr. 
1989), pp. 100-15  Cf. Pro Archia 8 = Watts, op. cit., pp. 14-5  State archives were 
staffed albeit imperfectly.  Cicero complains, “…the laws are what our clerks 
(apparitores) want them to be: we get them from scribes, and we have no 
authenticated public record in the public archives.” Laws, p. 174 (3.46).  Fraenkel’s 
practical comment says it all: “If an interested party wanted to have access to certain 
official documents, the scribae had to produce the volume in question and see to it 
that authentic copies were made.”  This perhaps idealizes the situation, but rings true. 
E. Fraenkel, Horace, Oxford, 1980 [1957], p. 14.  On the other hand, sometimes it 
was hardly worth the effort to bother with the “official” archives, and aristocrats often 
relied on their own memories.  Cf. Polybius, Histories, 3.26 (Paton, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 
60-3) and 22.9 (Paton, op. cit., v. 5, pp. 360-5), where, in the former case, ranking 
Romans often relied on memory regarding the content of treaties, while in the latter, it 
was ranking Acheans.  The preservation of the acta senatus, or minutes of the senate, 
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duties.214  Cicero stresses the point that they had to be honorable precisely because of 
their responsibilities.215  But these are the higher ranked apparitores.  The lower-
ranking, perhaps unsurprisingly, remain nameless.  For example, messengers 
(viatores), who could compel individuals to appear directly before a magistrate, are 
known only by their jobs.  Thus, as tribune of the people, Vatinius dispatched his 
viator to the home of Marcus Bibulus, the consul, to drag him by force (vi) thence.216  
Cicero says this was a completely illegal, not to mention immoral, act, yet there is no 
hint that the messenger hesitated: rather, he carried out the tribune’s instructions, as 
men of his profession were expected to do.  Of course, those were violent times: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was apparently haphazard during the Republic.  See R. Talbert, The Senate of 
Imperial Rome, Princeton, 1984, pp. 308-23  The speech of Cato Uticensis during the 
Catilinarian conspiracy was, according to Plutarch, only preserved because Cicero 
brought dictation specialists to the senate to record the proceedings. Cato Minor 23.3 
= Perrin, op. cit., pp. 288-91 Unfortunately, the study by Metz of stenography sheds 
no light on those who took down senatorial minutes.  A. Metz, “Die 
Entstehungsgeschichte der römischen Stenographie,” Hermes 66.1 (Jan. 1931), pp. 
369-86 
214Oakley, Livy, v. 3, pp. 618-9 (ad loc. 9.46.2); according to Oakley, the oath taken 
by scribae at Urso is thought to be similar or identical to the oath taken by Rome’s 
scribae.  For the oath, see N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, Roman Civilization, 
Sourcebook I: The Republic, New York, 1966 [1951], p. 424 (Sect. 81) 
215See Damon’s comments regarding Cicero’s reasons to speak thus.  
216In Vatinium 22 = R. Gardner, trans., Cicero: The Speeches, v. 12, LCL 309, 
Cambridge, 1966 [1958], pp. 266-9 Bibulus, who was Caesar’s colleague, had tried to 
block Caesar’s legislation.  His fasces were smashed in the ensuing riot, and he ran 
home to save his skin.  D. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero, London, 1971, p. 50; D. 
Stockton, Cicero: A Political Biography, Oxford, 1988 [1971], p. 169; M. Gelzer, 
Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Cambridge, 1968, p. 79  See also Varro’s 
comments regarding the distinction between magistrates with imperium, who have 
lictors and the right of vocatio, and those who have the right of prensio through their 
viatores.  Most interesting is his observation that many tribunes because of their 
inexperience (imperiti) wrongly believed that they too had the right of vocatio.  The 
hazards of amateur magistrates!  Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 13.12.6 = J. Rolfe, The Attic 
Nights of Aulus Gellius, v. 2, LCL 200, Cambridge, 1960 [1927], pp. 442-5  It 
probably overstates the case to call lictores and viatores “minor police authorities.” E. 
Echols, “The Roman City Police: Origin and Development,” Classical Journal 53.8 
(May 1958), pp. 377-85 
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perhaps the unnamed viator was only too happy to support Vatinius, regardless of his 
job.  Although he did not, Cicero might have named him as a scoundrel worthy of his 
master as he had with the staff of Verres.  Alternatively, any hesitation on the part of 
the viator would have only been too welcome, as Cicero could have used it to bolster 
his condemnation of the former tribune.  But that is not the case either.  The point to 
note here is that this messenger is nothing more than an instrument of Vatinius.  
Cicero never questions that.  
Magistrates also relied on dependents, drawn from the familiae of associates 
or their own: these were the accensi.217  In other words, although the state provided 
apparitores, magistrates might augment these with their own men, known as accensi.  
These accensi were generally freedmen (liberti), that is, socially indebted former 
slaves.  Not that social debts had the force of iron, but they certainly could persuade, 
and the legal obligations of freedmen could sometimes be brought to bear on the 
recalcitrant.  In the military, although information about the role of accensi is scarce, 
generals did rely on a range of persons, from inferior soldiers to “clients, whom he 
wished to reward, or men recommended to him by friends.”218  Perhaps some accensi 
were freeborn; such are not attested, but evidence on accensi is relatively sparse, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 P. Fracaro, “Accensi,” Athenaeum 5 (1927), pp. 133-46; I. di Stefano Manzella, 
“Accensi velati consulibus apparentes ad sacra: proposta per la soluzione di un 
problema dibattuto,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 101 (1994), pp. 261-
79 and “Accensi: profilo di una ricerca in corso (a proposito dei <<poteri 
collaterali>> nella società romana),” Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz 11 (2000), pp. 
223-57 
218A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War: 100BC – AD 200, Oxford, 1996, pp. 
124-5  Slaves and freedmen assisted with military finance in the imperial period, but 
there is no reason to see this as an innovation. Y. Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman 
Army, New York, 1989, p. 55  Interpreters too may fall into this category. D. Peretz, 
“The Roman Interpreter and his Diplomatic and Military Roles,” Zeitschrift für alte 
Geschichte 55.4 (2006), pp. 451-70. 
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especially for the Republican period.  Cicero advised his brother to employ freedmen 
(liberti) and maintain a firm grip on them as he would his slaves.219  He could speak 
from experience since Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther’s freedman, Pausanias, 
had served as Cicero’s accensus during the proconsulship in Cilicia.220  At any rate, 
the accensi were men brought on board to execute without question the commands of 
their bosses.221   That is how it was with perhaps the most notorious of the accensi to 
be memorialized outside epigraphic sources: Timarchides.222  In him Verres found a 
real partner.  Cicero’s rhetoric is doubtless designed to paint for his audience a 
suitably lurid picture, but one point is rings true, and that is his unfailing execution of 
tasks assigned by the boss, Verres.  His job included knowing all that needed to be 
known about the circumstances of men in the province who attracted the governor’s 
rapacity. This amounted to the application of threats or inducements as needed.  
Furthermore, Timarchides peddled the governor’s services: obviously he was, as he 
had to be for the operation to succeed, a man to be trusted, even if he was at liberty to 
enrich himself along the way.  If the ideology of the faithful accensus did not apply, 
Cicero’s argument would have failed.  Yet his audience knew well enough that 
accensi were agents of their master’s will; Timarchides would not have retained his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero’s Letters, p. 651 (1.1.4.13).  Freedmen were obliged by 
law to render service as needed to former masters.  J. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, 
Ithaca, 1978 [1967], pp., 51-5; R. Knapp, Invisible Romans, London, 2011, Ch. 5, 
esp. pp. 173-82 
220Ad fam. 3.7.4-5 = W. Williams, trans., Cicero: The Letters to his Friends, v. 1, LCL 
216, Cambridge 1965 [1927], pp. 192-5 
221“La raccomandazione di Cicerone al fratello di scegliere l’accenso fra i propri 
liberti aveva un reale fondamento nel bisogno di obbedienza assoluta, di sicurezza e 
riservatezza.” (emphasis added) di Stefano Manzella, op. cit., p. 244 
222 Di Stefano Manzella notes five accensi attested outside the epigraphic sources 
(C1-5); the inscriptions are mostly imperial. op. cit., pp. 227 and 234-5. 
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employment without the sufficiently faithful execution of his master’s will.  That 
much was assumed.  But accensi were not always louts.  They could be cultured men, 
like Gabinius Antiochus, the freedman and accensus of A. Gabinius, who 
accompanied his former master during the governorship in Syria, and the epigraphic 
evidence shows that an accensus could take pride in his status and go on to have a 
respectable career in his own right: Marcus Caelius Phileros, for example, who had 
served in Africa as a general’s accensus, went on to hold office at Carthage.223  It 
might be objected that these men do not represent a bureaucratic element in the 
Republic system because, unlike apparitores, who developed experience because of a 
continuity of service that transcended the temporary periods of office enjoyed by the 
magistrates, the accensi were essentially used on an ad hoc basis.  That misses the 
point.  The issue is that magistrates and other officials of the Republic relied as a 
matter of practice on both categories of assistants.  The magistrate used accensi and 
apparitores, both of whom were expected to serve their superiors faithfully.  This 
does not mean, of course, that all apparitores and all accensi were faithful servants.  
After all, Cato’s thwarted efforts to clean up the treasury by getting rid of 
unsatisfactory staff shows that expectation and experience did not always match.  It 
does mean, however, that they were employed precisely because they were supposed 
to act faithfully, not independently of the commands laid upon them.224 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 di Stefano Manzella, op. cit., p. 235 (C6) 
224Though of a much later date, it is interesting that Severus, probably Severus 
Alexander, saw Rome’s subjection to the city prefect’s jurisdiction as a kind of 
fideicommissum. Digest 1.12.1.4  A fideicommissum was a formally trust by which 
the deceased could conditionally bequeath his estate to persons who could not 
formally be heirs.  Thus, for example, he could leave his house to his son with the 
further stipulation that the house be passed to his eldest grandson upon the death of 
 88 
Literary sources similarly preserve this image of staffs doing what they are 
told.  Livy is particularly important here because of the influence his history had, 
courtesy of Machiavelli’s discourses, on subsequent thinking about the Republic.225  
In Livy, the many lictors, scribes, heralds, and messengers exist mostly as nameless 
figures, carrying out the orders of their magistrates.  They are, unsurprisingly, only 
known by their function, which serves to create a cumulative emphasis on these 
nameless figures as mere instruments of authority.  A few examples will serve to 
illustrate this.  The case of Publius Horatius sets the tone; the story took place, of 
course, the regal period, but is cast in terms familiar to Livy’s readers.  The Albans 
and the Romans are on the verge of war.  Rather than have their armies fight, they 
agree to let the war be resolved by personal combat.  As it turns out, the Albans have 
a set of triplets, the Curiati, and the Romans have their triplets, the Horatii.  Thus, this 
combat will be conducted by them.  The Romans win, Publius Horatius being the sole 
survivor.  The triumphant Horatius returns home bearing the spoils of his victory.  It 
just so happens that Horatia, his sister, had been betrothed to one of the Curiatii, and 
she is upset to recognize among the victor’s spoils a cloak that she had made for her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his son.  See, for example, B. Nichols, An Introduction to Roman Law, Oxford, 1992 
[1962], pp. 267-9; A. Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law2, Oxford, 2002 [1997], 
pp. 250-4.  The implication of the quotation from Severus, then, is that the urban 
prefect metaphorically held Rome in trust, with the stipulations emanating from the 
emperor himself.  Thus, the prefect, on this reading, is a fiduciary acting in good faith 
for the emperor.  Perhaps this is merely the legalistic expression of the emperor’s 
attitude towards his ministers; while not so articulated, it is interesting to consider 
how this echoes in formal terms the expected relation of staffs to their magistrates. 
225The fact that Livy did not have to explain much of the Republic’s apparatus to an, 
audience assumed already to know it, has led to uncertainty about features that 
interest later historians.  See C. Rowe and M. Schofield, The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought, Cambridge, 2005, p. 523  In this vein, it appears 
that Livy only once refers to accensi. 38.55.4-7 
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intended.  Horatius promptly kills her as a traitor, and the king has Horatius tried for 
the act.  In accordance with the law, the sentence of death is pronounced, and the 
lictor is ordered to carry it out.  Despite the obvious unpopularity of the sentence, the 
judge issues the command, saying: “Publius Horatius, I find you guilty of treason. 
Lictor, bind his arms.”  The people’s sentiments notwithstanding, the lictor 
unhesitatingly comes forward to execute the command.  Ultimately, the father 
intervenes, and Horatius is not executed, but the point here is that, while a citizen 
might appeal to prevent the execution of the sentence, the lictors never did anything 
but act exactly as directed.226  And, it is worth noting, they were not slaves; they were 
plebeians.  Livy relates, for example, that, when Publilius Volero refused the draft, 
the consuls sent the nameless lictors to seize him – “All of plebeian birth!” – a point, 
Livy suggests, not wasted on the angry, common people.  Although the mob 
manhandled the lictors and drove them from the forum, the lictors themselves never 
hesitated in their effort to carry out the consular command to arrest and scourge 
Volero.227  In a similar vein, Titus Manlius executed his son in the mid-fourth century 
BC, despite his military success, because he had carried out an attack without proper 
authority.  The young man had accepted the challenge of the enemy cavalryman, 
Geminus Maevius, and won the duel.  He returned filled with pride and displayed the 
spoils to his father, who promptly ordered his execution for failing to follow his 
orders, both as consul and as father (neque imperium consulare neque maiestatem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226R. Ogilvie, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, Penguin Classics, 
Harmondsworth, 1987 [1960], pp. 58-63(1.25-6), quotation from p. 62 (1.26.7) 
227Ogilvie, Livy, pp. 169-70 (2.55).  Lictors were not slaves, but citizens. R. Ogilvie, 
A Commentary on Livy: Books 1-5, Oxford, 1984 [1965], p. 374, ad loc. 2.55.3. 
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patriam).228  To the horror of the soldiers witnessing this, Titus Manlius utters the 
dreaded command: “Go, lictor, bind him to the stake.”  The anonymous lictor carries 
out the order without hesitation, the beheaded corpse serving as a grim and shocking 
reminder to all the other soldiers.229  Examples of lictors dutifully carrying out the 
orders of magistrates could be multiplied, but they would only serve to reinforce the 
point: they are invariably assumed to do the bidding of officials without question.230 
Messengers (viatores) and heralds (praecones) similarly serve as nameless 
functionaries in Livy.  As with the lictors, a few examples will suffice.  While the 
herald might be used to quiet a crowd so that an official might speak or make an 
announcement, the messenger’s tasks could be more physical.231  In the case of 
Volero, mentioned earlier, he eventually was made tribune and, together with his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228B. Radice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1982, 
pp. 165-7 (8.7), quotation at p. 166 (8.7.15) 
229p. 166 (8.17.19)  Other Livian examples of this expression are compiled in S. 
Oakley, A Commentary on Livy: Books VI-X, Oxford, 1998, v. 2, p. 450, ad loc. Cf. 
Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 12.3.1-2 (Rolfe, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 366-9), which suggests an 
etymological relationship between binding and the word, lictor.  Cicero in his speech 
on behalf G. Rabirius claimed that these commands, “Go, lictor, bind the hands,” and 
“cover the head and him to a tree,” were no longer lawful because citizens could not 
be summarily executed.  Yet the interesting implication of this claim is that, in fact, 
lictors called upon to carry out these tasks would do so without pondering the legality 
of the matter.  Such was the tradition, that lictors did the bidding of their masters, no 
matter how horrible the command might appear to people. Pro Rabirio 11-3 = Hodge, 
op. cit., pp. 462-5  Legal restrictions on the peremptory flogging of citizens (lex 
Porcia) are beside the point because magistrates were always capable of violating the 
law, as Verres had done, and, more importantly, the issue in question is the degree to 
which a magistrate could rely upon his lictor to carry out his orders.  Livy who is self-
consciously writing a normative history, portrays lictors as reliable; Cicero does as 
well although in the texts cited, he is not writing history. 
230Cf. Oakley, Livy, v. 2, p. 724, ad loc. 8.32.10  According to Livy, the decemvirs 
sat as judges by rotation.  The sitting judge would be accompanied by his twelve 
lictors, the nine colleagues, who were not sitting in judgment, would be attended by 
individual accensi. Ogilvie, Livy, p. 220 (3.33.8) 
231On heralds, Ogilvy, Livy, p. 304 (4.32.1); Radice, op. cit., pp. 201-2 (8.32.2)  On 
praecones, see Oakley, Livy, v. 1, p. 419, ad loc. 6.3.8 
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colleague, Laetorius, attempted to pass legislation favorable to the plebs.  At the vote, 
the dispute devolved into a physical confrontation with Laetorius ordering his viator 
to arrest the consul, the consul ordering his lictor to arrest Laetorius.232   The 
confrontation was resolved by a quick-thinking consul.   Another case of the viator 
being used to carry out an arrest arose during the confrontation between the dictator, 
Aulus Cornelius Cossus, and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus.  The dictator interrupted 
Manlius as he was giving a speech to explain his actions, demanded that he 
summarize and apologize to the Senate, and, those demands being refused, ordered 
the viator to arrest him.233  The viator’s role in this episode is treated so perfunctorily 
(arreptus a viatore) that it serves as nothing more than a fusion of function and 
person.234  That is, the person who was the viator in this narrative only exists in his 
role, a role which is presented as executed with complete automaticity.  The participle 
itself, arreptus, is striking for its physicality, not to say violence.  In the well-known 
case of Rome’s first poisoning trial, dated to the latter third of the fourth century BC, 
a viator was dispatched to make the accused, a group of respectable women 
(matronae), appear (matronis…per viatorem accitis); he simply carried out his 
instructions of the consuls.235  But a viator was not confined to delivering summons 
to appear or silencing the verbose; he might also deliver a magistrate’s messages.  For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Ogilvie, Livy, p. 172 (2.56.10-3)  Although in this tale, the consul has a lictor and 
the tribune a viator, it is clear that viatores were also available to other magistrates, 
such as the dictator. 
233Radice, op. cit., p. 57 (6.16.1-2) 
234The identical phrase is used when Appius Claudius is arrested. Ogilvie, Livy, p. 
245 (3.56.6) 
235Radice, op. cit., p. 183 (8.18.8); Manlius had been summoned to appear and give 
an accounting of himself by means of a viator. p. 55 (6.15.1)  For viator as senatorial 
messenger, see, Cicero, De Senectute 56 = W. Falconer, trans., Cicero: De Senectute, 
De Amicitia, De Divinatione, v. 20, LCL 154, Cambridge, 1964 [1923], pp. 66-9 
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example, during the Second Punic War, the dictator, Fabius, sent a messenger to tell 
the consul to appear before him without lictors in deference to his rank as dictator.236  
Obviously and unsurprisingly, magistrates decide, staffs execute.    
Still, these underlings were human beings, and there were, naturally, moments 
when standards and expectations of subordinate obedience might be violated.  One 
story stands out, for example, because it shows that under extraordinary 
circumstances, staffs might behave like citizens and follow dictates of conscience.  In 
187 B.C. Publius Scipio Africanus, accused by political enemies of peculation among 
other things, responded in a few words then promptly departed for the Capitol.  The 
mass of citizens (universa contio) in attendance followed him, and “the clerks 
(scribae) and messengers (viatores) abandoned the tribunes” so that no one remained 
“except their retinue of slaves and the herald who…summoned the defendant.”237  
The point of this unusual story is to emphasize the force of Scipio’s disturbing 
influence, an influence so powerful that it transcended the obligations of subordinate 
officials.  It is striking because unusual, nor does it undermine Livy’s general 
depiction of staffs serving as functionaries, obedient to their masters.  Indeed, if not 
for the consistent image of obedience, the departure of the clerks and messengers 
would be undramatic, but their decision to abandon their posts emphasizes Scipio’s 
power.  It is an exception that gains in all the more in force, the truer the actual rule. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236A. de Sélincourt, Livy: The War with Hannibal, Penguin Classics, 
Harmondsworth, 1985 [1965], p. 106  (22.11.5) 
237H. Bettenson, Livy: Rome and the Mediterranean, Penguin Classics, 
Harmondsworth, 1983 [1976], pp. 386-7, quotation from p. 387 (38.51.12)  Cf. 
Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 4.18.3-6 = Rolfe, op. cit., v. 1, pp. 368-71; W. Paton, trans., 
Polybius: Histories, LCL 160, Cambridge, 1978 [1926], v. 5, pp. 424-5 (23.14.1-4)  
On this episode and surrounding events, see, H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier 
and Politician, Ithaca, 1970, pp. 216-20. 
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Scribes also appear in Livy, although not with great frequency.  The case of 
Gaeus Flavius, the scribe who publicized the legal formulae (legis actiones) and 
calendrical arcana previously held in secret by the pontifical college, and then went 
on to hold office in the late-fourth century BC, was mentioned earlier.  He is 
important to Livy not as a scribe, although that status had provided Flavius with 
access to secret information.  Instead, he is significant because he was a historical 
anomaly.  Indeed, he was dogged by his status, be it as former scribe, as freedman’s 
son, or both.  On the one hand, he had to resign his post in order to take up the 
aedileship.  On the other, the nobles resented being compelled to show him the 
respect befitting his office.238  Rare indeed was the scribe who broke faith; 
remarkable, the scribe who held office.239  It is, after all, striking that the literary 
corpus preserves the names of 22 scribae, five of whom are mentioned by Livy.240  
Marcus Claudius Glicia held the dictatorship for but an instant; Lucius Cantilius, a 
pontifical scribe, was clubbed to death in the assembly by his boss, the pontifex 
maximus for the sacrilege of debauching a vestal; dangerous religious books, 
purportedly Numa’s, were discovered on the property of Lucius Petilius; Gaeus 
Cicereius, Scipio’s scribe, became praetor.241  Scribae were generally men of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 7.9.1-6 = Rolfe, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 116-9  See also Oakley’s 
comments on the attitude reflected in the passage in Gellius, p. 606. 
239Badian, op. cit. 
240Badian, op. cit., pp. 583-5 
241Badian provides the sources, p. 583-4 (2-5).  Claudius, Per. 19 = B. Foster, trans., 
Livy: History of Rome, v. 4, LCL 191, Cambridge, 1963 [1926], pp. 557-9 ; Cantilius, 
de Sélincourt, op. cit., p. 157 (22.57.2-3); Petillius, Bettenson, op. cit., pp. 464-5 
(40.29.3-14)  The episode involving Cantilius resulted in the execution of one vestal 
by live burial; the other suicided.  The case of Petillius is interesting because the 
praetor, Quintus Petillius, who insisted on having Numa’s books destroyed, had made 
him scribe.  Perhaps there is a connection between the name and the job.  Presumably, 
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shadows, magistrates, men of the political stage.  The creation of the office of censor 
occasioned the decision to provide secretarial staffs to assist him.242  If scribes 
violated their duties, presumably their oaths as well, they were prosecuted.  Thus, 
Livy relates that Lucius Licinius Lucullus, along with several of his assistants 
(scribae viatoresque), suffered in 201 BC for embezzling from the public treasury.243  
Staff faced conviction, Licinius disgrace, naturally.244  More to be expected were the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Badian does not include Marcus Anicius because, although originally a scribe, he was 
a municipal rather than a Roman praetor. De Sélincourt, op. cit., p. 192 (23.19.17) 
242Ogilvie, Livy, p. 279 (4.8.4) 
243de Sélincourt, op. cit, p. 668 (30.39.7)  Of course, given the relative lack of 
precision involved with accounts at the aerarium, allowance must always be made for 
politics lurking behind this case.  Cf. Cicero Pro Murena 42 = L. Lord, trans., Cicero: 
The Speeches, v. 10, LCL 324, Cambridge, 1964 [1937], pp. 198-201, where charges 
of peculation similarly resulted in the conviction of a scribe.  Regarding the 
imprecision of accounts see, Cicero, In Pisonem 61 with comments ad loc., Nisbet, 
op. cit., p. 124: “great detail was not expected,” nor was it given in the case of Scipio 
related above (fn. 237, supra)   
244True equality before the courts always made aristocrats fret over the fate of their 
liberty. Cicero asserted, for example, that true equality between inferiors and their 
betters was most “unfair.” Republic, p. 23 (1.53) Cf. M. Grant, trans., Tacitus: The 
Annals of Imperial Rome, Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1985 [1956], p. 75: 
“His [sc., Tiberius] presence successfully induced many verdicts disregarding 
influential pressure and intrigue.  Nevertheless, it also infringed on the independence 
of judges.”  The Latin is more forceful: set dum veritati consulitur, libertas 
corrumpebatur (“but while fairness was considered, freedom began to be ruined.”)  
Furneaux and Koestermann believe that libertas here means “independence of the 
judges,” the idea being that the emperor’s presence influenced their decisions.  H. 
Furneaux, ed., The Annals of Tacitus, Oxford, 1968 [1883], p. 278 (ad loc. 1.75.2); E. 
Koestermann, Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen, Heidelberg, 1963, v. 1, p. 245  It is also 
likely that Tacitus has an ironic sense here as well, namely the idea that previously 
aristocrats saw the effective use of influence among the judges as an expression of 
their liberty. Thus, Macmullen, op. cit., p. 133  Livy offers some support.  While 
Scipio felt that he had no duty to answer the charges of Petillius, some, in fact, argued 
that “nothing was so essential to the equalization of liberty (aequandae libertatis) as 
the possibility that even the most powerful men should be put on trial.” Bettenson, op. 
cit., p. 385 (38.50.8)  “Equality is impossible without impersonality,” observe D. 
North et al. Violence and Social Orders, Cambridge, 2009, p. 23 
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clerks who dutifully recorded the contributions of gold, silver, and bronze to the state 
treasury to pay for fleets during the 2nd Punic War.245   
If staffs appear here and there in Livy’s history, Cicero’s Commonwealth and 
Laws contain one reference, albeit it an important one.  For in that passage, he 
highlights the problem of disparity in knowledge between magistrates and their 
staffs.246  After all, because of the continuous nature of their position, scribes were 
well placed to accumulate specialized experience and knowledge.  Moreover, as they 
tended public records, they were responsible for providing officials with fair copies of 
documents, a point which Cicero similarly took as vulnerability for magistrates when 
he declared, “…the laws are what our clerks want them to be: we get them from 
scribes, and we have no authenticated public record in the public archives.”247  The 
anxiety appearing here reflects a recognition that, despite the theoretical status of the 
roles, the magistrate being the one to command, the scribe, the one to obey, in 
practice, magistrates might actually find themselves at the mercy of their staffs.248  
And there was little question that Cicero considered these men social inferiors, a view 
his readers were expected to share.  Thus, his mention in On Duties of Sulla’s scribe, 
Cornelius, becoming a quaestor, an implicit jibe at the policies of Caesar, is cited to 
bolster his argument that lust for money gives rise to civil discord.249  In other words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245de Sélincourt, op. cit, p. 402 (26.36.11) 
246Laws, p. 175 (3.48)  Cf. the comments of Polybius to the effect that leading men in 
Rome had little concrete knowledge (agnooun) regarding the treaties between Rome 
and Carthage. Paton, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 62-3 (3.26.2) 
247Laws, p. 174 (3.46) 
248This parallels comedy, which regularly shows slaves getting the better of their 
masters. 
249M. Griffin and E. Atkins, edd., Cicero: On Duties, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2008 
[1991], p. 73 (2.29); A. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis, Ann Arbor, 
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it is during turbulent times that people like Cornelius can rise to positions of 
authority.  Normally, they should not and would not.  They were, after all, men who 
sold their services, thereby subjecting themselves to another’s will and losing their 
liberty.250   
Cicero, no doubt like many of Rome’s social elite, distinguishes between 
those who acquire their wealth and position through honorable pursuits, such as 
agriculture, advocacy, and doing politics, and those who sell their efforts, physical or 
mental, to another for cash.251  In On Duties, for example, he ranks among the lowest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1996, pp. 406-7  As a scribe, Cornelius had assisted Sulla during the proscriptions, 
perhaps by keeping accounts of confiscated property. Sallust, Historiae, 1.55.17 in L. 
Reynolds, ed., C. Sallusti Crispi Catilina, Iugurtha, Historiarum Fragmenta Selecta, 
Appendix Sallustiana, OCT, Oxford, 1991  Cf. the story of Ventidius Bassus, who 
despite humble origins and having started out as a muleteer, met with Caesar’s favor 
and eventually held high office, which offended decent people. Gellius, Noctes 
Atticae, 15.4 = Rolfe, op. cit., v. 3, LCL 212, pp. 68-73 
250Cf. the stoic idea that the philosopher is truly free because freedom consists in 
independent action (autopragia), while lesser folk are slavish because slavery 
consists of the absence of independent action.  A. Long and D. Sedley, edd., The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1992 [1989], v. 2, pp. 426-7 (67M)  Pettit is 
right to see freedom from subjection to the will of another as key to understanding the 
classical Roman idea of libertas, although it is not true, as he claims, that civitas and 
libertas were effectively synonymous. P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of 
Freedom and Government, Oxford, 1999, 27-35.  In fact, as the jurists put it, one’s 
status consisted of libertas, civitas, and familia.  Maxima est capitis deminutio, cum 
aliquis simul et civitatem et libertatem amittit….  Minor sive media est capitis 
deminutio, cum civitas quidem amittitur, libertas vero retinetur….  Minima est capitis 
deminutio, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis commutatur.  J. 
Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutionum Libri Quattuor, Oxford, 1903, pp. 156-7 
(1.16)  At any rate, if libertas and civitas were synonymous, one could not lose one 
without the other.  The jurists clearly make a distinction. 
251The traditional Roman view saw honor in farming.  In De Senectute 55 (Falconer, 
op. cit., pp. 66-7), Cicero’s Cato explains the rejection of Samnite gold by Curius 
thus: “he said that it seemed outstanding to him, not to have gold, but to command 
those who do.”   While acknowledging that trade could be useful, if not too risky, 
Cato reminded his son that when people spoke of a good man, they praised him as “a 
good farmer and good pioneer (colonus).”  Moreover, farmers made “the bravest men 
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and most unworthy of free men “workers who are paid for their labour and not for 
their skill” with the added comment that all craftsmen are “engaged in a demeaning 
trade; for there can be nothing well bred about the workshop.”252  However much 
honor might accrue to those engaged in more mentally engaging trades such as 
medicine, architecture, or teaching, or, one might add, the apparitorial arts, Cicero is 
clear that such professions are appropriate “to the class that they befit.”253  There is 
always a degree of surrender or enslavement associated with the sale of one’s 
capacities.  When he speaks of laborers as those who engage themselves in a kind of 
slavery for the sake of money – they are mercennarii – one must wonder, despite his 
qualification (mercennariorum omnium quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur), 
over the extent to which such reasoning did not apply to the doctors, architects, and 
other such professions.  It is perhaps a matter of degree, the crucial issue being the 
sale of services.  This gradation between slavery and true freedom seems palpable 
when he approves the idea that extravagant expenditure delights women, children, 
slaves, and “those free men that are most likes slaves.”254  While those slave-like 
freemen may be slave-like in their mentality, those who hire out their services, also 
are slave-like.  The free too can surrender their volition to others at a price, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and strongest soldiers.”  Cato, De Agricultura 2 and 4 in W. Harper, trans., Marcus 
Porcius Cato on Agriculture, LCL 283, Cambridge, 1960 [1934], pp. 6-7 and 8-9 
252Duties, p. 58 (1.150)  Cicero explains that payment is a “contract for servitude”  
(auctoramentum servitutis).  Crook says that the auctoramentum was the “oath of free 
men hiring themselves as gladiators.” op. cit., p. 61  Even if the connotation was not 
always of gladiators, the word related to transactions of the demimonde or, to borrow 
a phrase from Cicero, “the dregs of Romulus.” 
253Duties, ibid. (1.151)   “[S]uch professions would not, of course, come into question 
for a senator’s son [viz., Cicero’s, the addressee of On Duties].  Hence, there is no 
question of our text recommending that noble Romans become physicians, architects, 
or teachers….” Dyck, op. cit., p. 336 (ad loc. 1.151) 
254Duties, p. 85 (2.57) 
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doubtless did many ordinary cives Romani, but Cicero’s Republican leaders were not 
of this sort.  They would be men with the independence of will necessary to carry out 
their duties as magistrates and as guardians of the civic community.255 
It is significant that Cicero likens government to guardianship (ut tutela, sic 
procuratio republicae).256 Tutela in Roman law was an arrangement designed to 
ensure that a guardian or tutor would manage the property of an underage child or a 
woman, who were legally incapable of administering it themselves.257  Historically, 
tutela derived from patria potestas, or a father’s authority within his familia.  
Naturally, a familia included women, children, and slaves, individuals who could not 
stand at law on their own.  The paterfamilias as head of the familia would do this.  
Once these relationships are understood, Cicero’s statement that government was a 
metaphorical tutela becomes clearer: magistrates were competent to act on behalf of 
ordinary cives.258  To magistrates rightly fell the responsibility for deciding the 
direction of the political community, the civitas Romana.  The picture that emerges, 
then, is one of the few, the right sort, holding magistracies, and the rest.259  And in 
terms of magistrates with their staffs, the former would make the decisions, the latter, 
execute them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255Cf. D. Potter, “Holding Court in Republican Rome,” American Journal of 
Philology 132.1 (Spring 2011), pp. 59-80.  Potter observes that “political life was 
staggeringly expensive.”  p. 64  This obviously ensured that the ordinary citizen had 
little opportunity to hold office, and that even the elite often ran up huge debts in 
money and favors to serve their immediate political aims.  
256Duties, p. 33 (1.85) 
257Nichols, op. cit., pp. 90-6; Crook, op. cit., pp. 113-6. 
258Cicero, in the voice of Scipio, describes the opposite of the tyrant as kind of “tutor 
and manager of the commonwealth” (quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae).  
Commonwealth, p. 49 (2.51) 
259The image evokes the third class of ordinary folks who are to go about their 
business quietly in Plato’s Republic.  See, Ch. 2., p. 61, supra. 
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The lack of attention paid staffs in Cicero’s political theory need not surprise.  
His concern was primarily with the men who were fitted to lead the Republic, not 
those who would silently help them do it.260  Cicero praised the Republican 
constitution because it assigned something (aliquid) to the “authority of the 
aristocrats (principum)” and certain matters (quasdam res) to “the judgment and 
wishes of the people.”261  The people, who could only approve or reject proposals 
presented to them, did not assemble to deliberate.262  Indeed, when assembled in 
centuries, most did not even vote.  At any rate, Cicero’s point that the people were 
concerned with certain matters (quasdam res) – a phrase that loses force if explained 
away as mere rhetorical variatio – actually makes this point because those certain 
matters were ones brought to them by magistrates, who were to the state, as the head 
was to the body.263  For Cicero, ideal Republican leaders would be wise men 
(prudentes), guiding the community the way that a manager (vilicus) would run an 
estate, knowing the principles necessary to his station, but subordinating theoretical to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260Note that his comments on scribes come when he is explaining a proposed law on 
censors that itself makes no mention of them, which confirms the idea that these 
staffs were assumed and generally required no explicit mention in works of this sort.  
Laws, p. 174 (3.46)  The proposed law (p. 161 [3.11]) is interesting because his 
solution to the problem of scribes controlling the laws is to identify as custodians of 
the law the censors, whom he likens to Greek nomophulakes.  
261Commonwealth, p. 31 (1.69) 
262Recall, though, that citizens did in actual fact argue and listen to the speechifying 
of magistrates at gatherings called contiones. 
263“The rule of kings and generals and magistrates and fathers (patrum) and nations 
directs their citizens and allies in the same way that the mind rules bodies, while 
masters subdue their slaves in the same way that the best part of the mind, wisdom, 
subdues the flawed and weak parts of that same mind, such as desires, anger, and 
other disturbances.” Commonwealth, p. 73 (3.37a)  The use of patres surely means 
senators.  Cf. Commonwealth, p. 28 (1.64) and p. 37 (2.14); Laws, p. 172 (3.40) 
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practical concerns.264  Moreover, they use the state’s institutions and their own ability 
to educate in order to rein in the impulsive mob as much with shame (verecundia) as 
with fear.265  The leader is a “man of foresight” (prudens) who, to use Cicero’s 
metaphor, guides the elephant, “a huge and destructive creature,” with “gentle 
instruction or touch.”266  Cicero does not indicate – the Commonwealth is 
fragmentary – how this particular man is to be found.  His comment, however, that 
attaining this level is a combination of will (voluntas) and ability (potestas) is 
significant: the required study was not simply a matter of intellectual ability, but also 
a matter of the leisure necessary for such pursuits.267  Ordinary citizens would rarely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264pp. 88-9 (5.5).  Cf. earlier comments on the combination of practical and 
theoretical knowledge with the important caveat that philosophical study is for those 
with the capacity. p. 61 (3.6a)  In On Duties, he connects prudentia (“good sense”) 
and consilium (“good counsel”) with the ability to anticipate events and resist 
impetuous reaction to turbulent events. p. 32 (1.81)  
265p. 89 (5.6=3.3 in J. Powell, M. Tulli Ciceronis de Re Publica, OCT, Oxford, 2006, 
p. 92)  Cf. Polybius, whose influence on Cicero’s Commonwealth is explicitly 
acknowledged (p. 41 [2.26]), on the beneficial force of superstition (deisidaimonia). 
Histories, 6.56.6-11. 
266p. 55 (2.67); p. 92 (6.1b)  In Duties, Cicero opposes prudentia, which comes with 
maturity, to the rash behavior of youth.  For this reason, the young should respect 
their elders. p. 48 (1.122)  Despite Cicero’s claim to a practical orientation, the 
implementation of his principles seems difficult. Laelius might observe that “[t]here 
is a fine supply of them among those present (sc., at the conversation),” but the 
dialogue is itself a nostalgic fantasy.  More importantly, in Laws, Cicero concedes 
that his prescriptions are not for men of his day: “What I say does not refer to this 
senate or to men of the present (qui nunc sunt), but to those of the future (futuris) who 
may wish to obey these laws.  Since the law orders them to lack all faults (omni vitio), 
no one with faults will even enter the order (sc., senate).  That is hard to accomplish 
without the proper education and training….”  p. 168 (3.29), cf. Commonwealth, pp. 
87-8 (5.2a)    
267Commonwealth, p. 61 (3.6a): qui utrumque (sc., rerum magnarum tractatio atque 
usus cum illarum artium studiis et cognitione) voluit et potuit.  Given that all men 
share in the ability to reason, one might suspect that other factors, such as the leisure, 
would implicitly be decisive in separating the ordinary from the worthy.  All men, 
Cicero noted, had “the capacity to learn (discendi facultas),” nor was there anyone 
who could not “reach virtue with the aid of a guide (dux).” Laws, p. 116 (1.30)  For 
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enjoy the requisite leisure; indeed, ordinary men hold incorrect ideas.268  Thus, 
although he does not refer explicitly to an Aristotelean deliberative capacity, Cicero 
does make clear the distinction between rulers and ruled, the former using a practical 
wisdom, the latter, like children, women, slaves, and men, who are free in name, but 
lack full libertas, being unruly and dangerous as an elephant.269  
It was by holding magistracies that men would regulate the mob.  
Distinguishing between office-holders and ordinary citizen, Cicero wrote, 
…the particular function (munus) of a magistrate is to realize that he 
assumes the role (personam) of the city and ought to sustain its 
standing and its seemliness, to preserve the laws, to administer 
justice (iura discribere), and to be mindful of the things that have 
been entrusted to his good faith (fidei).  A private person, on the 
other hand, ought first to live on fair and equal terms with the other 
citizens, neither behaving submissively and abjectly nor giving 
himself airs….270 
 
Magistrates, as fiduciaries by virtue of their office, bear responsibility for Rome’s 
reputation and represent law to the people, whose primary duty consists in keeping 
quiet.271  To be sure, they are not submissive, as a slave would be: citizens are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those who had natural ability, however, there was an obligation to hold public office. 
Duties, p. 29 (1.72) 
268Cf. Duties, p. 132 (3.80): “In the opinion of the ordinary man, I can think of 
nothing that could be a greater benefit than to be king.  Conversely, when I begin to 
bring my reasoning back to the truth, I find nothing less beneficial for a man who has 
achieved it unjustly.” (emphasis added)  In explaining a provision in his religious law 
that the ignorant should learn from official priests, he asserts that this is integral to 
maintaining the state, adding that ordinary people (populum) need “the judgment and 
authority of the nobility (consilio et auctoritate optimatium).” Laws, p. 141 (2.30) 
269The violence of the people, after all, would be “much more savage and 
uncontrolled” if there were no tribunes to reign them in. Laws, p. 166 (3.23) 
270Duties, p. 48 (1.124)  Regarding the phrase, describere/discribere iura, see Dyck, 
op. cit., p. 298, ad loc.  On the role of faith (fides), note the ideas, previously 
mentioned, of tutela and fideicommissum, fn. 224 and p. 98, supra. 
271Echoing Aristotle, Cicero speaks of magistrates commanding and being prepared to 
obey as there is a rotation between office-holding and being a private citizen.  Yet for 
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slaves.  But they know their place all the same, and avoid being a source of 
quarrels.272  In the Laws, Cicero expanded on the idea that magistrates administered 
law by characterizing them as “law that speaks (lex loquens),” and law itself as “a 
silent magistrate (mutus magistratus).”273  In other words, law has no effectual 
existence without the magistrate, whose duty consists in determining its application.  
Thus, laws rule magistrates, and magistrates “are in charge of the people.”274  
Moreover, these magistrates should be the “respectable citizens (boni),” whose 
political position would be assured by the elimination of secret balloting.275  Cicero 
explains: “…surely you see that…the real issue in voting is what the most respectable 
citizens (optimi viri) think? Therefore my law gives the appearance of liberty while 
keeping the authority of the respectable (boni)…”276 (emphasis added)  This is a 
world of desert according to one’s station; Cicero’s vision would institutionalize that.  
And these leading men, like vilici or estate managers, would offer the guidance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reasons already mentioned, this should not be understood to imply that Cicero was 
advocating that any citizen could hold office. Laws, p. 158 (3.5); R. Sharples, 
“Cicero’s Republic and Greek Political Theory,” Polis 5 (1986), pp. 30-50, esp. pp. 
38-42.  Cicero’s voting scheme was meant to resolve, in the words of Nicolet, “le 
conflit entre la libertas et l’auctoritas.” If ordinary citizens could enjoy libertas, 
auctoritas belonged to their betters.  C. Nicolet, “Cicéron, Platon et le vote secret,” 
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 19.1 (Jan. 1970), pp. 39-66, quotation at p. 
43.   
272Many were poor, and helping decent, but poor men could pay dividends to a man 
of position. Duties, p. 91 (2.70) 
273Laws, p. 157 (3.2)  Cicero goes on to state that “law is the power to command.” 
p.158 (3.3) 
274ibid.  
275Laws, p. 171 (3.38)  The specific law stated, “Let the creation of magistrates, the 
judicial decision of the people, and their orders and prohibitions be ascertained by 
ballot known to the best citizens (optimates) but free to the plebs.” p. 160 (3.10)  See 
Nicolet, op. cit.:  “Le peuple ne doit en somme avoir d’autre liberté que celle de 
reconnaître des boni, ceux qui sont des gens des honneurs.” p. 63. 
276Laws, p. 171 (3.39) 
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education needed to keep the peace within the political community.  These men are 
Rome’s analogue to the Platonic guardians without the myths and breeding.  If they 
ever were to come into existence, they would have the requisite combination of will 
and ability to justify to everyone else’s satisfaction their status.  Perhaps Cicero saw 
their existence as a real possibility once the turbulent period of the late Republic was 
transcended: his naïve optimism in this regard was no worse than that of Caesar’s 
killers, who themselves seemed to think that the true Republic would emerge 
spontaneously from their high-minded act.277  At any rate, his view regarding who 
should hold office is clear enough.  These would be the right kind of men whose 
claim to such honors was assured in part by their status, a point only reinforced by 
their combination of practical experience and theoretical learning. 
Magistrates, naturally, would not hold office or conduct official business 
solely through accensi or apparitores.  They would also turn to their circle of friends 
and dependents to get things done.  The impact of clients in the political sphere has 
been the subject of much debate, which is something of a surprise since the Romans 
recognized the institution specifically.  Of course, it is worth repeating a point 
previously made, namely, that a distinction must be made between the Roman 
categories (patrocinium/clientela) and modern, sociological ones 
(patronage/clientage).  The former institution is narrower and more specific, while the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277Rawson’s assessment is worthwile. op. cit., Ch. 9  Both the Laws and the 
Commonwealth were composed in the last half of the decade before Caesar came to 
power. On the assassins as having only half completed the task, see, for example, 
Cicerco’s letter to Cassius. Shackleton-Bailey, Letters, pp. 493-4 (12.1) For 
comments on the circumstances, see Stockton, op. cit., pp. 280-85.  Shackleton-
Bailey concludes that the plotters had given the aftermath of the murder little thought. 
Cicero, p. 229.  
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latter is broader, functional, and transcends indigenous labels.  In other words, a 
modern category helps to look past a word like “friend” (amicus) to identify a 
relationship considered by sociological criteria a client.  Not that this method enjoys 
favor in every quarter.  Sherwin-White and Miller, for example, seem utterly repelled 
by the idea that sociological categories might be applied to Romans.  Others, like 
Finley and Saller, find practicality in its application.278   No one, of course, denies 
that social ties were important to Roman society, and even Millar, who describes his 
as an “extreme” position, concedes that these ties, even ones of clientage, had some 
political relevance.279  The debate is really one of degree.  In other words, how 
decisive were these ties for elections and politicking?  Morstein-Marx, while not 
going so far as Millar, has suggested in his study of the Commentariolum Petitionis 
that the issue was not so much the absence of clientage in elections, but rather that the 
nobiles do not appear to have relied upon it particularly: clientage appears to have 
operated among those of middle or lower rank.280  At any rate, whether one enjoyed 
networks of clients directly and at a high level, or indirectly and through lower-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278Sherwin-White, op. cit., Ch. 2, fn. 108, supra; F. Millar, “Political Character of the 
Classical Roman Republic 200-151 BC,” Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1989), pp. 1-
19, esp. 9-17; Finley, op. cit., Ch. 2, fn. 108, supra; Saller, Personal Patronage under 
the Early Empire, Cambridge, 2002 and op. cit., Ch. 2, fn. 108, supra; Wallace-
Hadrill, “Patronage in Roman Society,” in Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., pp. 63-87; R. 
Morstein-Marx, “Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the ‘Commentariolum 
Petitionis’,” Classical Antiquity 17.2 (Oct. 1998), pp. 259-88; J. Tanner, “Portraits, 
Power, and Patronage in the Late Roman Republic,” Journal of Roman Studies 90 
(2000), pp. 18-50, esp. 30-6. 
279Millar’s overarching purpose is to show that the Republic was genuinely 
democratic. Roman Republic, pp. 5-6.  
280For example, the advice at Commentariolum 30 to court the leaders of the collegia, 
local districts, and neighborhoods suggests that these were run by local bosses, 
similar to what is described by R. Joseph.  Democracy and Prebendal Politics in 
Nigeria, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 57-63.  Tilly’s comments on social networks and trust 
are of interest as well.  C. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge, 2007, Ch. 4 
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ranked intermediaries is hard to judge, and does not actually seem to be a very 
important distinction.  What is important is the use of these vertical and horizontal 
networks to further one’s political interests.  It is hard to imagine a politics in which 
that one would not offer help to whoever could offer support.  Sometimes this might 
have been a one-off exchange of services; sometimes something more lasting.281  And 
taking care of one’s own was a duty of office. 
Plutarch gave the aspiring office-holder this advice: “There are also in public 
life ways which are not dishonourable of helping friends who need money to acquire 
it….  For the administration of affairs frequently gives man in public life this sort of 
chance to help friends.”  What kind of help?  “Hand over to one friend a case at law 
which will bring in a good fee…to another introduce a rich man who needs legal 
oversight and protection, and help another to get some profitable contract or lease.”282  
The quotation is late, but not out of place since it succinctly captures that 
unembarrassed expectation of what one should do once elected.  Cicero’s 
contemporaries would have understood, and even the comparatively fastidious Cicero 
never scrupled over helping friends when he could.  Not that such willingness was 
without limit.  His dialogue On Friendship is careful to note that one should not place 
friendship – one could assume a fortiori lesser dependents as well – above duty to 
country.283  That was always paramount.  But he understood well enough that 
rendering service entitled one to service as well.  In On Duties he writes, “[i]f men are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281Commentariolum 22 in L. Purser, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae, v. 3, OCT, 
Oxford, 1902 
282Precepts of Statecraft 808F-9A in H. Fowler, trans. Plutarch’s Moralia, LCL 321, 
Cambridge, 1950 [1936], v. 10, pp. 158-299, quotations at pp. 211-2. 
283De Amicitia 36-9, 42 = Falconer, op. cit., pp. 146-51 and 152-5 
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beneficent, then in the first place, the more men they benefit, the more helpers they 
will have in acting kindly.  Secondly, the custom of being beneficent will make them 
the readier to deserve well of many and, so to speak, more practiced at it.”284  The 
beneficent will help friends out by assuming their debts, helping to fund the marriages 
of their daughters, providing them with the means to buy property, supporting them 
when they seek higher office.285   Cicero’s letters provide several examples of these 
commendationes or interventions with the powerful on behalf of friends and clients.  
To Acilius, the proconsul, he recommends Marcus Clodius Archagathus and Gaeus 
Clodius Philo with the hope that Acilius will “accommodate them in all respects.”  
Elsewhere, he asks that Acilius intervene on behalf of Hippias, whose property is 
“being held by the state.”  As Acilius is in a position to intervene, Cicero asks him  
“to extricate him from his difficulty and to accommodate him in this and other 
matters.”   In the case of Titurnus, Cicero asks that Acilius give appropriate 
assurances so that Titurnus will know that Cicero is “a sufficiently powerful 
patron.”286  Perhaps Servius will take on Lyso as a client, Cicero asks.  Obviously, he 
did not believe that it would be inappropriate to make these requests of individuals 
holding office, and, one may presume, he was untroubled when similar requests were 
made of him when he served as a magistrate.  This was the normal give and take of 
decent society.  In fine, provided the matter did not involve shameful acts (turpitudo), 
friends should be helped even in “somewhat unjust”  (minus iustae) matters.287  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284Duties, p. 83 (2.53)  
285Duties, pp.84 (2.56) and 87 (2.61) Cf. De Oratore 3.133 
286Shackleton-Bailey, Letters, pp. 453-4 (13.19), 469 (13.32), 472 (13.37), and 473 
(13.39) 
287De Amicitia 61 = Falconer, op. cit., pp. 170-1 
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Turning to friends or their clients as needed to get things done was simply a natural 
part of the official’s life.  These people represented just one more set of persons, next 
to accensi and apparitores, to be relied upon for carrying out one’s duties. 
Roman officials in theory and practice relied on several kinds of persons to 
carry out their duties.  These could be friends or clients, accensi or apparitores.  
While the apparitores were quasi-professionals paid by the state, accensi were 
frequently freedmen from the office holder’s household or that of a friend.  These 
men were supposed to serve their bosses loyally.  Indeed, this is the force of Cicero’s 
recommendation that his brother use freedmen as accensi so that he might exert a 
master’s control over them. If in practice this was not always the case, the 
representation of these helpers in Livy suggests that this was at least the theory: 
besides, “always” rarely applies to real life.  In Livy, these helpers are generally non-
entities unless they deserve mention for some unusual reason.  Apparitores named by 
Livy only exist as events.  Perhaps one reveals legal secrets, another finds Numa’s 
religious books.  The point is not the scribae in those two cases, but the event.  For 
Livy these staffs never transcend their function: to become an aedile is to stop being a 
scribe, to find Numa’s artifacts is to make the function disappear into the background.  
The staffs are background persons, carrying out their tasks.  Moreover, the social 
circumstance of Rome was such that magistrates might augment the services of these 
staffs.  Friends and dependents were critical for getting things done: securing 
assistance for one person would allow for the favor to be requited later.  For Cicero 
magistrates are decision-makers and originators of policy.  Ordinary plebs might 
approve or deny proposals, but office holders by social and constitutional right 
 108 
enjoyed the privilege of presenting them their choices.  Only Cicero’s ideal 
magistrates had the combination of will and ability, experience and knowledge, 
needed to serve as law personified.  To be sure, the frustrating reality was that a 
magistrate’s ignorance could actually put him at the mercy of his staff.  But that did 
not change the fact that it was magistrates who mattered.  Choices were for them; it 





Modernity and Bureaucratic Servility 
Woodrow Wilson famously argued more than a century ago that the time was 
ripe for the “science of administration.”288  As he saw it, this would introduce 
efficiency of effort and expenditure to the government of the United States.  Life had 
now become complex, as opposed to the way it was in simpler times, and 
administration grounded on principles developed in the traditions of centralized 
government found in France and, particularly, in Germany, but adapted to the 
circumstance of American democracy, would succeed in making the government’s 
operations “more businesslike.”  After all, as he said, “the field of administration is 
the field of business.”289  Thus, America would need a cadre of officials trained in 
this discipline, imbued with the idea that administration and politics were separate 
domains, the former oriented towards the particular application of laws arising from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288W. Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 2.2 (June 
1887), pp. 197-222; Karl offers useful summary background to the Wilson article.  
op. cit., fn. 2, supra.  
289ibid., p. 209.  Cf. the views of Saint-Simon who argues repeatedly that a 
management class of business has the experience, interest, and wherewithal necessary 
to administer government.  G. Ionescu, ed., The Political Thought of Saint-Simon, 
Oxford, 1976.  For historical background to the rise of bureaucratic business 
structures and professional management, see A. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business, Cambridge, 1977.  Professional 
management was a later development that coincided with the depersonalization of 
corporate ownership, what Chandler describes as a transition from the entrepreneurial 
to the managerial firm where “full-time executives dominate top as well as middle 
management.” p. 415 This development was driven by new scales of enterprise 
resulting from mergers, and actually lags Wilson’s article (Chs. 12 and 13, passim)  
Nevertheless, a substantial degree of bureaucratization, spurred by these vast scales of 
the enterprise, had been achieved by the railroads.  It would appear that in the 
railroads, top management focused on strategic matters, leaving local matters to 
middle management in a way that seems to parallel Wilson’s idea about a degree of 
discretion residing in senior officials. pp.143-8 
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the latter.  There would be no need to fear the rise of a separate caste operating in its 
own interests for two reasons.  First, public opinion, despite the multitude of “selfish, 
ignorant, timid, stubborn, or foolish” Americans would serve as a check and 
guarantee of official responsiveness, and this check would be a necessary balance to 
the “large power and unhampered discretion” needed by bureaucrats to carry out their 
duties.290  And, secondly, officialdom’s “good behavior” would be defined in terms of 
“their allegiance to the policy of government.”291  Responsibility would lie with heads 
of services who could not carry out their tasks if they were “mere passive 
instruments.”292  Thus, discretion would appear to lay with the seniors, while their 
subordinates, in fact, would have to wait their turn, perhaps, someday to exercise 
similar latitude.   
Wilson argued that the failure of political science to address administration for 
so long was due to the change in the complexity of government and the fact that who 
legislates was until relatively recently the pressing question.  In his words, “[i]t is 
getting to be harder to run a constitution than to form one.” (emphasis in original)  
Actually, his claim is only partially true.  Its validity certainly lies in the emphasis 
placed by political theory on the issue of who is the government.  The classical 
tradition was primarily oriented, for example, to the ordering of institutions or the 
organization of the political community, and the role of citizens as magistrates of 
their own government.  But there were implications yet to be appreciated regarding 
the roles to be played by those who might actually assist those magistrates in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290Quotations from p. 208 and 213. 
291p. 216. 
292pp. 213-4, quotation from p. 212. 
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execution of their duties.  Although magistrates might rely on their own social 
networks to accomplish some tasks, they would also assuredly take advantage, as 
needed, of slaves and other kinds of underlings – the kinds of persons whose social 
condition specifically constrained their actions.  After all, magistrates would have the 
power to judge and command; their roles called for deliberation and deciding.  Their 
subordinates, ideally at least, would in truth be their “passive instruments.”293  But 
there is more.  For more modern writers of political philosophy did address the role of 
magistrates in relation to the sovereign.   
The relationship between magistrates and ministers, on the one hand, and their 
sovereign, on the other, is an issue taken up in varying degrees of detail by 
Machiavelli, Bodin, and Rousseau, to name a few.  Their concern reflects a 
realization that officers of the state exercised a power that could actually challenge 
the sovereign.  Thus, despite their diversity of thought, the consistent answer 
developed by them to the problem was to emphasize the ultimate subordination of the 
magistrates too, their conversion in some sense into the sovereign’s public slaves.  
And when the people stormed the gates of sovereignty, Rousseau was absolute in his 
assertion that, though citizens, the people in their role as ministers of the public will 
would themselves have to surrender to it.294  Indeed, Tocqueville said that striking a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293Cf. F. Goodnow, Politics and Administration: A Study in Government, New York, 
1967 [1900], p. 88. 
294On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right 3.18 in A. Ritter and J. 
Bondanella, edd., Rousseau’s Political Writings, New York, 1988, p. 146; R. Derathé 
et al., edd., Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Oeuvres Complètes, Pléiade, Paris, 1966, v. 3, p. 
434: “…les dépositaires de la puissance exécutive ne sont point les maîtres du peuple 
mais ses officiers, qu’il peut les établir et les destituer quand il lui plaît, qu’il n’est 
point question pour eux de contracter, mais d’obéir…ne font que remplir leur devoir 
de Citoyens, sans avoir en aucune sorte le droit de disputer sur les conditions.”  
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balance among the principles of centralization, representation, and equality was 
something historically unique and difficult to accomplish.295  But theory is one thing, 
practice another.  For despite the development within political theory of an ideology 
of official subservience, modern thinking has through the rise of sociology and 
related “sciences”, for example, come also to emphasize the idea that human beings 
regardless of formal constraint do not always do what they are told, a point hinted at 
by a frustrated Cicero in his comment about the disparity in legal knowledge between 
magistrates and their scribes.296  Notwithstanding a strong emphasis in the later 
literature of sociology, public administration, and political science on the frustrating 
independence of bureaucrats, there has been consistently voiced in political theory an 
argument emphasizing that officials were servants in a very literal sense, tasked with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(emphasis added)  H. Mansfield’s observation that “…everywhere in the West the 
modern state was, or was the work of, a monarchy” is a propos. “On the 
Impersonality of the Modern State: a Comment on Machiavelli’s Use of Stato,” 
American Political Science Review 77.4 (Dec. 1983), pp. 849-57, quotation from p. 
855b.  The development from stato as a thing to be acquired into an impersonal 
abstraction is nicely echoed in the shift from entrepreneurial to managerial 
corporations.  Under the entrepreneurial system, company founders and their 
descendants “continued to look on their business empires as personal property to 
personally managed….”  (emphasis added) Chandler, op. cit., p. 381 
295La Centralisation Administrative et le Système Représentatif, in A. Jardin, 
Tocqueville: Oeuvres, Pléiade, Paris, 1991, v. 1, p. 1114: “Ce qui arrive en ce 
moment parmi nous est tout nouveau dans l’histoire du monde....  Nous voulons fair 
coexister en même temps, sur le même sol, trois choses qui n’ont jamais été réunies 
nulle part: la centralisation administrative, le gouvernement représentatif et l’égalité.”  
This article was originally published in 1844. 
296D. Warwick writes, for example, “Given Weber’s overarching concern with 
rationality and efficiency in organizational design, it is understandable that he paid 
little heed to such antirational factors as constituency influences, bargaining alliances, 
and internal conflicts.” A Theory of Public Bureaucracy, Cambridge, 1978, p. 184  It 
is not always easy to decide whether Weber’s writings are descriptive or prescriptive.   
Cicero, Laws, p. 174 (3.48): “…most people holding office, because of their 
ignorance of the law, are just as knowledgeable as their assistants want them to be 
(tantum sapere quantum apparitores velint).” 
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faithfully executing the decisions of the sovereign.  The present chapter is concerned 
with examining this ideology, leaving the persistent problem of official discretion to 
the next. 
If there is one important development to note, it is the idea that depoliticized 
professionalism combined  with the right mixture of rules and law would be a means 
of ensuring the dutiful obedience of public servants.297  In other words, there is a 
palpable shift from the idea that officials might be kept in line through fear, 
elimination, or, in the case of a republic, a kind of honorial emulation, as Machiavelli 
suggested, to the relatively novel idea that loyalty might be the product of an ethos 
generated through proper education.298 This is precisely what Wilson with German 
and French models in mind suggested.299  Yet the point to bear in mind is that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297The goal in 18th century Prussia was to create “…an army of secretaries that would 
constitute a small and non-capricious element of a larger, well-oiled machine.” R. 
Michalski, Creon’s Secretaries: Theories of Bureaucracy and Social Order in 18th and 
Early19th Century Prussia, Ann Arbor, 2009, dissertation, pp. 55-83, quotation from 
p. 75.  W. Dorn notes that the Prussian bureaucracy of the18th century was 
“dominated by règlement.” (p. 407)  Of course, for all that, he also notes that theory 
and practice were not always coterminous (pp. 416-20).  “The Prussian Bureaucracy 
in the Eighteenth Century, Political Science Quarterly 46.3 (Sep. 1931), pp. 403-23.  
On the professional official, see A. Wood, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2007 [1991], pp. 332-6; M. Weber, The Profession and 
Vocation of Politics in P. Lassman and R. Speirs, Weber: Political Writings, CTHPT, 
Cambridge, 2010 [1994], pp. 330-1; Goodnow, op. cit., p. 84ff; F. Morstein-Marx, 
The Administrative State, Chicago, 1957, pp. 24-5, 41-2, and 47-9. Speaking of the 
British Civil Service’s “professional ethic” M. Quinlan writes: “…our job is to offer 
career-long service to the best of our ability and irrespective of personal liking….” 
“Ethics in Public Service,” Governance 6 (1997), pp 538-44, quotation at p. 540. 
298“honorial emulation” is, of course, a nod to T. Veblen’s idea of “pecuniary 
emulation” according to which people pursue social esteem and envy through the 
accumulation of wealth.  Theory of the Leisure Class, New York, 1994 [1899], ch. 2.  
C. Lynch’s interpretive essay in his Niccolò Machiavelli: Art of War, Chicago, 2003, 
pp. 207-8. 
299On the importance of Germany and France for conceptions of the state, see J. Nettl, 
“The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20.4 (Jul., 1968), pp. 559-92, 
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professionalism represents the internalization of a servile ethos.  A senior official may 
retain some measure of discretion, but exercised according to the rules which he 
observes and the ethic with which he imbued, his reward for loyal duty being the 
honor and satisfaction that derive therefrom.   
The present chapter, then, will explore the view in modern political theory that 
sets officialdom’s role as one of subordination to sovereignty, a role that evokes, yet 
in modern formulation, goes beyond some aspects traditional theories formulations.  
Yet, if Greek and Roman theory was explicit in its acknowledgement that these 
subordinate staffs were slaves, modern theory evades the shame of that association by 
recasting bureaucratic servility in terms of official honor.  For all that, theory and 
practice have been at odds, and the more the reality of uncontrolled discretion has 
manifested itself in the literature of sociology and public administration, the more the 
dilemma of control has come to the fore.  It must be remembered that the goal in a 
democracy is to have the will of the people, the sovereign, obeyed.  What is forgotten 
in all this is that these officials are citizens themselves, and it will be this element that 
the next chapter will explore.  For now, the focus is on officials as servants to their 
sovereign. 
Niccolò Machiavelli is usually taken as the initiator of modern political 
theory.  Whether his views were sincerely Republican or not is a debated matter of 
interpretation that has oscillated with the concerns of commentators since his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
esp. p. 567; on France for the development of administrative law, see L. Mannori and 
B. Sordi, “Science of Administration and Administrative Law,” in D. Canale et al., 
edd., A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900, (A 
Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, v. 9), New York, 2009, pp. 
225-61. 
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publications first appeared.  Thus, his work was initially vilified as anti-Republican, 
only to be rediscovered as a Republican, only to be reassessed as anti-Republican, 
only most recently to be found again to be Republican.300  Perhaps nothing is less 
certain.  At any rate, whatever Machiavelli’s overarching commitment, the problem 
of ministerial or magisterial independence is addressed both in the Prince and the 
Discourses on Livy.301  In its essentials, the problem for the prince is a matter of how 
to ensure the loyalty of his ministers, or ensure that they do not form a plot to 
assassinate and replace him.  In a republic, the problem is how to provide an 
institutional or social environment in which magistrates or commanders do not so 
resent the state’s failure to show gratitude for deeds done that they mobilize their own 
retainers to seize power for themselves.  In both cases, the issue is how to ensure that 
the sovereign, be it single or multiple, is not threatened or overthrown by its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300On Machiavelli’s changing fortunes, see H. Baron, “Machiavelli: The Republican 
Citizen and the Author of ‘the Prince’,” The English Historical Review 76.299 (April 
1961), p. 217-53.  M. Viroli’s argument for Machiavelli’s republicanism, with its 
overwrought emphasis on his debt to the rhetorical tradition, seems particularly 
trivializing and unpersuasive.  Machiavelli, Oxford, 1998.  It is odd that he can cite 
Baron’s essay approvingly and claim at the same time that “…Machiavelli’s 
reputation as a republican theorist is a solid acquisition.” p. 115 If anything, Baron’s 
study suggests that it is anything but solid.  For a robust critique of Machiavelli’s text 
as a kind of tyrant’s vademecum, see Bodin’s preface to his first French edition. K. 
McRae, Jean Bodin: The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, Cambridge, 1962, pp. A69-
70; G. Mairet, ed., Jean Bodin: Les six livres de la République, Paris, 1993, pp. 46-51  
Equally banal is Viroli’s reading of Machiavelli and Rousseau: “Republic and Politics 
in Machiavelli and Rousseau,” History of Political Thought 10.3 (Autumn 1989), pp. 
405-20. 
301Q. Skinner and R. Price, edd., Machiavelli: The Prince, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2005 
[1988]; H. Mansfield and N. Tarcov, trans., Niccolò Machiavelli: Discourses on Livy, 
Chicago, 1998; M. Bonfantini, ed., Niccolò Machiavelli: Opere, Milan, (no date), La 
Letteratura Italiana: Storia e Testi, v. 29.  The implications for bureaucracy to be 
found in the Prince differ from those of the Discourses, which is, perhaps, not too 
surprising since they speak of different regimes. 
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servants.302  The prince in civil principality must either rule directly or through public 
officials, which renders him vulnerable because he depends on “the goodwill (la 
voluntà) of those citizens who act as [his] officials.”303  Moreover, these officials 
themselves can develop a constituency of their own because citizens become, in a 
case of indirect rule, habituated to obeying them, not the prince.  Machiavelli 
explicitly states that one aspect of the solution lies creating a dependency on him and 
his government (bisogno dello stato e di lui), dependency, of course, being a mark of 
servility.304  But of what is the government to consist, if not the prince and those with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302It is significant that Machiavelli displaces the classical political typology of 
monarchy, oligarchy or aristocracy, and democracy, with “a principality, a republic, 
or anarchy (o principato o libertà o licenzia).” Prince, p. 34 (Ch. 9: The Civil 
Principality)  This suggests an acceptance of a long, aristocratic tradition that found 
democracy terrifying, and saw in republic (libertà) a freedom assured by power in the 
hands of the right people.  See Saxonhouse, op. cit.; Held, op. cit., pp. 33-4; Keane, 
op. cit., pp. 59 and 161-5.; A. Ryan, op. cit., v.1, pp. 68-9 and v. 2, pp. 818-9  Cf. J. 
Bryce’s relatively circumspect comments. Modern Democracies, London, 1929, v. 1, 
pp. 185-6 and 204-5. 
303Prince, ibid., p. 37.  Although he advocates the prince’s direct rule here, in 
Discourses he suggests that the prince who would control a free community should 
mask his “dominion.” Discourses, p. 177 (2.21)  As is usual with Machiavelli, 
maxims are not necessarily absolute, but must be matched to particular cases.  Cf. the 
case of the Latins who only came to realize that they had, in fact, been subjects of the 
Roman Empire.  Discourses, pp. 155-6 (2.13.2) and p. 160 (2.16.1) 
304Discussed by Mansfield, in “Stato,” p. 853.  Some objections should be made 
regarding Mansfield’s comments.  First, his discussion of the difference between the 
modern term, state, and the words in the Classical authors (p. 850) is not thoroughly 
convincing.  To claim that the ancients did not have a word for “state” is merely to 
assert, perhaps tendentiously, that the words they use did not mean state.  That is 
possible, but it begs the question: what word would they have used for the idea under 
consideration?  Similarly, his claim that constitutions embodied society (p. 850) as 
well is misleading.  Society is famously seen as a modern idea, yet it is hard to see 
how the arrangement of institutions were anything more than one kind of social 
manifestation.  Finally, while the force of personality was indeed great in the ancient 
world, it is important to recall that the offices (arkhai/magistratus) were things, not 
persons, and, as such, existed apart from the people who held them. p. 851  How else 
could they have been discussed apart from the persons who held office?  And yet they 
were. 
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whom he surrounds himself in dependency?  Thus, implicitly, another aspect of the 
solution lies, in part, in the need to assimilate the interests of these men to the 
sovereign’s.  For the prince must be cognizant of those nobles who align their success 
with his and those who do not, but the latter may represent a permanent threat.305  Of 
the former, the prince is to “honor and esteem” them.  Of the latter, there is a further 
division between those who are pusillanimous (pusillanimatà) and, therefore, 
potentially useful (tu ti debbi servire di quelli massime che sono di buono consiglio), 
and those who might have the will and wherewithal to replace the prince himself.  
Not that all these nobles would serve in a prince’s consistory, but clearly those that 
might would either be loyal because of a union of interests or too weak-willed to do 
other than be in his service.  Such could be all the prince’s men. 
To secure and maintain his position, the prince should rely upon fear and love, 
mercy and cruelty.306  Machiavelli famously inverted Cicero’s faith in the power of 
love (diligi) to bind men together in a polity.307   Machiavelli had little faith in the 
mirror of the prince tradition that, starting with Seneca, asserted the prince’s duty as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305Prince, ibid., p. 35.  In this regard, Machiavelli notes that it is a minority who 
“desires to be free so as to command (commandare), but all the others (sc., ordinary 
commons), who are infinite, desire freedom so as to live secure (vivere securi).”  H. 
Mansfield and N. Tarcov, trans., Niccolò Machiavelli: Discourses on Livy, Chicago, 
1998, p. 46 (1.16.5)  Of those who seek command, one must either “[get] rid of them 
(levargli via) or [have] them share in so many honors….” ibid. 
306Prince, pp. 58-61 (Ch. 17) Cruelty must be well executed. p. 33 (Ch. 8) 
307Cicero, Duties, pp. 70-1 (2.23-4).  Cicero, who sees Caesar as exemplifying the 
point, quotes Ennius: “They hate the men they fear; and whom one hates, one would 
have dead.” Significantly, he compares the use of violent oppression (vi oppressos) of 
free men in republic to the treatment of slave by their masters (ut eris in famulos).  
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self-sacrifice in the service of the political community’s greater good.308  This was 
profoundly unrealistic for him, who saw man as motivated by primarily private 
interest.309  To be sure, he argues, love is nice, if one can get it.  But failing that, and 
most princes would indeed fail, one must rely on fear while being careful not to 
engender hatred.  He concludes, if a choice is to be made, “…it is much safer to be 
fear than loved.”310  The crux of the matter is that men are fundamentally unreliable 
and tend to their own interests.  While they might become friends, they may very well 
turn away in a prince’s time of need or weakness. Love too is maintained through 
gratitude, which requires constant maintenance.  Indeed, as noted in the Discourses, it 
was a sense of the Republic’s ingratitude for services rendered that led to Caesar’s 
decision to seize power.311  Yet, fear, engendered by the certainty of punishment, 
keeps them ever hesitant to break faith.  This is a fear, however, that should not lead 
to hatred.312  To illustrate his point, he compares the methods of Hannibal and 
Scipio.313  The former exhibited an “inhuman cruelty (inumana crudeltà)” that 
produced fear in his men, allowing him thereby to maintain control over an army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308On Mercy in J. Cooper and J. Procopé, Seneca: Moral and Political Essays, 
CTHPT, Cambridge, 2009 [1995], pp. 117-64.  “Of all men, however, mercy becomes 
no man more than a king or a prince,” Seneca tells Nero. p. 132 (1.3.3) 
309See the analysis of V. Sullivan, Machiavelli’s Three Romes, DeKalb, 1996, pp. 66-
72. 
310ibid., p. 59. 
311Discourses, p. 66 (1.29.3) 
312The case of Remirro de Orco suggests one method for dealing with hatred when it 
is produced by the harsh policies of one’s agents. Prince, p. 26 (Ch. 7) If Cesare 
Borgia benefited himself by killing de Orco, Maximinus Thrax missed the 
opportunity by failing to act when his prefects, on his orders, behaved cruelty in a 
way that brought hatred upon him. p. 70 (Ch. 19) 
313ibid., p. 60 (Ch. 17)  Note that the “humane and benevolent (umani e benigni)” 
dispositions of Pertinax and Severus Alexander were their undoing.  Marcus Aurelius, 
however, was saved from this flaw because he was a rightful heir and did not owe his 
position to either the soldiery or the people. p. 67-8 (Ch. 19) 
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composed of soldiers from different countries and cultures.  Scipio, however, was 
over-indulgent (troppo sua pietà) and easy going (natura facile). As a result, Fabius 
Maximus accused him of corrupting the army, and a subordinate officer was able to 
ravage the community at Locri.  Machiavelli concludes that, but for the Senate’s 
control (sotto il governo del Senato), his reputation would have not been what it was.  
The lesson to be drawn is that fear is superior to love precisely because love depends 
on the disposition of he who loves, while fear depends on the disposition of the prince 
himself.  The one depends on the subject, the other on the prince. 
The use of cruelty and fear, however, is not absolute.  A wise prince must 
calibrate these tools to circumstances.  Specifically, one must judge rightly whether 
one is dealing with subjects or equals.  In considering the cases of Quintius 
Capitolinus and Appius Claudius, Machiavelli comes up with examples that appear to 
contradict the lessons of Hannibal and Scipio.314  For Appius was “cruel and coarse 
(crudele e rozzo),” and, as a result, his men scarcely obeyed him.  Quintius was of 
“kind and humane disposition (benigno e di umano ingegno)” and proved victorious 
with his men.  This leads to a further conclusion, based upon whether the men being 
commanded are “partners” or “subject.”  With partners, that is, persons of relatively 
equal standing, one cannot “use punishment entirely,” nor the severity recommended 
by Tacitus.315  With subjects, however, one “ought to turn rather to punishment than 
to compliance so that they do not become insolent and do not trample on you because 
of too much easiness (troppa facilità)….”  Of course, this use of cruelty is tempered 
by the proviso that one should not use it excessively, lest one be hated.  Just as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314Discourses, pp. 260-1 (3.19) 
315Machiavelli’s quotation cannot be identified in the Tacitean corpus. 
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prince should rely on fear – fearing being within his control – so he should rely on 
cruelty, yet in no case should this be taken to extremes for hatred imperils the 
prince.316 
Whether or not Machiavelli has in the back of his mind, Cicero’s explicit 
mention that masters use punishment with their slaves, it is worth noting the 
appearance of punishment as the manifestation of the cruelty which he espouses.  The 
subordination of those subjected to cruelty and fear is noteworthy and becomes more 
emphatic when one considers that Machiavelli similarly suggests that a people living 
in a subordinate condition acquires the habit of servility.317  Yet this is exactly the 
condition that the prince requires of those who would minister to him.  These men 
must be dependent on the prince for honors, and they must be reined in by the threat 
of certain punishment.318  Punishment, of course, must be sure, and it should not be 
arbitrary and gratuitous.  Nor should it be applied to any and all: decimation provides 
an example of using the punishment of a few to reinforce and reinvigorate the loyalty 
of the many through the introduction of persistent fear.319  The implication for the 
prince is that control over the stato is retained through fear and cruelty, in the right 
measure and at the right time, as well as the gift of fitting rewards given to avoid 
resentments that inevitably arise from ingratitude.  Thus will he retain the assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316Prince, pp. 63-72 (Ch. 19)  “One of the best safeguards that a ruler has against plots 
is not being hated by the people.” p. 64 
317Discourses, p. 44 (1.16) Cf. Florence’s subordination to Rome, which rendered it 
abject “without thinking of itself,” which means that it had to think of another, i.e., 
Rome.  Discourses, pp. 100-1 (1.49.2-3) 
318Independent gentlemen, endowed castles and personal retainers, require a greater 
force in order to bring them to heel.  Discourses, pp. 111-2 (1.55.4) 
319Discourses, p. 309 (3.49) Cf. the idea that punishment and fear carried out 
periodically to ensure that powerful individuals do not arise. p. 211 (3.1.3)  
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of those nobles whom he does not eliminate when he takes power, being those nobles 
who are pliant and useful or able to see the possibility of realizing their interests 
through him.  These men are subordinate and dependent: they are servile and subject 
to his bidding, a condition that can be assured so long as the prince does not incur 
their hatred or contempt.   
A republic, however, because it consists of free men, demands different means 
to ensure that no one noble seizes power and institutes tyranny.  Machiavelli 
essentially argues that the loyalty of nobles is secured partly by ensuring that these 
men not have the capacity to develop private networks of retainers with whom they 
can challenge the republic, and partly by a divide-and-conquer approach that 
institutes a rivalry for honor and glory among leading men.320  In the Discourses, he 
makes a careful distinction between powerful men who develop their reputations by 
public means and those who act privately or, one might say, secretly.321  One gains a 
good reputation publicly “by counseling well, by working better in the common 
benefit….  One ought to open to citizens the way to this honor and to put up rewards 
both for counsel and for works so that they have to be honored and satisfied with 
them.”  This echoes the advice to the prince, although here the prince’s position is 
held by the people, hence the need for public words and deeds.  Essentially, it 
amounts to proper rewards, i.e., gratitude, when these great men align their interests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320Not allowing magistrates to continue in the same office is another dimension of 
avoiding the rise of a powerful figure. Discourses, pp. 269-70 (3.24) Cf. the 
distinction made in the Art of War between those who make soldiery their art and 
those who do not, the former posing a special danger to a republic.  pp. 15 (1.64-6) 
and 17-8 (1.87-9) Cf. Prince, pp. 68 and 70 (Ch. 19) where Machiavelli discusses the 
power of the soldiery and the defects of Commodus and Maximinus Thrax. 
321p. 276-7 (3.28) 
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with the republic’s.   Yet building private influence leads to the building of a network 
that spells danger for the republic.  It is striking, here, that Machiavelli specifically 
contradicts what Cicero had approved in On Duties.  Thus, Machiavelli states that 
“[t]he private ways are doing benefit to this and that other private individual – by 
lending him money, marrying his daughters for him, defending him from magistrates, 
and doing for him similar private favors that make men partisans to oneself….”322  
Cicero, it will be recalled, in distinguishing between the extravagant and the liberal 
man, had identified the latter as someone who would “ransom captives from bandits, 
or assume their friends’ debts, or help them to finance their daughters’ marriage, or 
give them assistance in acquiring and enlarging their property.”323  Obviously, 
networks thus built, being private, would accrue to the noble alone, rendering him 
more powerful and dangerous to a republic, which is constructed of free and 
politically equal men.  But this is only one dimension of keeping magistrates loyal to 
the republic; another can be inferred from Machiavelli’s consideration of the risks 
posed by successful army commanders. 
Successful captains are dangerous to the prince precisely because their success 
brings glory directly to them, not the prince.  Machiavelli argues, “…a prince should 
go personally on expeditions….  For if they win, the glory and the acquisition are all 
theirs; and when they are not present…the glory is someone else’s….”324  This puts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322Cf. Art of War, p. 15 (1.67) 
323Duties, pp. 84 (2.56) and 87 (2.61-2) 
324Discourses, p. 67 (1.30); cf. Art of War, pp. 16-7 (1.78-83): “…if a king does not 
order himself so that his infantrymen may be content in time of peace to return home 
and to live from their arts (sc., peaceful arts), of necessity must come to ruin, for a 
more dangerous infantry is not found than that which is composed of those who make 
war their art.” 
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the commander in the position of either bestowing all glory on the prince and living 
with whatever ingratitude might come, or seizing power himself.  Another option is to 
bide his time, developing the loyalty of his troops and subjects, doubtless for later 
action.  That is the problem for the prince’s consideration.  For the republic, when 
sending commanders into battle, the key is to allow enough leading men to rise, such 
that their ambitions and jealousies keep them in competition with each other.325  At 
Rome, when not yet corrupt, this created a situation in which commanders hid their 
ambition and derived glory even from laying down office.326  The thirst and 
competition for glory achieved through the bestowal of office ensures, he argues, that 
the people in general need not fear from their commanders.  Doubtless this is helped 
when terms of office are limited in time and not held serially, and when the republic 
itself is militaristic.  It is not a concern for the common weal, as Lynch points out, but 
a desire to retain glory combined with the knowledge that glory is earned and retained 
in competition with like-spirited men.327  The implication from the principle 
regarding military commands is that magistrates too should be multiple and so 
arranged that they align their interests with the republic and achieve glory by public 
means.  The more important aspect of Machiavelli’s advice is the problem that it is 
meant to forestall, even if only for a time: discretion in the service of private 
interests.328  In other words, the issue at hand is how to get officials to carry out the 
sovereign’s will, be it singular, as with a prince, or plural, as with a republic.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325Art of War, p. 17 (1.86) 
326Art of War, pp. 15-6 (1.68-72) 
327Lynch, op. cit., p. 208.  His full discussion of this issue is pp. 207-12. 
328Shumer, “Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption,” Political Theory 
7.1 (Feb., 1979), pp. 5-34 
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would-be prince needs for his officials to carry out his wishes, as if they were their 
own, hence the desire to have nobles align their interests with his; the republic 
likewise must ensure that no one individual rises to a position from which he might 
make himself prince, although it is a regime that provides an arena where great men 
vie for glory.  The desired end in its essence evokes the implications of the classical 
position: the wish for subordinates to execute faithfully the will of their superiors. 
Although political scientists usually identify Machiavelli as the first of the 
modern theorists, in many respects he remains firmly rooted in his predecessors, and 
one is often left to conclude that inverting ancient moral advice and setting political 
effectiveness as the measure of success seems a rather paltry means of heralding the 
arrival of modern political theory.329  Indeed, if Machiavelli claims to propound 
politics as they are rather than as they should be, then Aristotle the empiricist 
certainly presages such an approach.  At a more fundamental level, Machiavelli’s 
approach is deeply personal: it is concerned with the actions of men in a way that is 
quite at home in the ancient world.  There is nothing impersonal or transcendent 
about the state, whether it is held by the prince or by great men occupying 
magistracies and captaincies.  However one may wish to judge that matter, it really is 
Jean Bodin who charts new territory.330  For Bodin makes the abstract idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329Arendt notes that Machiavelli first envisioned a secularized politics that could 
break the anacyclosis of regimes that was and for many remained a fundamental 
assumption about the nature of the political. On Revolution, p. 36; the concept of 
anacyclosis in Polybius, see the comments of Brink and Walbank.  C. Brink, and F. 
Walbank, “The Construction of the Sixth Book of Polybius,” Classical Quarterly 
4.3/4 (Jul.-Oct., 1954), pp. 97-122, at pp. 110-3 
330Even if his concept of sovereignty has earlier precursors, Bodin is the point of 
reference for the subsequent tradition.  Despite the importance of Hobbes, this study 
will not focus on his work because it would largely only serve to reinforce what can 
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sovereignty or maiestas central to his understanding of politics, and his theory is 
fundamental to later conceptions of the state and the public servant.331  For the 
popular revolutions of subsequent centuries, and ultimately democratic theory itself, 
dependent as they are on the idea of the collective people as sovereign, amount to 
little more than a replacement of one man as sovereign by one people as sovereign.332  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be drawn from Bodin.  At any rate, the deductive and quasi-scientific approach of 
Hobbes obscures whatever debt he may have had to Bodin.  As Dunning noted a 
century ago, “…from different starting-points and by different routes, the two reached 
the same goal.”  W. Dunning, “Jean Bodin on Sovereignty,” Political Science 
Quarterly 11.1 (Mar. 1896), pp. 82-104, quotation from p. 84.  Hoekstra seems to take 
for granted a direct connection that is not immediately apparent from the Leviathan or 
On the Citizen (De Cive).  K. Hoekstra, “Early Modern Absolutism and 
Constitutionalism,” Cardozo Law Review 34 (2013), pp. 1079-98.  It is, after all, 
striking that Malcolm’s chapter on Hobbes in the Cambridge History makes no 
mention of any relationship or debt to Bodin. N. Malcolm, “Hobbes and Spinoza,” in 
Burns, ed., op. cit., p. 530ff.  Perhaps it is unremarkable that the chapter on Hobbes in 
Strauss and Cropsey makes no reference to Bodin given the completely dehistoricized 
and decontextualized stance adopted by their approach. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, 
edd., History of Political Philosophy, Chicago, 1987 [1963].   
331Establishing the text of Bodin’s famous book on government is complicated by the 
fact that it went through multiple editions in French that have various differences 
among them and a Latin edition that was Bodin’s own work, but not a verbatim 
translation of the original. These complications can be left to specialists.  For present 
purposes, references will be made to the selections in J. Franklin, ed., Bodin: On 
Sovereignty, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2008 [1992], which contains Bodin’s 1.8, 1.10, 2.1, 
and 2.5; the 17th century English translation of Richard Knolles, reprinted in McRae, 
op. cit.; and the modernized French edition of Mairet, op. cit., which, although an 
abridgment, contains most of the text.  Obviously, where any edition is lacking, there 
will be no reference to them.  For discussions of the various texts, one may consult 
the comments in the editions of Franklin and McRae. 
332This development has been interpreted as man stepping into the shoes of the 
displaced monarch, human or divine.  Note that Bodin himself allows for sovereignty 
“in the people.” 2.5 = McRae, op. cit., p. 221B/C; Franklin, Bodin, p. 114; Mairet, op. 
cit., p. 223  For the transfer of the divine mysteria to the secular realm, see E. 
Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Mediaeval 
Origins,” Harvard Theological Review 48.1 (Jan., 1955), pp. 65-91.  For the view that 
the nation stepped into the role of the king, see Arendt, op. cit., p. 156  For an 
interesting critique of the concept of sovereignty precisely because it implies 
something exogenous to humanity, see J. Maritain, Man and the State, Chicago, 1953, 
Ch. 2  To Maritain, it makes no sense to argue that a people or its creature can step 
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One might say that the concept best suited to describe this is the transformation from 
monarchy to demarchy rather than the democracy, a term that puts the matter of 
power in the forefront and was originally polemical.333  At any rate, for Bodin 
sovereignty is marked by two basic features: indivisibility and perpetuity, which 
together allow no political space to rival claimants and render all else within the 
political community subordinate, or, in the words of Mairet, reduce the political 
community to a matter of the one versus the many.334   This idea’s nachleben informs 
later conceptions of the state, no matter the institutional form.335 Absolutist theory is 
pliable and sufficiently useful to make way eventually for the people itself, once seen 
collectively as a nation, or perhaps even law itself, to step in as absolute sovereign.336 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
outside itself to be the sovereign.   For a more modern version of this approach, see S. 
van Duffel, who, curiously, does not acknowledge that Maritain had previously 
argued for God being the only logical candidate for sovereignty.  “Sovereignty as a 
Religious Concept,” Monist 90.1 (2007), pp. 126-43 
333On demokratia and its derivatives, see R. Sealey, “The Origins of ‘Demokratia’,” 
California Studies in Classical Antiquity 6 (1973), pp. 253-95 
334Mairet, op. cit., pp. 34-5.  Interestingly, the modern salafist concept of tawhid, 
which insists on Allah’s complete and indivisible sovereignty, dovetails nicely with 
Bodin’s idea about the sovereign’s nature.  Radical salafists reject democracy 
precisely because the idea of man as legislator contradicts the notion of the divine 
legislator who, by definition, has no partner (la sharika).  See, for example, S. al-
Fawzan, Concise Commentary on the Book of Tawhid, Riyadh, 2009 [2005], Ch. 37, 
38, and 59 The French rendering both of “unity” in Bodin’s sense and of tawhid is, 
tellingly, the same: unicité.  Cf. Elshtain’s passing comment in her Sovereignty: God, 
State, and Self, New York, 2008, p. p. 134. 
335Of course, the dominant conception of the state is Western.  See, for example, C., 
Coercion, Capital, and European States, New York, 1992; C. Young, The African 
Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven, 1997; S. David, “The 
Primacy of Internal War,” in S. Neuman, ed., International Relations Theory and the 
Third World, New York, 1998, pp. 77-101; J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 
Princeton, 2000. 
336On the law as sovereign, see C. Schmitt, Political Theology, Chicago, 2005 [1985], 
Chs. 2 and 3.  Rawls, whose work, given his totalizing concept of rationality and 
obsessive proceduralism, is not meaningfully democratic, pluralist, or political in 
nature, falls into this category.  A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1999 [1971]  
 127 
Bodin defines sovereignty as “…the absolute and perpetual power of the 
commonwealth.”337  The Latin version of his definition is telling because it includes 
the key phrase, soluta legibus, or “freed from the laws.”  The sovereign, then, is 
above and external to the political community in the following sense: it is the source 
of law, able to modify or abrogate it at will.338  Of course, it should be noted that this 
absolute sovereign is not, in Bodin’s understanding, completely unlimited.339  The 
sovereign’s exemption from laws, of which he is the ultimate source, guarantor, and 
judge, in no way frees him from divine or natural law, which serve as an ever-present 
backdrop to his own activity.340  The limitation on his will then relates to the split 
between the divine and secular realms, and, while the sovereign as God’s “living and 
breathing” image prevails in the realm of Caesar, he remains bound by God: God 
remains the final judge of all, although a wronged people enjoys no ultimate right of 
revolution and must await either the intervention of another prince or God’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sandel’s criticisms of Rawls are completely dispositive.  Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice, Cambridge, 1998; although not written in this vein, Shumer’s comments are 
strong rebuttal to the kind of theory offered by Rawls. Shumer, op. cit. 
337Bodin 1.8 = McRae, op. cit., p. 84H; Franklin, op. cit., p. 1; Mairet, op. cit., p. 110. 
338Maiestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque…soluta potestas.  Quoted in 
McRae, op. cit., p. A75.  This, of course, is the theme picked up by Schmitt: the 
sovereign is “he who decides on the exception.” C. Schmitt, op. cit., p. 5 
339For example, Bodin writes, “…if we say that to have absolute power is not to be 
subject to any law at all, no prince of this world will be sovereign, since every earthly 
prince is subject to the laws of God and of nature and to various human laws that are 
common all peoples.” Bodin 1.8 = McRae, op. cit., p. 84I; Franklin, op. cit., p. 10; M. 
Shepard, “Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin,” Political Science 
Quarterly 45.4 (Dec. 1930), pp. 580-603; J. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of 
Absolutist Theory, Cambridge, 2009 [1973], Ch. 5. 
340Bodin identifies lawgiving as one of sovereignty’s marks: “…the first prerogative 
(marque) of a sovereign prince is to give law to all in general and each in 
particular….without the consent of any other, whether greater, equal, or below him.” 
Bodin 1.10 = McRae, op. cit., p. 159E; Franklin, Bodin, p. 56; Mairet, op. cit., p. 160.  
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punishment for vindication.341  This is obviously cold comfort to the sovereign’s 
subjects.  For no matter their enormity, a sovereign’s misdeeds never justify a 
subject’s rebellion: “it is not the part of any subject individually, or all of them in 
general, to make an attempt on the honor or the life of the monarch, either by way of 
force or by way of law, even if he has committed all the misdeeds, impieties, and 
cruelties that one could mention.”342 (emphasis added)  This conclusion flows from 
the idea that the sovereign is the source of law and shares that power with no one; 
therefore, no person subject to that law can assume the superior position implicit in 
the act of judging the sovereign.  To allow such a circumstance would allow for 
incomplete or shared sovereignty, which is in Bodin’s view no true sovereignty at all.   
Being perpetual, sovereignty endures beyond any given sovereign’s life in a 
way that parallels the distinction between the permanence of a magistrate’s office and 
the temporary nature of a commissioner’s.343  Being indivisible, sovereignty cannot 
be shared with anyone.  Indeed, for Bodin, the very idea that powers can be shared is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341Constituent or fundamental law (leges imperii) also binds, but the people are never 
able to enforce a claim arising from its violation. Bodin 1.8 = McRae, op. cit., p. 95A; 
Franklin, Sovereignty, p. 18.  “God, of whom [the prince] is the living & breathing 
image” Bodin 1.8  = McRae, op. cit., p. 109D; Franklin, Bodin, p. 39  On foreign 
intervention to remove a tyrant, Bodin writes, “…so is it a most beautiful and 
magnificent thing for a [viz. foreign] prince to take up arms in order to avenge an 
entire people unjustly oppressed by a tyrant’s cruelty….” 2.5 = McRae, op. cit., p. 
220K; Franklin, Bodin, p. 113; Mairet, op. cit., p. 222  In fact, he most succinctly 
makes the point in the preface to the 1578 French edition, where he states, “…I 
denied that it was the function of a good man or of a good citizen to offer violence to 
his prince for any reason, however great a tyrant he might be; and contended that it 
was necessary to leave this punishment to God, and to other princes.” (emphasis 
added) McRae, op. cit., p. A72 
342Bodin takes up the issue of tyrannicide in 2.5 = McRae, op. cit., p. 218Iff.; 
Franklin, Bodin, p. 110ff.; Mairet, op cit., p. 220ff.  Quotation from 2.5 = McRae, op. 
cit., pp. 222G-H; Franklin, Bodin, p. 222; Mairet, op. cit., p. 224.  Because he is not 
legitimate, a tyrant by usurpation may be resisted or killed, at least, in theory.  
343Cf. Bodin 3.2 = McRae, op. cit., p. 280G; Mairet, op. cit., p. 267. 
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nonsensical, and he, therefore, rejects the classical idea of a mixed constitution.344  
Thus, he argues, there always exists an authority of final instance, even in the case of 
the Roman Republic, which from Polybius onward had been traditionally seen as an 
example of a mixed constitution.345  For Bodin, division brings competition and chaos 
in its wake.346  To have a division of sovereignty would imply, for example, the 
executive at odds with the legislative in asserting itself as ultimate authority.  
Therefore, true sovereignty can only possess a unitary nature.  It is the translation of 
God’s authority from the divine to the secular realm; only the sovereign can create 
and give law, and set it aside as needed.347 
Bodin considered this matter with sufficient thoroughness to explain exactly 
what sovereign power meant for the duties of magistrates and government officials.  
While his conclusions serve partly a riposte to protestant theories about magisterial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344Bodin 2.1 = McRae, op. cit., p. 194F-H; Franklin, Bodin, p. 104; Mairet, op. cit., 
pp. 193-4 
345Polybius had argued in Book 6 of his Histories that the Roman constitution, being 
mixed, was a kind of inexplicable oddity that somehow disrupted, albeit not 
perpetually, the cycle of regimes (anacyclosis).  For Bodin’s rejection of Polybius, 
see 2.1 = McRae, op. cit., p. 188Fff.; Franklin, Bodin, p.95ff.; Mairet, op. cit., p. 
184ff.   
346The prospect of chaos always looms in Bodin’s mind as is clear from the opening 
words of his preface to the first French edition. Mairet, op. cit., p. 45-6.  The McRae 
edition has excerpted parts of this preface, which preserve by implication some of this 
concern. op. cit., p. A70  Mairet’s French edition is to be consulted here.  Hobbes 
does not, pace Mansfield, stand apart for his opposition to “revolution as rebellion 
against the sovereign.” H. Mansfield, “Hobbes and the Science of Indirect 
Government,” American Political Science Review 65.1 (Mar. 1971), pp. 97-110, 
quotation at p. 98b 
347Bodin argues, “Just as God, the great sovereign, cannot make a God equal to 
himself because he is infinite and by logical necessity (par demonstration necessaire) 
two infinites cannot exist, so we can say that the prince, whom we have taken as the 
image of God, cannot make a subject equal to himself without annihilation of his 
power.” 1.10 = McRae, op. cit., p. 155D-E; Franklin, Bodin, p. 50; Mairet, op. cit., p. 
155 
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discretion, it was also an expression of his theory’s logical implications.348  
According to Bodin, the power to make and repeal law is the first mark of 
sovereignty; from it derives the power to appoint and remove officials, which itself is 
sovereignty’s third sign.349 In any case, magistrates are effectively vicars of the 
original source, their sovereign. Their duties and their relationship to the sovereign 
are treated at length in Chapters 2-6 of Book 3.  Legal scholar that he is, Bodin begins 
his discussion, as he does with other topics, by explaining his terms.  Officials are 
divided into two categories: the ordinary that occupy standing office, and the 
extraordinary that hold positions by appointment for particular periods and tasks.  The 
latter category, therefore, encompasses commissioners because they are created ad 
hoc and hold an office that is limited in duration and scope.  The former category 
formally consists of the officers, who, in turn, are either magistrates or ministers.  
Magistrates are distinct because they have the authority to command, which ministers 
lack.  From this it is clear that the official who presents potentially the greatest 
challenge to the sovereign and his prerogatives, is the magistrate because he too 
commands.  Other officials possess inferior powers.350  It is worth noting here how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348This protestant tradition will be discussed further in the next chapter, but it is 
important to acknowledge it here in connection with Bodin’s own work.  For 
background, see Franklin, Absolutism, Chs. 1 and 3; R. Kingdon, “Calvinism and 
Resistance Theory 1550-1580,” in J. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought 1450-1700, Cambridge, 2004 [1991], pp. 193-218; H. Strohl, “Le droit à la 
résistance d’après les conceptions protestants,” Revue d’histoire et de philosophie 
religieuses 10 (1930), pp. 126-44.  
3491.10 = McRae, op. cit., p. 163E and 166G-8G; Franklin, Bodin, pp. 58 and 64-7; 
Mairet, op. cit., p.162-3 and 165-7 
350Bodin’s definitions and discussion of these officials occur in 3.2-3 = McRae, op. 
cit., pp. 278A-309B; Mairet, op. cit., pp. 264-79.  It is worth observing that Bodin is 
careful to distinguish between laws, which come from the sovereign and apply to all, 
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firm Bodin is in subordinating magistrates to the sovereign.  Whereas Machiavelli 
presents a political stage on which great men act for personal glory – such is the 
world of his republic – or where a single prince must balance the elimination of some 
challengers with the cooptation of others, Bodin posits an environment where the 
very nature of sovereignty itself instantiates the subordination of all else.351  This is 
not a matter of enticing and cajoling: the very nature of sovereignty demands the 
execution of its will.  Here, then, are the true precursors of the public servant as slave 
to a political master, whether a people or a monarch. 
The question remains, however, what do these officials do when faced with 
orders that are manifestly unjust.352  Letters of justice leave to the magistrate a wide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and edicts, which come from magistrates and are comparatively limited in scope. 1.10 
= McRae, op. cit., pp. 156I-7A; Franklin, Bodin, pp. 51-2; Mairet, op. cit., pp. 157-8. 
351Ancient theory is far more consonant with Machiavelli on this point: the right kind 
of men in the right positions, motivated by pietas, use their discretion in the service of 
the nation (patria) or their friends, but always as an act of will.  At Athens, to be sure, 
while there might be nothing wrong with dorodokia or helping out one’s friends, pure 
malfeasance could be dealt with by dokimasia.  In the final analysis, however, how an 
official chose to behave in no way depended on an abstract notion that one was 
implicitly subordinate to pure authority.  On dorodokia, see Conover, op.cit.; 
Plutarch, Precepts.  Cf. the status of Prussian bureaucrats in the 18th century vis-à-vis 
their sovereign.  W. Dorn, “The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Political Science Quarterly 46.3 (Sep. 1931), pp. 403-23 
352It is important to acknowledge that for Bodin officials differ from citizens because 
they are public, not private, figures.  “And first I call them publike persons, who are 
to attend upon the publike affaires: of whome there are two sorts, one which hath 
power to commaund, whome they call Magistrats: and another sort which hath no 
such commaunding power, but is onely to understand or to put in execution the 
commaundements of the others; and are yet all publike persons also.”  Public affairs 
are synonymous with the mundane.  3.2 = McRae, op. cit., p. 278G-I; Mairet, op. cit., 
pp. 264-5 The private man, on the other hand, “cannot by any publicke right 
commaund over any other subject, although that he by privat and domesticall 
commaunds rule and governe his own familie.” 3.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 309D; 
Mairet, op. cit., p. 280: “le particulier n’a point de sujets sur lesquels il ait puissance 
publique de commander….” The question of magisterial obedience itself is taken up 
directly in 3.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 309Cff.; Mairet, op. cit., p. 280ff. 
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field for discretion to act in the king’s name, and, therefore, do not go to the heart of 
the matter.353  By their nature, they call upon the magistrate himself to adjudicate 
matters of equity on behalf of the sovereign:  
…the prince leaveth unto the discretion of him to whom such his 
letters are addressed, to allow of them, or to refuse them, as his 
conscience, and the equitie of the cause shall require: which is not in 
letters of commaundement which leave nothing unto him to whom 
they are directed, except happily sometimes the examination of the 
fact onely….354   
 
Letters of commandment, however, do not generally grant such discretion.  They 
leave to the magistrate only the examination of the facts, not the assessment of 
justice.  In any event, these letters, which do not constitute law, only allow the 
magistrate latitude as prescribed by their content.  In other words, the magistrates are 
free to act in a manner circumscribed by the nature of the letters themselves, which 
ultimately means that magistrates act at the sovereign’s behest.  Moreover, whenever 
confronted by unjust commands or commands detrimental to the republic, the 
magistrate, having delayed execution of the command and advised the sovereign of 
his scruple, one, twice, or even three times, must ultimately carry out his sovereign’s 
order.355  Obviously, Weber’s notion of the duty-bound bureaucrat needs neither 
Hegel nor Prussian bureaucracy as a frame of reference: the notion of bureaucratic 
obedience was already there in Bodin as a logical corollary to the very idea of 
monadic sovereignty.  To be sure, he does seem to hedge when it comes to the matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3533.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 312F; Mairet, op. cit., p. 285 
3543.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 311A; Mairet, op. cit., p. 283 Of course, if such letters 
give the magistrate no discretion, his duty is to carry out his orders. 3.4 = McRae, op. 
cit., p. 312H-I; Mairet, op. cit., p. 285  For an interesting perspective on the nature of 
equity, see comments in P. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, New York, 2011, Ch. 2 
3553.4 = Mcrae, op. cit., p. 313D  
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of implementing laws or commands contrary to the laws of God and nature, but this 
reservation must be squared with the following, one might say, hopeful, comment: 
But some will say, no prince to be found so evill advised, nor that it 
is to be supposed that he would commaund any thing contrarie unto 
the lawes of God and nature: and true it is; for why he worthily 
loseth the title and honour of a Prince, which departing from reason, 
and forgetting the dutie of a prince, breaketh the lawes of God and 
nature.356 (emphasis added) 
 
But to drive the point home regarding the magistrate’s duty to his sovereign, Bodin 
cites the example of Anastasius, who denied plaintiffs the right to cite imperial 
rescripts or letters in support of their case.  Even this apparently clear example of 
injustice did not give the magistrates then, nor would it give magistrates in any other 
case, the right to do anything more than advise the sovereign of the matter and carry 
out the sovereign’s final decision.357  Thus, for example, “if the Maigstrate bee 
commaunded by the Prince to abrogat an auntient law, being more upright and 
profitable to give way unto another lesse iust, and less profitable for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3563.4 = McRae, op. cit., pp. 312K-3A; Mairet, op. cit., p. 286: “Si on me dit qu’il ne 
se trouvera point de Prince si mal appris, et n’est pas à presume qu’il voulût 
commander chose contre la loi de Dieu et de nature, il est vrai: car [celui-là] perd le 
titre et l’honneur de Prince, qui fait contre le devoir de Prince.  Nous avons montré 
par ci-devant que le Prince ne peut rien contre la loi de nature…” (emphasis added)  
To be sure, this conclusion calls for a suspension of disbelief, and Bodin certainly 
knew this.  His discomfiture over this optimistic assertion is clear when he writes in 
the first preface, “He (sc., God) gives kingdoms and empires to the wisest and most 
virtuous princes, or to speak more accurately (pour mieux dire), to the least unjust 
and most proficient in managing affairs and governing peoples.” (emphasis added) 
McRae, op. cit., p. A70; Mairet, op. cit., p. 49 
357McRae, op. cit., p. 314F: “Mine answere is, that that is to be understood, if in such 
the princes rescripts or letters no speciall clause be comprehended, derogating from 
the generall lawes: notwithstanding which derogation, yet the Magistrat ought 
neverthelesse to advertise the prince thereof, and to put him in mind of his dutie: who 
if he be not by the Magistrats reasons to be removed from his former opinion, but 
command the same the second time, the Magistrat is then to obey his commaund, 
although the thing so commaunded be not agreeing with the common profit, and 
contrarie unto the lawes.” 
 134 
Commonweale; he may stay the execution of such a law or commaundement in 
suspense, until he have shewed his reasons therefore unto the prince, which he is in 
dutie bound to do, not once, but even twice or thrice….”358  The interesting case cited 
by Bodin of Jean de La Vacquerie and his colleagues refusing to carry out a proposed 
law, even on point of death, still emphasizes that the final decision rests with the 
sovereign.  The outcome, in which the sovereign yielded, is laudable, but the 
discretion remained with the king.359  Obviously, then, once the law is promulgated or 
the command issued, the time for counsel is over, and the magistrate’s duty is faithful 
execution.360 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3583.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 313D. Note the use of law and command together: Bodin 
does at times obscure by his inconsistent use of these words when discussing 
magistrates, although it is worth bearing in mind that command is characteristic of 
law: lex nihil aliud sit quam summae potestatis iussum sive sanctio. McRae, op. cit., 
p. A75 Whether the magistrate shall carry out his duties contrary to the law of nature 
is, frankly, difficult to discern.  On the one hand, Bodin stipulates, “[i]f therefore the 
commaundement of the prince be not contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature….”  
On the other hand, he insists, “ for all that wee must not thereof conclude or gather, 
that if the prince doe in that case commaund anything contrarie unto his oath or the 
dutie of a Prince, that the Magistrat is therefore to refuse to obey his commaund.” 
McRae, op. cit., p. 313C  
3593.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 315D-E  It is interesting that Bodin emphasizes the social 
standing of the men involved in swaying the king’s judgment: “The king, beholding 
the gravitie, the port, and dignitie of these persons, and almost abashed with the so 
constant resolution of such his great magistrats, and withal doubting the power and 
the authoritie of the parliament, cause those his decrees so much misliked, to bee 
abrogated….” 
360It is true that a magistrate may suspend execution of a command which he 
considers unjust on the grounds that time should be given for him to advise the 
sovereign of the matter.  But, again, once advised, if the sovereign still wishes the 
law’s execution, the magistrate’s duty is obedience.  As Bodin notes, “…when such 
constancie cannot heale the disease of the Commonweale, or faults of soveraigne 
princes and that the prince commaundeth the magistrats, to have his actions excused 
unto his subjects; it is much better for the magistrate to obey his commaund, and in so 
doing to cover and burie the memorie of a wicked fact already done, than in refusing 
so to do, to irritate the prince to the doing of worse.” 3.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 318I-K 
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Bodin goes further.  Inasmuch as a body of magistrates will make up the 
sovereign’s administration, he considers the possibility of resignation in the case of a 
magistrate who feels, even against the opinions of his colleagues, that “an edict, 
commission, or commaundment from his prince” is contrary to equity and, therefore, 
unjust.  Yet in such a case, though a magistrate might submit his resignation, if the 
sovereign refuses, he cannot vacate his post.361  Bodin argues that the corporate 
judgment of magistrates as to a law’s equity, if in accord with the sovereign’s wishes, 
must itself be respected because to allow otherwise would “open a perilous gap to all 
the subjects, by their example to refuse and reject the edicts and commaunds of their 
prince” with chaos as the ultimate outcome.362  Indeed, tyrannicide suffers from a 
similar problem.  Thus, theoretical concessions to private judgment are, practically 
speaking, best left merely theoretical because Bodin foresees chaos arising when 
everyone simply follows his own judgment of the matter.363 More to the point, the 
sovereign’s task is to command the unwilling, a risky task indeed, if any and all are 
truly free to exercise personal judgment before obeying.364  Consideration of this 
point shows the way to square apparent ambiguities in his treatment of magistrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3613.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 316H-I 
3623.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 316I 
363Having carefully distinguished sovereign from tyrant, Bodin concludes, “…it is 
never permissible for a subject to attempt anything against a sovereign prince, no 
matter how wicked and cruel a tyrant he may be.  It is certainly permissible not to 
obey him in anything that is against the law of God or nature….  For oh, how many 
tyrants there would be if it were lawful to kill!  He who taxes too heavily would be a 
tyrant, as the vulgar understand it….  How then should good princes be secure in their 
lives?” 2.5 = McRae, op. cit., p. 225D-E (the Knolles text differs differs significantly 
in wording, though not in sense); Franklin, Bodin, p. 120; Mairet, op. cit., p. 229 
364“…the main power of sovereign majesty and absolute power consists of giving law 
to subjects in general without their consent.” (emphasis added) 1.8 = McRae, op. cit., 
p. 98H; Franklin, Bodin, p. 23 
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who find a law unjust.  In theory, they may very well have the option of withdrawal 
or, perhaps, inaction, if a command violates God’s law, although Bodin virtually 
claimed this an impossibility, but in practice this is actually inadvisable and ought to 
be avoided.365  In fine, he concludes, magistrates ought to do what they are told.  
Thus, for example, Bodin more or less forecloses the practical exercise of magisterial 
resistance, even when done on the grounds of religious conscience:  
this is especially to be considered, that we pretend not the vaine 
show of religion, or rather of superstition, against our princes 
commaunds, and so upon a conscience evill grounded open a way 
unto rebellion: for when the magistrate maketh conscience, and a 
matter of religion, about the executing of his princes commaunds, he 
seemeth himself (and giveth occasion unto others also) to suspect 
evill both of the religion and conscience of his prince.  Wherefore he 
ought to be well assured of the true knowledge of the eternall God, 
and of the true worship and service unto him due: which consisteth 
not in vaine and counterfeit shows of religion or conscience.366 
 
The possibility for error in conscience is sufficient to suggest that the best course in 
practice is just to obey. 367 Moreover, refraining from resistance is also preferred lest 
one provide examples for others to imitate, especially as their own judgment too 
might be in error: “…it is much more also to be feared, least that the other 
magistrates, by the example of one or two, and after them other privat men (le peuple) 
also, should presume to contemne (désobéir) the princes commaund, to the great 
endangering and ruine of the Commonweale.”368  The exceptions and allowances 
made by Bodin appear, then, merely to dissolve as the dangers of serving as a bad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365“Nous avons montré par ci-devant que le Prince ne peut rien contre la loi de 
nature….” (emphasis added) Mairet, op. cit., p. 286 (3.4)  The Knolles text softens or 
obscures this claim. McRae, op. cit., p. 313A 
3663.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 325B; Mairet, op. cit., pp. 291-2 
3673.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 315A: “…the equitie and reason which we call naturall, is 
not alwaies so cleere and manifest….” 
3683.4 = McRae, op. cit., p. 323B; Mairet, op. cit., p. 289 
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example, executing an error in judgment, or even diminishing the very grandeur of 
sovereignty all tend in the end towards chaos, which is to be avoided at all costs.  
Thus, Bodin’s idea of sovereignty serves as the foundation, acknowledged or not, for 
the tradition of bureaucratic duty – a duty to obey, even after remonstrance. 
Obviously, sovereignty, being the key concept in understanding the 
bureaucratic tradition, one could trace its development by various paths.369  It will 
suffice here to focus on that the theoretical implications of sovereignty that were 
taken up by Rousseau and the French revolutionaries.370  If one were only to argue for 
this on the grounds that the French administration was particularly influential, that 
would suffice.371  But what is particularly intriguing here is the way in which 
sovereignty, once conceived as popular will, called for an even stronger form of 
absolutism than conceived by Bodin.  In any case, Bodin’s arguments about 
sovereignty and the duties of magistrates truly lay out all the contours that apply in 
later years.  The French philosophes and revolutionnaires merely draw out to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369It is possible to examine the development of bureaucracy through cameralism and 
beyond in Prussia.  Michalski, op. cit. Or by focusing purely on political theory, one 
could reach Rousseau via Hobbes and Montesquieu.  Or one could take Locke as a 
point of reference by way of Filmore.  It is not so much that one approach or avenue 
is superior to any other, but that the development of sovereignty within the French 
tradition is particularly striking and revealing, especially in light of its influence on 
the development of scientific administration.  Mannoni and Sardi, op. cit., pp. 240-1 
Cf. Tilly, op. cit., pp. 107-14 and the discussion of French administrative science in 
T. Porter, Trust in Numbers, Princeton, 1996  Friedrich observes that the development 
of cameralism itself was heavily influenced by Montesquieu. C. Friedrich, “The 
Continental Tradition of Training Administrators in Law and Jurisprudence,” The 
Journal of Modern History 11.2 (Jun. 1939), pp. 129-48 
370On the basis of good, common sense, of all things, Talmon rejects the notion that 
the philosophes did not have an impact on the revolutionary leaders. J. Talmon, The 
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York, 1970, pp. 69-70. 
371Mannori and Sordi, op. cit., pp. 234-42 
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extreme the basic principles previously articulated.  The positions of Rousseau and 
Saint-Just illustrate this extreme position. 
In his Social Contract, Rousseau works through the theoretical implications of 
the people as sovereign, as manifested through the general will.372  For Rousseau, as 
for Bodin, the sovereign is the source and guarantor of law, capable of abrogating 
(effreindre) it as needed.373  But Rousseau goes further.  Whereas for Bodin, the 
sovereign is constrained by divine and fundamental law (leges imperii), even, as was 
pointed out, if only in theory, Rousseau’s sovereign is not so bound.  He is truly 
legibus solutus.  Indeed, “…there is not, nor can there be, any kind of fundamental 
law (loi fundamentale) binding on the body of the people, not even the social 
contract.”374 (emphasis added)  The implication, as Derathé points out in his 
comment on this passage, is precisely this: “…il n’y a point de limites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372A. Ritter and J. Bonadellia, edd., Rousseau’s Political Writings, New York, 1988; 
Derathé, R., et al., edd., Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Oeuvres Complètes, Pléiade, Paris, 
1966, v. 3; Talmon, op. cit., pp. 40-9  Rousseau is in practice no democrat as 
Constant observes: “…son (sc., Rousseau’s) erreur a fait de son Contrat Social, si 
souvent invoqué en faveur de la liberté, le plus terrible auxiliaire de tous les genres de 
despotisme.” Principes de Politique in A. Roulin, A., ed., Benjamin Constant: 
Oeuvres, Pléiade, Paris, 1957, p. 1071 = B. Fontana, Constant: Political Writings, 
Cambridge, CTHPT, 2006 [1988], p. 177. 
373Social Contract 1.7 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 94; Derathé, op. cit., p. 362  Hobbes is 
more often seen as paving the way for Rousseau, but it is difficult too not to see 
Bodin, whom Rousseau cites in his work, in the background of his discussions about 
sovereignty and its implications.  His desire to sublimate the “particular will” evokes 
the concern of Hobbes with private conscience. See Mansfield, Hobbes, fn. 346, 
supra.  For Rousseau’s engagement with Machiavelli, see L. McKenzie, “Rousseau’s 
Debate with Machiavelli in the Social Contract,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43.2 
(Apr./Jun. 1982), pp. 209-28 
374Social Contract, ibid., and 3.18 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 148; Derathé, op. cit., p. 436: 
“…there is no fundamental law in the state that cannot be repealed.”  Of course, the 
social contract itself is by its very nature fundamental law, and the people may 
dissolve that at will.  In his Septième lettre, Rousseau asserted: “Or il est de l’essence 
de la Puissance Souveraine de ne pouvoir être limitée: elle peut tout ou elle n’est 
rien.” Lettres écrites de la montagne, Derathé, op. cit., p. 826 
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constitutionelles à la souveraineté et…le souverain étant à tout instant maître de 
changer ses volontés ou ses lois, il n’y a point de lois fondmaentales qu’il soit tenu de 
maintenir en vigueur, pas même la forme du Gouvernement.”375  This notion brings 
with it the further idea that the totalizing nature of the sovereign as the expression of a 
people’s general will, is incapable itself of harming the people as a corporate body.376  
Being composed of all individuals, taken together as a monad or unity, the sovereign 
has no interest contrary to that unity and thus cannot even wish to harm it although it 
may itself be suppressed by a surfeit of particular wills.377 The general interest and 
the sovereign, then, are one and the same, and individuals, with their particular 
interests, must obey, whether willingly or under compulsion (contrait par tout le 
corps).378   Therefore, Rousseau reasons, the sovereign need not even provide any 
guarantee to those subject to it, that is, to the individual members who compose the 
community.379  Where Bodin, argued, albeit optimistically, that God himself provided 
sovereigns that would not seek to harm their communities, Rousseau suggests that the 
sovereign, as a manifestation of the community’s will itself, perforce cannot harm the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375Derathé, op. cit., p. 1447 (his fn. 5)  Derathé cites several parallel passages that 
only reinforce Rousseau’s idea.  
376There is a potentially interesting parallel between this notion of the corporate 
nation state unanimity and the notion of ijma’ in Muslim thought.  This idea of 
consensus derives from a hadith according to which Muhammad had stated that the 
community (umma) would never reach consensus on a matter of error (dhalala). s.v., 
idjma’ in H. Gibb and J. Kramers, edd., Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, Leiden, 1995 
[1953], pp. 157a-8b 
377Social Contract 4.1 = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 148-50; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 437-9 
378Social Contract, ibid. = Ritter, op. cit., p.95; Derathé, op. cit., p. 364 
379Social Contract, ibid. = Ritter, op. cit., p.94; Derathé, op. cit., p. 363 The sovereign 
cannot have any interest contrary to the community’s (n’a peut avoir d’intérêt 
contraire au leur) 
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members of that community.380  Rousseau’s sovereign, then, appears much stronger, 
perhaps even “radical,” when compared to the one depicted by his predecessor.381  
Rousseau expands on the nature of sovereignty at greater length in Book 2 of 
the Social Contract, and in Book 3 he takes up the relationship between the sovereign 
and its agent, defined as government.  Some aspects of this sovereign are more or less 
traditional: for example, inalienability (2.1) and indivisibility (2.2).  But sovereignty’s 
status as an infallible hypostasis of the community’s general will, over and against 
particular wills, takes the tradition a step further.  Rousseau asserts, for example, “that 
the general will is always in the right and always tends toward the public utility.”382  
To some extent, the implicit logic is that the general will is always right (droite) 
because it is the source of law (droit), and laws themselves are never particular.  They 
are general in application.383  Therefore, the general will produces by way of 
legislation general expressions of right, which ipso facto are law.384  In connection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380Cf. the critique of the line of reasoning that says “the prince is what he should be.” 
Social Contract 3.6 = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 131-2; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 412-3 
381Elshtain rightly observes, “…Rouseau winds up with a unitary, monistic version of 
sovereignty that levels everything that stands in its way – particular wills, particular 
faiths, anything that might prove an irritant in the image of the indissolubility and 
indivisibility of sovereignty.” op. cit., p. 131 She had rightly characterized 
Rousseau’s version of sovereignty as “radical.” p. 120   
382Social Contract 2.3 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 100; Derathé, op. cit., p. 371 
383Social Contract 2.6 = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 105-7; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 378-80; 3.1 = 
Ritter, op cit., p. 118; Derathé, op. cit., p. 395-6; 3.12 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 140; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 424 This link between the general will and law, which is general 
in specification because it applies to all, echoes Bodin’s distinction between law and 
edict.  It is worth observing too that Rousseau considers government itself a 
commissary entity, a point which emphasizes its temporary nature as an agent with 
delegated authority (“…it [sc., Government] is only the minister.”). Social Contract 
3.1 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 119; Derathé, op. cit., p. 396: “[c]e n’est absolument qu’une 
commission….” Cf. fn. 350, supra. 
384The general will “must come from all to be applied to all.” Social Contract 2.4 = 
Ritter, op. cit., p. 102; Derathé, op. cit., p. 373; for Rousseau’s definition of law, see 
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with this, it is worth recalling Rousseau’s assertion in the Discourse on Political 
Economy that the popular will, which is only a synonym for the general will, is “the 
voice of God.” 385  To be sure, Rousseau concedes, individuals, motivated by their 
particular interests, can by their acts interfere with the expression of the general will, 
but this concession points to the larger problem within the political community: the 
danger of particular wills, or, in modern terms, private interests.386  And this applies 
to members of the government as well, once they pursue their particular wills.387 
After all, individuals, who may not themselves see the good or may be deceived, 
determine their actions and choose to act in response to their immediate concerns: 
they may lack the civic virtue or “common interest” necessary to the expression of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Social Contract 2.6 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 106; Derathé, op. cit., p. 379: “Alors la 
matière sur laquelle on statue est générale comme la volonté qui statue.  C’est cet acte 
que j’appelle une loi.” (emphasis added)  Law is by definition the general will’s 
expression: “…laws are the only authentic acts of the general will….” Social 
Contract 3.12 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 140; Derathé, op. cit., p. 425 
385See Rousseau’s discussion of general and particular wills in his Discourse on 
Political Economy. Ritter, op. cit., pp. 61-2; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 244-6 The actual 
divine will, Rousseau argues, is simply beyond the ken of mankind; otherwise there 
would be no need for government or law. Social Contract 2.6 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 105; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 378 In light of this observation, Rousseau’s comment on nature of 
the lawgiver himself (“It would take gods to give laws to men.”) raises interesting 
questions. Social Contract 2.7 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 108; Derathé, op. cit., p, 381 
(where Dieux is capitalized; note the variation quoted in Derathé’s note [p. 1462, n. 3] 
“il faudroit un Dieu, etc.”) 
386Cf. Arendt, op. cit., p. 78 It is worth noting that Rousseau highlights the dangers 
that moral habits pose to the state: “Now, the less the particular wills relate to the 
general will, that is, the less moral habits (moeurs) relate to laws, the more the 
repressive force must be increased.”  Social Contract 3.1 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 120; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 397  Rousseau contrasts moeurs because they are internal with 
laws, which are external. Fragments 6, Derathé, op. cit., p. 555 
387Social Contract 3.10 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 137ff; Derathé, op. cit., p. 421ff.  
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infallible general will.388  The general will, as an expression of the sovereign, then, is 
more completely unbound in Rousseau’s configuration than Bodin’s. 
For Rousseau, government is the sovereign’s agent.  To act, the sovereign 
depends on government in the sense that every action consists of two parts, 
conception and execution.389  Without the power to act, the desire to act is 
incomplete, and without the desire to act, the capacity to act is merely potential. 
Naturally, this analysis applies to individual members of a community just as it 
applies to corporate bodies within the community.  Thus, particular will.  Against this 
stands the will of the entire polity come together as a state, and the totality of its 
singular will is, as already explained, the general will.  The general will, therefore, 
finds its institutional expression in the government as executive.390  This may take the 
form of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or mixed government.  The particular 
institutional arrangements, however, are not as important to the discussion as the 
relationship they all must have to the sovereign.  Even with a monarch, it is 
understood that he will have to operate via agents or magistrates who constitute the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388“Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public 
affairs....,” warns Rousseau.  Social Contract 3.4 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 125; Derathé, 
op. cit., p. 404   On political manipulation, see Discourse on Political Economy.  
Ritter, op. cit., pp. 62-3; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 246-7 Cf. Social Contract 2.4 = Ritter, 
op. cit., p. 103; Derathé, op. cit., p. 374  Regarding the necessity of virtue for all 
regimes, see Social Contract 3.4 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 126; Derathé, op. cit., p. 405; 4.1 
= Ritter, op. cit., pp. 148-50; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 437-9 In Fragments Politiques, 
Rousseau states, “L’erreur de la plupart des moralistes fut toujours de prendre 
l’homme pour un être essentiellement raisonnable.” Fragments 16.1 (Des Moeurs), 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 554 
389Social Contract 3.1 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 118; Derathé, op. cit., p. 395 
390“J’appelle donc Gouvernement ou supreme administration l’exercise légitime de la 
puissance exécutive, et Prince ou magistrat l’homme ou le corps chargé de cette 
administration.” (emphasis in original) Social Contract 3.1 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 119; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 396 
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administration: thus the particular institutional arrangement need not occupy the 
discussion.  Government is seen as mediator between the sovereign as general will 
and the political community made up of citizens.  Put differently, “[its]most pressing 
concern, as well as [its] essential duty, is, therefore, to oversee the observance of the 
laws of which [it] is the minister and upon which all his authority is founded.”391  
Needless to say, as a commissary, government does not issue laws.  Its commands are 
particular in nature, not general as laws are, and, therefore, they are edicts.392  To 
carry out its duties on behalf of the sovereign, it will find instantiation in the form of 
officials.  Enter magistrates. 
Obviously, magistrates are agents of the sovereign.  Their duties flow from 
that relationship.  Yet they also are citizens and remain members of the political 
community. Furthermore, as Rousseau prescribes, they also form, as they do to some 
extent in Bodin, a corporate body.  What this means is that the magistrate himself 
possesses and may respond to three wills: as a citizen, general will (volonté generale), 
as a private individual, particular will (volunté particulière), as an official, corporate 
will (volunté de corps).  As Rousseau explains,  
We can distinguish in the person of the magistrate three essentially 
different wills.  First, there is private will of the individual, which 
tends only towards his particular advantage; secondly, there is the 
common will of the magistrates, which relates solely to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391Political Economy, Ritter, op. cit, p. 64; Derathé, op. cit. p. 249 Rousseau actually 
speaks of “the leader (chef)” in this context, but, as he explains in the Social Contract, 
the prince and the government are functionally interchangeable.  Thus, the principle 
articulated here with regard to “the leader” applies to whatever form the government 
takes as the sovereign’s executive. 
392Ryan appears not to be sufficiently attentive to this important distinction in 
Rousseau.   Otherwise, he ought to have said that the government would operate by 
means of “…something closer to edicts….” op. cit., v. 2, p. 566 In point of fact, by 
definition, the government cannot produce law, only edicts.  
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advantage of the prince, and which may be called the corporate will 
since it is general in relation to the government and particular in 
relation to the state of which the government forms a part; thirdly, 
there is the will of the people or the sovereign will, which is general 
both in relation to the state considered as the whole and to the 
government considered as part of the whole.393 
 
Naturally, a magistrate’s particular will ought always to be sublimated in service of 
the general or corporate wills.  Otherwise, there is the risk that each may usurp 
sovereignty within his own domain.394  Yet, this is precisely the problem: the 
individual magistrate, in fact, runs the risk of being most responsive to his particular 
interest, not the general will, which in Rousseau’s gradation of wills is weakest.395  
This, in fact, is the very substance of the problem described among modern writers as 
the problem of “democratic control.”396  In other words, Rousseau is conscious that 
the link between the expression of the general will by the sovereign and the execution 
of that will by the individuals so charged is always at risk of being broken because of 
private interests.397  But he goes further.  By introducing the notion of corporate will, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393Social Contract 3.2 = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 122; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 400-1 
394Social Contract 3.5 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 128; Derathé, op. cit., p. 407  Rousseau 
actually speaks here of the individual leaders (chefs), but the principle surely applies 
to those to whom the sovereign delegates the authority to act.  Ritter’s translation, 
“…can each (sc., leaders) act as sovereign in his own region…” misses the force of 
the French: “…(les chefs) puissent trancher du Souverain chacun dans son 
department….” (emphasis added) Cf. Social Contract 3.10 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 139; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 423: “…autant de Princes que de Magistrats….” 
395Social Contract 3.2= Ritter, op. cit., pp. 123; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 401 
396As Rousseau states, “…the act which institutes the government is not a contract but 
a law, [that] the trustees of executive power are not the masters of the people but its 
officials (officiers), [that] it can establish and discharge them whenever it please, 
[that] for them there is no question of contracting but only of obeying….”  Social 
Contract 3.18 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 147; Derathé, op. cit., p. 434 Rousseau is, of 
course, speaking here of fundamental law or leges imperii. 
397Once magistrates begin to function independently in the service of their private 
interests, the state is on the decline. Social Contract 3.10 = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 138-9; 
Derathé, op. cit., p. 423.  Cf. fn. 394, supra. 
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he acknowledges an ambiguous institutional concern, because, after all, even a 
corporate body might substitute its interests for the sovereign’s.398  Corporate will is 
that particular set of interests and intention to act that officialdom inevitably 
possesses and must be subordinate to the general will.  Obviously, as the government 
machinery expands, its “corporate will” tends to match more closely the general will.  
Yet, obviously concerned that the state should actually accomplish something, he 
asserts that a large state is best ruled by a smaller government.  The implication that 
the corporate will under such circumstances might actually be less commeasurable 
with general will is clear inasmuch as the magisterial body represents a smaller 
sample of the political community as a whole.399   In some sense, however, corporate 
will may be a compromise position: better than particular will, which can run 
strongest, but worse than general will, which tends to be weak.400   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Cf. Septième lettre, Lettres écrites de la montagne, Derathé, op. cit., p. 815 
399Social Contract, ibid. = Ritter, op. cit., pp. 122-4; Derathé, op. cit., pp. 400-2  
Rousseau refers to government as a “machine” in 3.6.  Ritter, op. cit., p. 128; Derathé, 
op. cit., p. 408 This popular trope (i.e., Rousseau is not the only one to use it) 
obviously sees the government as a clock or watch, as the reference to mainspring 
(ressort) makes clear: it is no general machine.  This metaphor is particularly 
significant, for, just as a watch’s mainspring animates it and eventually wears out, so 
the mainspring of a government may also weaken and eventually lose its motive 
force. Social Contract 3.10 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 138; Derathé, op. cit., p.422  It is 
worth noting that the late 18th century was a period when several technological 
innovations were introduced to horlogerie by Abraham Breguet, who survived the 
revolution and eventually counted Napoleon among his customers as he had Marie 
Antoinette.  The introduction of the metaphor of government as clock (as opposed, or 
in addition to the older one of state as a ship) merits a separate study because it 
obviously reflects a shift in technology. 
400 One might even see in corporate will a precursor to the notion of professionalism 
that became a key feature of later, idealized concepts of bureaucracy. 
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Moreover, in point of fact, the corporate will even has a salubrious capacity 
with regard to the state.401  To be sure, anything that competes with the general will 
puts the entire community at risk.  But in the scheme of things, it is particular wills 
and factions above all else that threaten the general will.  Here, the corporate will 
might be of some service.  In a manner evocative of Machiavelli’s republic, where 
competition among great men’s ambitions invigorates the state, Rousseau suggests 
that magistrates, as a corporate body, can balance or limit the prince’s power.402  Not 
that Rousseau elucidates the mechanics of this balancing act, but he does suggest that 
it can be a positive force.  Corporate will, then, is not all bad, but it does pose a 
problem, just as any grouping inferior to the general will represents a potential threat 
to the state.403  Doubtless, this is why, when addressing the state’s fundamental laws, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Curiously, Cobban, who strives throughout his book to rescue Rousseau from the 
charge of having theorized a totalitarian state, does not take up the issue of corporate 
will in relation to the magistrates. A. Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State, 
Hamden, 1964, pp. 46-8 
402Prince and government are sometimes the same, sometimes distinct in the Social 
Contract.  Cf. fn. 391, supra. Speaking of limited government, Rousseau says that the 
lack of balance between legislative and executive can “be prevented by establishing 
magistrates, who, leaving the government undivided, serve only to balance the two 
powers and to maintain their respective rights.  In that case, the government is not 
mixed; it is limited.” Social Contract 3.7 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 132; Derathé, op. cit., p. 
414 Cf. Social Contract 3.10 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 137; Derathé, op. cit., p. 421, where 
Rousseau mentions the absence of a “corporate will” to resist the prince.  
Interestingly, Rousseau’s conception of the magisterial function in the Polish 
constitution expresses this in terms that evoke Machiavelli’s republican notions: “Je 
voudrois que toutes les fonctions publiques menassent ainsi de l’une à l’autre; afin 
que nul ne s’arrangeant pour rester dans la sienne, ne s’en fit un métier lucrative et ne 
se mit au dessus du jugement des hommes.” Considérations sur le gouvernement de 
Pologne et sur sa réformation projettée, Derathé, op. cit., pp. 1001-2 
403This corporate will is, of course, one of the vexing problems of bureaucracy, and 
animates modern concerns about the need for democratic control.  On the other hand, 
although not specifically conceived as corporate in nature, protestant theories of 
magisterial discretion anticipates Rousseau’s point because in that tradition, 
magistrates themselves may counter the sovereign in the interest of the community. 
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Rousseau emphasizes officialdom’s necessary subordination to the sovereign.404  In 
other words, bureaucracy does not exist to act in its own interests.  Rather, it, the 
government, exists to serve the sovereign, and that is precisely what Rousseau says: 
“…[for] the trustees of executive power…there is no question of contracting but only 
of obeying.”405 
Rousseau’s Social Contract was only a theoretical work; it was the burden of 
revolutionaries to labor under its influence.406    Obviously, the French revolution is 
itself too large a subject to undertake here, but it is worth remembering it as a period 
that saw a radical change in French administration.  The rise alone of a huge national 
army amid the circumstance of wars, internal and external, called for growth in the 
number of officials, but, more significantly, the overall revolutionary program called 
for an entirely new configuration of government on a scale never before seen in 
France.407  Cobb noted that perhaps as many as 150,000 new bureaucrats were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See, for example, J. Franklin, ed., Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth 
Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza, & Mornay, New York, 1969.  This issue 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
404Social Contract 3.18 = Ritter, op. cit., p. 147; Derathé, op. cit., p. 434 
405Social Contract, ibid. 
406In A. Cobban’s words, “practical circumstances dictated theory.” A History of 
Modern France, Harmondsworth, 1984 [1957], v. 1, p. 235 In his book on Rousseau, 
he disappoints when it comes to discussing the Jacobins as interpreters of Rousseau’s 
theory. Rousseau, passim, but esp., pp. 20-2.  Goyard-Fabre notes, “Sans doute faut-il 
distinguer, dans la Révolution française, le mouvement des idées et l’application qui 
en est faite puisque ‘l’essence de la souveraineté’ dont parle Rousseau est en quelque 
sorte contredite par la politique jacobine de Salut Publique.” S. Goyard-Fabre, 
“L’idée de souveraineté du peuple et le ‘libéralisme pur’ de Benjamin Constant,” 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 81.3 (Jul./Sep. 1976), pp. 289-327, quotation at 
p. 299. 
407Tilly identifies this as the transformation from indirect to direct rule.  For his 
discussion, see, op. cit., pp. 107-14.  Cf. the fascinating arguments about 
bureaucratization in Qin China: E. Kiser and Y. Cai “War and Bureaucratization in 
Qin China: Exploring an Anomalous Case,” American Sociological Review 68.4 
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appointed during the period of the terror, and Church suggested that the bureaucracy 
expanded four times over.408  All this growth in a period spanning just a few years!  It 
is no surprise, then, that the issue of control by the central authority over burgeoning 
officialdom would figure in the thinking of those tasked with acting on the people’s 
behalf.409 Among the Jacobins, while Robespierre stands out, not least for his 
instrumental role in the terror, it was his acolyte, Saint-Just, whose theoretical efforts 
– improvements to Rousseau, as he perhaps saw them – were systematic and 
thorough-going.410 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Aug. 2003), pp. 511-39  One problem with their analysis relates to the idea of 
“militarization,” which depends on a relatively uncritical acceptance of numbers of 
soldiers, casualties, and the like found in the Chinese sources with historical estimates 
for other civilizations that are the product of modern, critical analysis.  This surely 
distorts, and one is tempted to recall the energy Delbrück, for example, devoted to 
undermining any faith in the Classical record.  See H. Delbrück, Warfare in 
Antiquity, Lincoln, 1990 [1920], pp. 33-52.  In the area of the French treasury, which 
one might consider a proxy for the growth of centralization during the Revolution, see 
J. Bosher, French Finances 1770-1795: from Business to Bureaucracy, Cambridge, 
2008 [1970]  
408See the comments of R. Cobb and C. Church in “Social Mobility,” Past & Present 
32 (Dec. 1965), pp. 8-9 For the American experience, the table provided by Choung  
reveals, not surprisingly, the impetus war has provided to the growth of bureaucracy 
here.: “…the growth appears to be primarily a function of wars….” W. Choung, 
Control Mechanisms over Bureaucratic Power Expansion and a Tentative Model for 
the Comparative Study of Bureaucracy, Temple University, dissertation, 1981, p. 19 
(Table 1.2) and p. 20 (quotation) 
409Cf. Tocqueville’s observation that a democratic people initially concentrates power 
in its prince before eventually entrusting administrative power to “des mandataires 
secondaires.  Telle paraît être la marche naturelle instinctive et pour ainsi dire forcé 
que suivent les sociétés qui…sont entrainées vers la démocratie.” F. Mélonio, ed., 
Alexis de Tocqueville: l’ancien régime et la révolution, Paris, 1988, p. 73 
410Saint-Just, Robespierre’s “faithful disciple”: Talmon, op. cit., p. 98; Saint-Just 
perhaps overestimating his corrections to Rousseau: Talmon, op. cit., p. 84; A. 
Kupiec and M. Abensour, edd.,Saint-Just: Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, 2004  Terror 
was, according to Robespierre, a tool necessary to government during turbulent times: 
“Si le ressort du gouvernement populaire, dans la paix, est la vertu, le ressort du 
gouvernement populaire en révolution, est à la fois la vertu et la terreur….” Le 18 
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In every respect, Saint-Just’s thought is animated by a deep mistrust of 
particular will (volonté particulière).  Individuals left to their own devices, particularly 
under conditions of inequality, look only to their own concerns.  Thus the various 
pernicious manifestations: ambition (l’ambition), arrogance (l’orgueil), jealousy (la 
jalousie), all of which undermine the general will’s expression.411  In some ways, of 
course, this echoes Rousseau’s concerns, but Saint-Just’s words come with a sense of 
urgency appropriate to a man besieged by traitors, false friends, and enemies 
everywhere, as he surely felt himself to be.412  The goal, then, was to recreate an 
apolitical state of nature where men would (one senses that Saint-Just might say, 
“must”) behave independently and as equals.413  This is a paradise that can only come 
about by addressing the problem of physical want and creating an institutional 
framework utterly subordinate to law as an expression of general will, which, it is 
worth stressing, is only the general will, if it is also governed by reason.414  Indeed, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pluviôse an II sure les principes de morale politique in R. Garaudy, ed., Les orateurs 
de la révolution française, Paris, 1939, pp. 71-7, quotation from p. 75.   
411See Discours du 9 Thermidor, for example, in Kupiec, op. cit., p. 776: “Si tout le 
monde avait été modest, et n’avait point été jaloux qu’on parlât plus d’un autre que de 
soi, nous serions fort paisibles…L’orgueil enfante les factions.” 
412See, for example, his final speech, Discours du 9 thermidor an II. Kupiec, op. cit., 
pp. 769-85.  
413Saint-Just apparently views politics as nothing but the environment of factional 
activity: “Si vous voulez que les factions s’éteignent, et que personne n’entreprenne 
de s’élever sur les débris de la liberté publique par les lieux communs de Machiavel, 
rendez la politique impuissante en réduisant tout à la règle froide de la justice.”  
(emphasis added) Discours du 9 thermidor in Kupiec, op. cit., p. 777 For him, 
dependence, whatever its form, represented inequality. Institutions républicaines in 
Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1090.  Rawls in his Theory of Justice seems equally driven by a 
desire to eliminate politics: the veil of ignorance and reason both conspire to remove 
the contentious essence of politics from the field of view. 
414This is a significant qualification as it means that the general will is not merely a 
tally of votes (Rousseau’s will of all).  The people, who are “stupid,” must have 
reason.  See L’esprit de la révolution in Kupiec, op. cit., p. 426 (stupidité publique); 
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the creation of institutions above all else that will serve to structure a world where man 
can act according to his nature.415  It is a world, perhaps, that lies ahead, not in the past, 
because the actual state of nature is not recoverable – the real state of nature had no 
politics, after all.416  On this point, the comments of Saint-Just in the Discours du 9 
Thermidor bear quoting.  After suggesting that politics must be eliminated in order to 
address the problem of factions, he goes on to describe why what is needed is a system 
of law, not men: 
Laws have no passion to divide them and make them conceal.  Laws 
are severe, and men are not always so: an impenetrable masque can 
cover them for long periods.  If laws protect innocence, the outsider 
(l’étranger) cannot corrupt them; but if innocence is the toy of vile 
intrigues, there is no longer a guarantee inside the city.  One must 
flee to the desert to find there his independence and his friends 
among the wild animals.  One must abandon a world where one no 
longer has the energy for crime or virtue and where there is nothing 
left but the bogeyman  (épouvante) and indifference (mépris).417 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
p. 468 (juste et raisonnable) Cf. the comment of Constant: “…while [Saint-Just] 
seemed to suppose the nation capable of the most painful sacrifices, he acknowledged 
her, by his style, incapable of paying attention.” Liberty of the Ancients Compared 
with that of the Moderns, fn. a., in Fontana, op. cit., p. 320. 
415“Les institutions sont la garantie du gouvernement d’un peuple libre contre la 
corruption des moeurs et la garantie du peuple et du citoyens contre la corruption du 
gouvernement.” Institutions républicaines in Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1089 
416Cf. A. Pons, ed., Condorcet: Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de 
l’esprit humain, Paris, 1988, p. 81: “Sans doute, ces progrès pourront suivre une 
marche plus ou moins rapide, mais jamais elle ne sera retrograde….” 
417Kupiec, op. cit., p. 778 Cf. in his Institutions républicaines, Saint-Just describes the 
rationale of institutions in terms that evoke the harmony of mankind in the 
prepolitical state of nature.  Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1089; cf. the comparison between law 
and arbitrary judgment. L’esprit de la révolution, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 446  The 
comments of Constant regarding this faith in law are particularly biting: “Ce sont des 
fous qui, s’ils gouvernaient, recommenceraient Robespierre, avec les meilleures 
intentions du monde.” (emphasis added) Journal, 27 Mai (7 Prairial) in Roulin, op. 
cit., p. 277 
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Here Saint-Just seems to encapsulate his antipathy towards the world of particular 
wills as manifested in politics; here, he seems to say that one must either abandon 
mankind altogether, effectively reverting to a state of nature, or recreate those 
conditions via law’s austere implacability.418  For him, law itself can expunge 
destructive amour propre, creating a kind of world where men are all independent, 
like wild animals, but equal and free of jealousy: a recapitulation of Genesis or the 
Epic of Gilgamesh where Adam or Enkidu dwelt peacefully among the beasts. 
Of course, it is not merely a matter of institutions and law.  Reason must 
animate the system, or rather, the machine.  To be sure, the metaphor of the machine 
or clock is a favorite during the 18th century.419  Saint-Just, therefore, is not 
particularly unique in evoking the imagery (nor was Robespierre himself); 
nevertheless, it is worth pausing to consider the implications of this metaphor for a 
man concerned, as he was, with eliminating particular wills and ensuring the 
government function according to laws articulated via institutions.420  The watch – 
and this is obviously what underlies a lot of the imagery given the constant reference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418The unacknowledged contradiction in this rests in the fact that man in the state 
nature no longer is man precisely because reason, which distinguishes men from 
animals, no longer has any place.  Reason, which distinguishes good from bad, ceases 
to function in a state where everything is good. 
419See Bosher’s comments. op. cit., pp. 133-5. Cf. fn. 399, supra.  L. Winner, 
although he generally focuses on the 19th century and later, is extremely insightful 
and eloquent on the relationship between technology and politics, which, of course, is 
reflected in the language used to describe both.  Autonomous Technology: Technics-
out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge, 1978 
420It is worth noting that Robespierre in speech of 18 Pluviôse speaks of virtue as the 
“ressort essential qui le (sc., democratic government) soutient et qui le fait mouvoir.”  
A revolutionary government has for its mainspring virtue and terror.  See Garaudy, 
op. cit., pp. 74-5  
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to ressort or mainspring – is regular and predictable in its beat.421  Its gears and 
wheels are located in their proper place, and move in concert with a harmonious 
regularity that marks time, progress, and regularity.  Once crafted by the watchmaker, 
or lawgiver, all of its pieces put in place, it merely needs to be set in motion to 
continue on its own, calmly, remorselessly.  Thus the system of Saint-Just, who 
conceives of government as a collection of institutions and laws, subject to reason, 
executed by ministers whose particular will is effaced by regulation itself.  Like a 
good watch, good government is reglé.  In this vein, Saint-Just, discussing the 
censor’s role in republican government, distinguishes between weak government, 
where one must depend on individual merit, and strong (robuste) government, in 
which “la force et l’harmonie des institutions” operate to good effect.422  Contrasting 
weak government, perhaps beholding something like Machiavelli’s competing great 
men in his mind’s eye, with the strong, Saint-Just clearly portrays a government that 
is a mechanism or a watch movement operating in perfect time, a symphony of mere 
parts giving expression to the impersonal administration of justice.  Hence, on the one 
hand, with weaker government, lacking in institutions, “il n’y a plus de contrat…il y a 
une réaction continuelle de forces particulières;” on the other hand, with good 
government, “il y en a un (sc., un contrat) qui règle tous les mouvements et fait 
partout la loi….  il y a une force commune (sc., le ressort), dont chacun fait partie, et 
qui concourt au même but et au même bien.”423  These are terms that, apart from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Cf. the Leviathan’s introduction, where Hobbes also invokes the watch. R. Tuck, 
ed., Hobbes: Leviathan, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2006 [1991] p. 9 
422Institutions républicaines, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1140 
423ibid.  Although he had meant it as a criticism, it was, nonetheless, a general 
statement of reality, when he said, “[L]a justice est rendue en France au nom du 
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describing the operation of a clockwork movement, presage Weber’s bureaucratic 
cage (Gehäuse): Saint-Just saw that justice could not be left to anything as uncertain 
and unreliable as chance or men’s hearts.424  He was determined to design such a state 
where what was law, that is, volonté generale raisonnable made real, would find 
complete, inexorable expression, without exception, for all men, equality perforce.  
This was nature recreated as impersonal mechanism, presenting a scene on which a 
reintroduced savage man would carry out his independent life, free.425 
A problem remained.  Laws do not speak, but require flesh and blood men to 
implement them.426  Yet, Saint-Just distrusted bureaucrats even more than he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
monarque…par la bouche du magistrat….” L’esprit de la révolution in Kupiec, op. 
cit., p. 381. 
424Needless to say, even those who argue about public administration as a science 
merely hope that the expert will be motivated by objective, scientific knowledge, 
hardly the dubious uncertainties of subjective reflections.  Weber used the word 
Gehäuse to describe the bureaucratic future, a word that in German refers to a watch 
case.  Perhaps he too was echoing watch metaphor, but in a negative way.  It is 
curious that Baehr does not take up this aspect. P. Baehr, “The ‘Iron Cage’ and the 
‘Shell as Hard as Steel’: Parsons, Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in 
the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” History and Theory 40.2 (May, 
2001), pp. 153-69 
425It is a kind of early paternalism: government carried out, even against the wishes of 
the governed, in their interest.  While Saint-Just and Robespierre sought to hasten 
man’s perfectibility, S. Conly in her book on paternalism abandons perfectibility, 
perhaps because she implicitly considers it hopeless.  Against Autonomy: Justifying 
Coercive Paternalism, Cambridge, 2014 [2013] Cf. C. Caldwell’s comment that 
education is insufficient: “Coaxers and coercers discover common ground,” Financial 
Times, March 1, 2013. 
426He acknowledged in 9 thermidor that without magistrates, government would 
cease (anéantie). Kupiec, op. cit., p. 783  But the crux of the problem is, to use 
Rousseau’s words, this:  “[l]e corps chargé de l’exécution de vos Loix en est 
l’interprete et l’arbitre suprême; il les fait parler comme il lui plaît; il peut les faire 
taire; il peut même les violer sans que vous puissiez y mettre ordre….” Lettres écrites 
de la Montagne, Septième lettre, Derathé, op. cit., p. 814. 
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distrusted his fellow men.427  Whether or not he was animated by memories of the 
ancien régime, he evinced an enduring distrust of officials and, consequently, utterly 
rejected by implication any value placed on some kind of magisterial volonté de corps 
that Rousseau had suggested could limit the prince.  Therefore, he demanded that 
magistrates be moral models for citizens to follow, constrained by law and removed 
from the civic community, rendered institutional others: they were not to be citizens 
precisely because the danger they represented by their tendency towards volonté de 
corps threatened to make them more powerful than citizens themselves.428  Saint-Just 
says, “whoever is a magistrate is no longer of the people.”429  Moreover, one must not 
even address an official as a citizen because the very title is superior to him.430  
Magistrates, therefore, must constitute something outside the political community, a 
community which, ideally, has itself ceased to be political in any meaningful sense.  
Indeed, motivated by “fear,” magistrates, themselves function as mere cogs, 
exhibiting the kind of “inflexibility” that prevents those relationships of the past, 
dependency, and other human factors that lead to faction.431  Saint-Just’s officials are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 L’esprit, in Kupiec, op. cit., p. 385; “tout officier public est un tyran.” L’esprit, in 
Kupiec, op. cit., p. 426 
428moral example, Institutions républicaines, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1144  Modern 
discussions of public administration frequently see bureaucrats as others, not as 
citizens per se.  See, for example, McGregor, op. cit. 
429Institutions républicaines, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1139 cf. L’esprit, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 
385 
430Institutions républicaines, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1139 
431Institutions républicaines, Kupiec, op. cit., p. 1144  In their study of Qin China, 
Kiser and Cai highlight the role of the legalist school, which rigidly stressed official 
obedience to law and duty, to the formation of bureaucracy.  For an example of this 
school of thought, see B. Watson, trans., Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings, New York, 
1964.  Saint-Just’s idea of government accords well with Han Fei’s recommendation 
that ministers should only do exactly and only what they are assigned, and the ruler 
should punish even those who accomplish good outside of their task. p. 32 
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Aristotle’s “living tools.”  Saint-Just’s vision, then, is even more rigid and 
mechanistic than Rousseau’s because, perhaps, his distrust of his fellow man, despite 
his proclaimed faith in the people, was so intense, particularly where matters of 
power were involved.432  For him, the only means to ensure total order for the rational 
machine of government consisted of an arrangement of ordered institutions, complete 
obedience to law, and a wall of separation between administrators and citizens. In this 
way alone could a proper, indeed, moral community exist, that is, with government 
obedient to the community’s rational expression through law, its officialdom 
functioning as its literal servant.  This is the very substance of democratic control in 
the modern sense, albeit one of its more conceptually robust manifestations. 
Democratic control has been an enduring subject of concern for public 
administration.433  Put differently, the fundamental problem has been the discretion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432The people (le peuple or la nation), it is worth recalling, is a collective entity, not 
truly a group of individuals.  For the intellectual background to the idea of nation, see 
D. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France, Cambridge, 2003 [2001].  
433“Public responsibility demands the willing subjection of the bureaucracy to the 
laws as the general instructions of the representatives of the people.” F. Morstein-
Marx, op. cit., p. 44; D. Levitan, “The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a 
Democratic Society,” Political Science Quarterly 61.4 (Dec., 1946), pp. 562-98; J. 
Wilson, op. cit., pp. 334-6  Note that this tension has come to be recast in some 
circles as a principal-agent problem. K. Bawn, “Political Control Versus Expertise: 
Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures,” American Political Science 
Review 89.1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 62-73  The idea of democratic control is undermined 
as citizens come to be viewed as customers by the bureaucracy.  See J. Stewart, 
“Advance or Retreat: From the traditions of Public Administration to the new public 
management and beyond,” Public Policy and Administration 13.4 (Winter, 1998), pp. 
12-27; E. Suleiman, Dismantling Democratic States, Princeton, 2003  It is worth 
stressing that the shift to empiricism in the study of administration has tended to put 
the research emphasis more on identifying who actually does control rather than the 
normative question of who should control.  Thus, for example, one can discuss at 
length the degree to which Congress actually influences the bureaucracy without 
considering what the situation ought to be.  T. Moe, “An Assessment of the Positive 
Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 12.4 (Nov., 
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the official within the context of the polity’s sovereign will.  Thus, Finer in his well-
known debate with Friedrich, argued that official responsibility within the political 
context was a matter of external control.  Officials must be answerable, not to 
individual conscience or some vague sense of professionalism, but to the oversight 
and direction of the legislature or executive as the sovereign people’s 
representative.434  Indeed, echoing Han Fei’s warnings about excess, Finer went so far 
as to argue that one must be concerned not only about the bad official, but also the 
good one.435  In other words, excess in and of itself, for good or ill, amounts to 
official usurpation of the legislature’s right to command.436  As Finer bluntly put it in 
an earlier article, “…the first commandment is, Subservience!”437  Despite that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1987), pp. 475-520; B. Wood and R. Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control 
of the Bureaucracy,” American Political Science Review 85.3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 801-
28.  The focus of the present discussion is on normative, not empirical questions. 
434H. Finer, “Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government,” Public 
Administration Review 1.4 (1941), pp. 335-50; see too “Better Government 
Personnel,” Political Science Quarterly 51.4 (Dec., 1936), pp. 569-99, responsibility 
is taken up at pp. 580-2 Finer seems to emphasize the legislature as a body to which 
bureaucracy must ultimately answer. H. Simon advocates this approach because, he 
argues, the administrative task must in practice involve values and judgments. 
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organization, New York, 1976 [1945], p. 58.  B. Constant saw this as potentially 
giving one branch of government excessive power and devised a different approach.  
See M. Hartman, “Benjamin Constant and the Question of Ministerial Responsibility 
in France, 1814-1815,” Journal of European Studies 6 (1976), pp. 248-61.  
Interestingly, Hamilton and Jefferson may have anticipated Finer and Friedrich.  L. 
Caldwell, The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson, New York, 1988 
[1944]. For an informative and useful survey of the public administration literature 
through its date of publication, see D. Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of 
the Political Theory of American Public Administration, New York, 1948. 
435“Responsibility,” p. 338a 
436“Responsibility,” p. 341a 
437“Government,” p. 582 Finer clearly idealizes the British civil service, which saw 
neutrality and subservience as a professional ethos. Cf. H. Dale, The Higher Civil 
Service of Great Britain, Oxford 1941, esp. ch. 5, “Relations with Ministers and 
Parliament.”  It would, however, be quite mistaken to view this as an attitude of the 
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apparently absolute statement, he does allow that an official is not to serve merely as 
a passive instrument awaiting the minister’s commanding touch.  Rather, without 
specifying exactly where the balance is to be struck, he does allow that the official 
has a capacity to advise, albeit, repeating a very traditional formulation, decisions 
once made are to be carried out.  Such is his understanding of “political control,” 
which, he argues, is to bureaucracy, what market discipline is to the business.438  
Finer’s conclusion echoes Weber’s regarding the need for bureaucracy to serve, 
although he did not have much confidence in professionalism’s efficacy as a 
safeguard against bureaucratic independence.439 This is in some sense a restating of 
the principle articulated by Rousseau, namely, that the decision (will) and its 
execution (act) are separate domains.440 
Public administration pioneers like Wilson and Goodnow essentially maintain 
this distinction as well.441  For them, politics represented a parlous domain from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
past: see, for example, M. Quinlan, “Ethics in Public Service,” Governance 6 (1993), 
pp. 538-44 
438“Government,” pp. 582-4 (political control, price mechanism at p. 583); pp. 586-7 
(officials to give advice).  Cf. Schumpeter’s “third condition” for successful 
democracy. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, 1975 
[1942], p. 293 
439Parliamentary control is of critical importance to Weber. See, for example, 
“Suffrage and Democracy in Germany,” in Lassman, op. cit., pp. 126-7 and 
“Parliament and Government in Germany,” Lassman, op. cit., p. 159ff.  As an ethical 
matter, the official “who receives an order which, in his view, is wrong can – and 
should – raise objections.  If his superior then insists on the instruction it is not 
merely the duty of the official, it is also a point of honour for him to carry it out as if 
it corresponded to his own innermost conviction….” (emphasis in original) p. 160  
This duty arises from a professional conception of “office.” 
440Goodnow writes, “…popular government requires that it is the executing authority 
which shall be subordinated to the expressing authority, since the latter in the nature 
of things can be made much more representative of the people than can the executing 
authority.” op. cit., p. 24 
441Wilson, op. cit.; Goodnow, op. cit. 
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which the civic community’s desires would emerge, and administration existed to 
carry out those desires immune from political contamination.442  Politics amounted to 
“the expression of the will of the state;” administration consists in “executing the will 
of the state.”443  Therefore, administration itself, which carries out law and must use 
judgment to fit particular cases, must not be subject to politics: this ensures that 
administration remains impartial, just, and efficient.444  F. Morstein-Marx adds that 
neutrality is a means to avoid compromising “the basic purpose of the administrative 
system as an instrumentality of equal use for any government coming to power 
lawfully.”445 (emphasis added)  Of course, this discretionary power, viz., the 
application of general rules to specific cases, cannot be exercised in arbitrary 
fashion.446  In fact, it is this discretionary capacity that Saint-Just and Rousseau both 
saw as a danger.  It appears, though, that, while Saint-Just saw the solution to this 
problem in the ruthless imposition of rules, Goodnow and others somehow viewed 
the solution as a matter of objective rationality.  In other words, the official, properly 
trained and dealing with facts in the manner of a scientist, would become a kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442On this distinction, see L. O’Toole, “Doctrines and Developments: Separation of 
Powers, the Politics-Administration Dichotomy, and the Rise of the Administrative 
State,” Public Administration Review 47.1 (Jan.-Feb., 1987), pp. 17-25; Karl, op. cit.  
443Goodnow, op. cit., pp. 23 and 72; M. Harmon and J. White, “’Decision’ and 
‘Action’ as Contrasting Perspectives in Organization Theory,” Public Administration 
Review 49.2 (Mar.-Apr., 1989), pp. 144-52 
444Goodnow, op. cit., p. 84; Cf. Wilson: “…administration lies outside the proper 
sphere of politics.” (emphasis in original) op. cit., p. 210 
445op. cit., p. 130; see also his comments at pp. 137-8 
446In Wilson’s words, “Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of 
public law.  Every particular application of general law is an act of administration.” 
op. cit., p. 212 Simon reframes the politics-administration distinction as one between 
facts and values.  While this retains the binary nature of the problem as articulated, 
for example, by Goodnow, he argues that the functional separation implied for 
legislatures and administrations cannot in practice be maintained.  Officials 
necessarily are concerned with both facts and values as are legislatures.  op. cit., Ch. 3  
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impersonal translator of reality, a kind of corporeal volonté raisonnable.  As 
Goodnow claimed, administration was apart from politics because “it embraces fields 
of semi-scientific, quasi-judicial and quasi-business or commercial activity – work 
which has little if any influence on the expression of the true state will.”447  Wilson 
himself had claimed, “[a]dministrative questions are not political questions” and he 
asserted as too “obvious” to require discussion the notion that administrative officials 
were essentially technical in nature.448  Officials, on Goodnow’s understanding, were 
engaged in “the pursuit of truth,” in other words, an impersonal and unbiased activity 
that would in some sense reflect in its application objective reality.449 Oakeshott 
seems to capture this sentiment when he writes,  
The conduct of affairs, for the Rationalist, is a matter of solving 
problems, and in this no man can hope to be successful whose reason 
has become inflexible by surrender to habit or is clouded by the 
fumes of tradition.  In this activity the character which the 
Rationalist claims for himself is the character of the engineer, whose 
mind (it is supposed) is controlled throughout by the appropriate 
technique and whose first step is to dismiss from his attention 
everything not directly related to his specific intentions.450 
 
Oakeshott is writing about politics, but he captures the faith that seems to undergird 
Wilson and Goodnow’s concept of the bureaucrat as technician: the idea that his 
impersonal sorting of facts, based in reason, reflects his role, and, from their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447op. cit., p. 85; Wilson too had business practices in the back of his mind: “The field 
of administration is a field of business.” op. cit., pp. 201 and 209  Cf. the idea of 
planning in Mannheim, which effectively displaces politics. K. Mannheim, Man and 
Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York, 1940 
448op. cit., pp. 210-1 
449ibid. 
450M. Oakeshott, “Rationalism in politics,” in Rationalism in politics and other 
essays, Indianapolis, 1991, pp. 5-42, quotation at p. 9 
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perspective, solves the problem of an arbitrary officialdom.451  After all, if politics are 
the domain of caprice, administration is the domain of problem-solving, calling for 
science.  It truly does evoke the vision of Saint-Just whose dream of recreating a state 
of nature through the absolute, impartial application of law was if anything the 
unflinching application of pure reason revealing nature.  Here, to put it differently, the 
same hope seems to animate a vision of apolitical, rational technocrats, implementing 
the sovereign will in a manner that is objectively correct.  In this way, bureaucratic 
subservience to popular sovereignty is maintained because the civic community 
provides the direction for the ship of state, while all the activities of the ship’s crew 
are ostensibly carried out on the basis of what is objectively required.  When sailing 
to a destination, one cannot debate the objective necessity of unfurling a sail.  Thus, 
bureaucracy is ostensibly maintained as the sovereign’s servant, employing delegated 
discretion only as dictated by objective circumstances.452 
Any normative conception of bureaucracy must relate its function to the 
sovereign’s will.  Whether that sovereign is a monarch, as historically often was the 
case in many states that developed formalized administration, or “the people,” as has 
become increasingly common, the fundamental issue has been one of subordinating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451On the problem with the purely “technical” role envisioned here, see D. Thompson, 
“Ascribing Responsibility to Advisers in Government,” Ethics 93.3 (Apr., 1983), pp. 
546-60 
452This arrangement was of specific concern to Weber who identified bureaucratic 
expertise as a source of power vis-à-vis the legislature.  He saw that “…the position 
of power of all officials rests on knowledge.” (emphasis in original) Lassman, op. cit., 
p. 178ff, quotation on p. 178 Gulick argues that politics, not in the sense of a spoils 
system, must influence administration because that would undermine the very notion 
of self-rule.  Here, though, he mainly means politics as the expression of 
government’s “general will.” L. Gulick, “Politics, Administration, and the ‘New 
Deal’,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 169 (Sep., 
1933), pp. 55-66  
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the bureaucracy to the sovereign. Machiavelli grasped at this idea when he considered 
how a prince might ensure the effective execution of his wishes; in his consideration 
of a republican government, however, the idea of the state as an independent entity 
capable of a will was less clear.  Instead, it appeared that the fundamental problem 
was the provision of a framework that allowed great men to compete in a way that 
allowed the republic to continue.  Accomplishing what was in the republic’s interests 
was a matter of balancing the ambitions of these great men against one another: the 
polity envisioned here was competitive and turbulent.  Great captains might behave 
appropriately because they sought glory and feared their competitors, but they were 
not men in service to a sovereign.  The strong articulation of sovereignty came with 
Bodin.  His theory and its subsequent permutations laid the groundwork for the idea 
that bureaucracy must be subordinate to the sovereign people.  Of course, the problem 
of official discretion was not uniquely a problem for modern theorists like Weber.  
Bodin and those after him, like Rousseau and Saint-Just, considered the matter, and in 
light of the logic of sovereignty, determined that discretion must be limited.  In its 
most extreme articulation, Saint-Just envisioned a scheme in which officials, set apart 
from the political community, no longer exercised discretion in any meaningful sense 
because law would be perfectly expressed as a kind of reasoned revelation.  And this 
was relevant to the pioneers of public administration because they looked to the 
continent for their models of professional bureaucracy.  The effort to separate 
execution and decision, seen as administration and politics, gave bureaucrats some 
discretion in matching actual circumstances to legislation.  But this too was an 
attenuated discretion in the sense that reason and science would lead to impartiality.  
 162 
In this sense, there is no real discretion in applying a rule to an actual case any more 
than there would be discretion in deciding the sum of two numbers.  The facts simply 
emerge; objective reality is revealed.  Under this understanding then, the danger of 
discretion evaporates, and the public servant both carries out the sovereign will and 




The Discretion of Citizens as Officials 
 
I have explored in the preceding chapters two currents of thought about the 
relationship between magistrates and the political order in which they find 
themselves.  On the one hand, there is what I will call alternatively a participatory or 
republican tradition that sees magistrates as leading citizens, relying to a large extent 
on their own discretion and turning to slaves, dependents, or friends as they fulfill 
their duties in furtherance of the state’s policies.  The magistrates, using discretion 
that is organic to their role, make the decisions; the staffs carry them out.  This is a 
natural reflection both of their status as citizen-magistrates and of the socially 
subordinate nature of those called upon to assist them.453  Here, social and political 
arrangements are mutually reinforcing, and magistrates, although they may, as human 
beings are wont to do, sometimes abuse their authority, are in theory, at least, using 
discretion for the community’s good.   The other strand of theorizing about 
magistrates is absolutist.  This approach assigns the role of decision to a robust 
sovereign and the role of execution to the sovereign’s officials.  The gradual 
displacement of monarchs by peoples only meant that peoples became sovereigns, 
and theories about how officials are to behave, have been informed fundamentally by 
this absolutist understanding of the relationship between sovereign and government.  
Even modifications allowing for official discretion have cast it in objective terms that 
boil down, not to moral question of right or wrong, but objective ones of fact.  This is 
in some sense analogous to the idea that discretion plays no role in deciding whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453Friends, obviously, are not subordinates. 
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the temperature outside if 80 degrees or not.  Thus, value judgments generally remain 
the purview of the sovereign, who decides, not administrators as public servants.  
Even when the discussion has turned to those officials who might use their discretion, 
the emphasis has mostly been on those of senior rank, the implication being that 
subordinates carry out their assigned tasks as assigned.454  To be brief, strong 
conceptions of sovereignty have informed the normative view of bureaucratic 
responsiveness: even in democracies, the emphasis has been on bureaucrats fulfilling 
the people’s sovereign will.455  Their different outlooks notwithstanding, absolutist 
and participatory approaches to official duty have identified the question of discretion 
as a matter of central importance.  In the present chapter, I will argue that official 
discretion within the context of a modern democracy ought to remain attentive to the 
official’s status, not as a public servant, but as a citizen.  This is an understanding that 
draws upon a participatory theory of magistracy,  and it implies that the prior status of 
any public servant as a citizen always entails an implicit capacity to judge 
circumstances and wield discretion on his own authority.  Limiting factors derived 
from role, law, or procedure are likely to be influential in his use of discretion, if not 
decisive in most cases, but on theoretical grounds the choice to heed any of those or 
his own conscience derives not from such secondary considerations, but from his 
status as citizen, which is prior to all.   After all, citizens partake of sovereignty, and 
are not merely the sovereign’s subjects.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454See, for example, Goodnow, op. cit., p. 88 
455Consider the concerns voiced at the 2014 American Political Science Association 
conference by B. Ginsberg and J. Bachner regarding the problem of the government 
not being demographically like the people. P. Wood, “Federal workers tend to be 
whiter; richer; more liberal,” Baltimore Sun, October 5, 2014, p. 8. 
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Discretion boils down to choices.  Will an official follow the letter of the law?  
Will he refrain from enforcing the law?  Will he actively resist the law?  Will he 
enlist the help of his fellow citizens to thwart the law?  Discretion entails such 
questions and many others.  But, as I said, it is a matter of choice, and the question 
has always been whether or not there is a theoretical justification for officials to use 
their own judgment to make those choices.  I say theoretical because human beings 
are not automata: some will make choices regardless of the rules.456  Bodin, who, as 
we saw earlier, was primarily interested in stability, discussed discretion as a 
theoretical matter when he spoke about the possibility of magistrates resigning, 
disregarding instructions, or even committing tyrannicide.  The possibility, not to say 
likelihood, of erroneous opinion and the danger of setting a bad example were enough 
for him to leave these options theoretical: best, he seemed to conclude, to do what one 
is told.  Saint-Just offered an extreme articulation of this view when he suggested that 
public servants would simply carry out laws based on reason.457   And in modern 
terms, Weber offered an idealized version of bureaucrats who, whatever their 
misgivings and counsel, would, as a matter of professional duty, execute whatever 
they were bidden.458  The real world, however, is not like this.  Rather, it is full of 
examples of people bending rules and doing other than what bureaucratic duty would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456Thus the need to accept that fact and make the institution function with that as a 
given!  R. O’Leary, The Ethics of Dissent: Managing Guerilla Government, 
Washington, 2006 
457p. 149ff., supra. 
458On Weber and the state, see A. Anter, “L’histoire de l’État comme histoire de la 
bureaucratie,” Trivium 7 (2010), pp. 2-15 
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suggest.459  This is not to say that the political community is utter chaos: the persistent 
claim that people left to their own devices would simply produce confusion has not 
occurred.  Instead, one finds a continuum between obedience and disobedience.   
The thrust of a large body of empirically-oriented literature that arose as a 
corrective, if not refutation, of Weber’s idealized bureaucrat, speaks grosso modo 
with one voice, emphasizing the common-sense notion that human beings do not 
always do as they are told, regardless of their professional or legal obligations.  In 
Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, Gouldner described resistance encountered by a 
management that attempted to bring more formality to the organization of a gypsum 
plant.460  In the Management of Innovation, Burns detailed the social phenomena at 
work in the Scottish electronics companies attempting to reorient themselves to a 
post-World War consumer market.461  Warwick in A Theory of Public Bureaucracy 
similarly examined how U.S. State Department bureaucrats stymied management 
innovations introduced by short-term appointees.462  Noting that studies of 
bureaucracy have been too indebted to Weber’s ideal type, Warwick argued that the 
political realities of bureaucracy and the role played by bureaucrats themselves in 
shaping organizations have consequently not been given their due.  In other words, 
professional devotion to duty through subordination to one’s political masters is pace 
Weber not reflective of reality.463  Niskanen’s approach goes a step further by using 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459Law enforcement is perhaps one of the starkest examples of this.  As Davis argues, 
individual police officers make policy, much of it, formally illegal. K. Davis, 
Discretionary Justice: a Preliminary Inquiry, Urbana, 1973 [1969], pp. 80-90 
460Gouldner, op. cit. 
461Burns, op. cit. 
462Warwick, op. cit. 
463Note the sometimes polemical tone of Ch. 10 
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economic principles to describe and explain bureaucratic behaviors.  In essence, this 
is a principal-agent model that portrays the participants as rational utility-
maximizers.464  To be sure this descriptive project leads him to offer advice on how to 
manage bureaucracies, but his approach is not fundamentally normative.  In their 
book, Deliberate Discretion?, Huber and Shipan discerned conditions under which 
legislatures either left delegated authority vague or attempted to delineate with great 
specificity what was being left to bureaucracies to do.465  Theirs too is a principal-
agent, rational-choice approach: “…the Bureaucrat, like the Politician, is a strategic 
political actor who will make choices that are predicated on achieving his most 
preferred policy outcome.”466   In Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy the issue for 
Carpenter was not whether or not bureaucracies behave according to Weber’s 
formulation, but when bureaucrats have succeeded – this is a matter of history –  in 
making themselves political actors, capable of advocating issues of concern to them 
over and against the desires of politicians.467  Even Kingsley’s famous study of the 
English bureaucracy, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British 
Civil Service, which argued that the British civil servant simply came more or less 
from the same class as the ministers and politicians, thereby reflecting the same 
outlook, was similarly descriptive-historical in its approach.468  Being empirical and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464Niskanen, op. cit. 
465Huber and Shipan, op. cit. 
466p. 84 
467Carpenter, op. cit. 
468Kingsley, op. cit. 
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written ostensibly to describe actual behavior, such approaches have generally 
stressed value-free description over prescription.469   
Of course, normative considerations can emerge from empirically grounded 
observation – is this not the case with Aristotle’s Politics?470   The modern tendency, 
however, is often to produce narrow prescriptions that address issues of immediate 
concern, are particularistic and utilitarian in nature, and, of especial importance here, 
offer little to suggest that an official might act on the basis of his own moral 
considerations, whatever those may be.471  But discretion for good or ill is of central 
importance.  Finer, for example, worried about the official who used discretion in a 
manner not prescribed by rule, regardless of motive, for good or ill.472  Yet it remains, 
says Davis, “indispensible for the individualization of justice.”473 And it hardly seems 
possible, except in those cases easily adapted to very specific rules or to the 
capabilities of modern technology, to remove it completely from the bureaucrat’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469Cf. J. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, Ch. 1, esp. 
his comments about avoiding normativity pp. 3-4; J. Noonan, Bribes, New York, 
1984, pp. 544-50; P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument, Oxford, 1999, Ch. 7 
470It is worth stressing here that the Politics is just one part of an interlocking group of 
texts: the Constitution of Athens, the Politics, Eudemian/Nicomachean Ethics, and the 
Rhetoric.  The difference between the fruits of Aristotle’s empiricism and that of 
Gouldner or Warwick or any number of modern authors who discern patterns or make 
normative claims on the basis of their research is stark indeed. 
471For an example of an approach motivated by concerns of the moment, see R. 
Wood, “Ethics in Government as a Problem of Executive Management,” Public 
Administration Review 15.1 (Winter, 1955), pp. 1-7 
472cf. fn. 431, p. 154, supra.  Rules, of course, present their own problems.  See, H. 
van Gunsteren, The Quest for Control: A Critique of the Rational-Central-Rule 
Approach in Public Affairs, London 1976; L. Muehlhauser and L. Helm, 
“Intelligence Explosion and Machine Ethics,” Machine Intelligence Research 
Institute (October 01, 2014), www.intelligence.org/files/IE-ME.pdf; A. Eden, et al., 
edd., Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment, Berlin, 
2012, pp. 101-26 
473op. cit., p. 25 
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hands.  The question then becomes one of how to limit or control the use of 
discretion.  Frequently, several means are invoked: law, procedure, oversight, and 
role.474  In other words, we can make laws indicating exactly what is to be done or not 
done, as when we say that the government shall not discriminate against certain 
minority groups.  We can ensure that exact procedures are followed as when we lay 
out the rules for public contracting.  We can provide for oversight by a variety of 
bodies ranging from the Congress, to the Judiciary, to administrative bodies.  And we 
can say that the particular position held by an official serves to limit his capacity to 
act.   
Falling back on such measures as law, procedure, oversight, and role is 
reasonable in a modern world where man is the measure of everything.  Scholarly 
treatment of discretion typically does not describe the moral content that would 
inform an official’s use of discretion.   This is not very surprising.  Any post-
Enlightenment approach to such questions, when not theologically grounded, usually 
appears utterly implausible.  There hardly remains any convincing basis for saying 
that anything is right or wrong.475  We can argue, for example, that slavery is wrong, 
but beyond a kind of assertion derived from the consensus of civilized peoples (ius 
gentium), there actually is no metaphysical basis in the modern public sphere for such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474This is not an exhaustive list.  Professionalism is another means of control, but the 
question of whether or not all bureaucrats form a professional class in the way that 
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that professionalism was important. 
475M. Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, London, 2004 [1947].  This lack of moral 
consensus has important implications for artificial intelligence. Muehlhauser and 
Helm, op. cit.  
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an assertion.476  It was this kind of observation that initially led MacIntyre, for 
example, to resuscitate virtue ethics as a basis of action.477  But all of this is rather 
arbitrary in the modern context: there is no metaphysical hook on which we can hang 
any conception of right or wrong.  No sovereign or lawgiver, outside and apart from 
man, exists to tell us what to do.478  And so the argument of Rawls, for example, is 
hard to swallow precisely because there is no real basis for any of his foundational 
claims.  Moreover, his antipathy towards all the beliefs that are the very substance of 
politics, such as religion and moral values, and his definition of reasonableness, 
which is itself a veritable denial of any meaningful diversity, completely undermine 
the project as democratic polity: what he proposes is anything but that, and supported 
by nothing more than his own moral assertions.479  Given this moral aporia, what can 
those interested in official discretion do, but fall back on man-made mechanisms to 
constrain it?  It strikes me that the collapse of theology has removed the only external 
and metaphysical basis for moral action, leaving man as, so to speak, the final 
criterion: procedure, nomos, or law, seen as Rechtsstaat or some denatured form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476“Because no logical or a priori basis exists on which people might try to persuade 
one another to agree on it other than by appealing to share utilities, shared values 
based on some transcendent moral conception of the good cannot be rationally 
decided upon.” Harmon and White, op. cit., p. 145b  I use the phrase “public sphere” 
pointedly because religion, which for many people offers some metaphysical support, 
is in the Western democracies usually seen as a private matter.  Rawls, for example, 
argues that religion does not belong in the political realm.  It is worth recalling that 
ius gentium was traditionally little more than the shared moeurs of civilized peoples. 
477Anscombe, op. cit.; MacIntyre, op. cit. 
478This was Maritain’s critique of the word, sovereign, when applied to man. fn. 332, 
p. 125, supra. 
479I leave aside the question whether fairness is a means or an end, although it does 
strike me as something instrumental.  Behind the veil of ignorance, I find but one 
person.  Schmitt’s point about the quiddity of politics is utterly opposed to the vision 
of Rawls, but far more plausible.  C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Chicago, 
2007 [1995] 
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thereof, becomes the yardstick.480  At any rate, it is worth bearing in mind that actual 
moral content is often the scope of discussions about the cases where bureaucrats 
might exercise discretion for the good.  And discretion for just ends is precisely 
where officials as citizens can be effective. 
In Discretionary Justice, Davis relates a telling anecdote that bears quoting 
because it illustrates the issue of discretion and just ends: 
In interviewing immigration officers, I have often inquired whether 
the result in a particular case does not seem unjust, and the answer 
has often been: “Yes, but we had no choice: the statute compels the 
answer we gave.”  My next question would usually be: “Did you 
make note of the case, with a view to recommending a statutory 
change?”  The answer was invariably no.  The attitude is that as long 
as the injustice is caused by the statute, the administrator has no 
reason for concern.481 
 
The interesting aspect of this statement is not the fact that these officials did not go up 
their hierarchical chain to inform decision makers about the unjust results of policy.  
Davis sees that as the critical issue, and it might be that among the actions available 
to officials is the option to advise superiors about unjust outcomes.  But I see the 
interesting point illustrated here as being that officials were perfectly willing to accept 
injustice and do nothing about it because responsibility could be assigned elsewhere.  
They behave as passive instruments.  Yet, much like jury nullification, discretion 
itself, by appealing to moral values outside those of the organization, might provide 
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“‘The Prince is Not Bound by the Laws.’ Accursius and the Origins of the Modern 
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481Davis, op. cit., pp. 52-3 
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an immediate remedy on the basis of actual circumstances, although it is equally clear 
from this or any number of other examples that the majority of bureaucrats are 
perfectly willing to carry out their duties mechanically on the theory that 
responsibility for the outcome lies elsewhere.482  Later, Davis illustrates the role of 
discretion in actual practice with the case of beat police officers.  These men and 
women, as Davis argues, are, in fact, involved every day in the using their discretion 
to make and execute policy.  An officer might pull one person over for speeding and 
let him go.  He might pull over another and issue a citation.  It is his discretion that 
decides whether or not he cites one person or the other, regardless of whether or not 
the law has a general prohibition against speeding.  As Davis points out, whether or 
not they choose to arrest one person or another is fundamentally arbitrary.  And 
individual decisions not to arrest or cite offenders, whether or not the results are just, 
take place regardless of the letter of the law and without publication of any rules 
explaining to the public in advance how laws will be put into practice.483  His purpose 
is not to argue in favor of an excessively legalistic approach: there must be scope to 
act on the basis of actual circumstances.  But, he says, there is a utility in being open: 
using rules or adjudication to decide specific cases, or to express in what way 
legislation or policy will actually be put into practice.  The alternative, exemplified by 
the current behavior of police departments, is simply to engage in a capricious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482R. Schopp, “Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as Jury Responses 
to Crimes of Conscience,” Southern California Law Review 69 (1995-6), pp. 2039-
116 When such notions still had meaning, natural law did provide a basis for 
resistance to manmade law or civil law. 
483Davis, op. cit., pp. 80-90; J. Wilson, Bureaucracy, pp. 327-9  Davis, in a vein 
reminiscent of Taylor’s Scientific Management, worries that beat police officers lack 
the education and seniority necessary to the task, and suggests that department heads 
should be the ones deciding these matters.   
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administration of justice that is often contrary to the letter, if not the spirit, of the law 
or, in a word, illegal.  For him, the problem is not discretion per se, because that is in 
actual practice policy’s lifeblood, but the task of ensuring that how it will be 
employed is articulated clearly and in advance by those in a position to know the 
circumstances of its application.  We see here that he relates the use of discretion to 
the actual role of the police officer, and calls for procedure to curtail what he 
considers excessive discretion.  In essence, Davis accepts the amount of discretion 
necessary to the task: anything beyond that can lead to injustice.  It is the excessive 
discretion that Davis cannot stomach, and the remedy comes down to role, rule, and 
procedure. 
For their parts, Burke and Dobel both rein in discretion fundamentally on the 
basis of role.  Burke argues that the ability of officials to take matters into their own 
hands is essentially circumscribed by both their roles as bureaucrats, duty-bound to 
serve the state, and the actual circumstances of knowledge and proximity.  In other 
words, officials have duties to inform decision-makers, but this duty relates to what 
they are in a position to know and where they are located within the organization.  Put 
differently, someone’s duty to be informed about a given matter depends on his actual 
relationship to it.  An official’s personal or chance interest in a matter may, given his 
actual position, lie outside the scope of his duties and, thus, would in itself provide no 
justification to intervene or take action.  Therefore, apart from general instances 
where statutory rules designed to encourage whistle-blowing encourage anyone with 
knowledge of waste, fraud, or abuse, to come forward, an official who happens to 
know that something is unjust may not be duty-bound to do much about it, if it is 
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beyond the scope of his assigned tasks and position within the organization.  To 
illustrate: 
With respect to the general public, for example, lack of public 
attention to politics, low level of participation, distorted political 
agendas, malapportionment…and other impediments to political 
participation do indeed affect the character of democratic politics 
and, by implication, its decision-making process….  Bureaucrats 
stand in no (or at best minimal) causal relationship to these 
conditions; as a result they bear no responsibility for their remedy.  
One might claim, as a good democrat, that officials should devote 
their time, energy, and institutional resources to educating the 
public….  But this kind of superogatory effort should not be 
encouraged as responsible conduct, since it stands in no meaningful 
relationship to a bureaucrat’s official role….484 (emphasis added) 
 
An official, however, is obligated to know what pertains to his job, and to advise on 
that basis regarding what he himself also knows.  This is the substance of Burke’s 
idea that bureaucrats must have a sense of responsibility: officials by virtue of their 
office have responsibility for each other (something a little evocative of Rousseau’s 
volonté de corps), a responsibility in policy formulation, and a responsibility for their 
own choices. Prudence, as an instrument to guide discretion, figures in Burke’s 
understanding: individuals must make the right choices.  In the final analysis, the 
official is bounded, nor do even foreseeably unjust results necessarily provide a basis 
for acting contrary to policy.485  The burden, as with Davis, is to report problems up 
the chain of command and let competent authorities make the decisions; fairness, in 
the sense of righting wrongs, is, generally speaking, not within an official’s 
competence.486  After all, simply allowing for responses to private morality would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484Burke, op. cit., pp. 64-5 
485Burke, op. cit., p. 70 
486Burke, op. cit., p. 69 
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“[set] political power to private purpose.”487  Obviously, role is central to Burke’s 
understanding of “bureaucratic responsibility.” 
In his book, Public Integrity, Dobel argues that a balance must be struck 
between the duties of office and personal moral commitments, a balance that rests on 
the use of prudential judgment.488  Prudence, a concept consciously borrowed from 
Machiavelli, figures prominently because the official above all else ought to remain 
effective: “[t]he relation of prudence to public integrity flows from the ‘effectiveness 
imperative.’”489  The notion that one should live to fight another day means that 
fighting every battle ultimately results in an official failing to achieve his moral ends.  
Prudence also means that the official takes into account and is responsible or 
answerable for what he intends to accomplish.  Thus, “…if several principles or 
goods conflict, individuals may choose to act on the ones they believe are most 
feasible, will endure the longest, or involve the least amount of violence.”490  
Prudence is “…the logic of excellence in political achievement.”491  For Dobel, an 
official’s personal responsibility is important, but must be balanced by his legal role 
because someone acting purely on his own can go too far: “Personal judgments and 
initiatives in government must be tested by public deliberation and accountability.  
This domesticates personal moral initiative while keeping it alive in government.”492 
(emphasis added)  Naturally, there are no absolute answers, and Dobel does not 
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accept complete surrender to role; one cannot remain passive, but one is not 
completely unbounded.493  All of this is well and good, but prudence, as an means to 
good judgment, addresses, perhaps, only one part of the problem.494  Dobel cannot be 
faulted for leaving open-ended whatever personal moral commitments might guide an 
individual official.  Little justification is offered, however, for the idea that an 
official’s role, which serves as the basis for his capacity to act with prudence, should 
imply this balance between, as the quotation from Davis suggests, statute and justice.  
Dobel’s theory maintains the bureaucrat as a formal functionary whose organizational 
position somehow ought to entail the exercise of prudential judgment, although it is 
not always clear on what basis beyond the fact of his being an official.  In other 
words, his status as an official is the given, and in Dobel’s analysis the official is 
someone separate from the political community. 
An approach that sees bureaucrats as political actors is presented by Denhart 
and Catron.  They suggest that the political dimension of an official’s status calls for 
something more than acting merely as an indifferent agent of policy: “…an 
administrator must approach the decision from both the broad perspective of the 
requirements of democratic ideals and the narrower institutional demands of 
bureaucratic ideals.”495  Thus, administrators should not, in their view, be simple, 
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the view of those, like Goodnow and Wilson, who espoused a science of public 
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impersonal cogs.496  This ability to behave as a political agent responding to 
individual circumstances should be grounded on an ethos that is both bureaucratic and 
democratic by training and socialization.  We might infer that this ethos arises almost 
organically from a bureaucrat’s actual role and practice as an official. Denhart and 
Catron, however, do not provide any obvious reason why officials should rely upon 
“the requirements of democratic ideals” as opposed to firm adherence to 
“bureaucratic ideals” beyond the circumstance of their involvement in the process: 
this amounts to scope of action deriving from role.  It does seem a rather capricious 
assertion without some rationale provided for why the bureaucratic role might by its 
nature entail political activity, although, empirically speaking, it surely must.  In 
short, it begs the following question: why would the official’s role not imply utter 
subordination to legal requirements or superior authority?  This after all is the nature 
of delegated authority: the individual to whom discretion is delegated ought to 
operate under the terms of delegation.  Furthermore, how would a particular official’s 
role provide any basis for examining circumstance and making decisions responsive 
to ideas of the just?  More often than not an official’s role finds expression exactly in 
the fulfillment of impersonal duty regardless of actual circumstances, which suggests 
that there is nothing organic to the constitution of bureaucratic role to suggest a 
practical, legitimate capacity to exercise discretion in a manner informed by a sense 
of justice originating anywhere else than the organization itself.  Indeed, as Applbaum 
implies, a role that entails as its duty executing acts of injustice hardly carries within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496op. cit., pp. 190b-91a  Their discussion of a kind of duty both to judge and explain 
recalls Plato’s insistence that laws in Magnesia would contain preambles explaining 
their raison d’être. 
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its constitution the means to do the opposite.497  Interestingly, although Davis was 
himself concerned that officials in such circumstances did not bring the problem to 
the attention of those in a position to effect statutory change, there obviously might 
have been another option: namely, to negate the statute in the interest of justice.498  It 
would seem that the qualities suggested so far as inhering to role and providing a 
basis for moral action are actually not related to the nature of the role itself.  This 
point can be illustrated, if we reflect again on the nature of law enforcement. 
If we think of police officers, a perspective emerges that undermines the idea 
that the official’s role per se would offer any organic ability to apply prudence or 
democratic considerations.  For modern circumstances now suggest that such moral 
capacities are accidental, not essential to role.  Technology’s encroachment into 
traditionally administrative domains suggests this because the mechanistic application 
of rules entails no prudence or democratic consideration whatsoever.  This effectively 
creates a collapsed view of legitimacy where “the justice question of ‘what to decide’ 
– given substantive conflict of interests, beliefs, or values – cannot be separated from 
the legitimacy question of ‘how to decide’ or ‘who is to decide.’”499  Thus, for 
example, when a red-light camera system uses radar to determine whether or not a 
driver has violated the rules of the road and then takes and processes a photograph of 
a car’s license plate, enabling a citation to be issued automatically to the owner of the 
vehicle without any human mediation, it becomes clear that context in the sense 
individual circumstances is rendered irrelevant to this rule-based, procedural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497Applbaum, op. cit., p. 259 
498Applbaum, op. cit., p. 207 
499Applbaum, op. cit, p. 217 
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conception of duty: here duty is nothing more than specific function or process.500  
Technology now makes possible what Saint-Just only dreamt of.  This example also 
illustrates how a rule only functions by a process of reductionism or denial of context: 
particular circumstance is completely irrelevant to a rule that defines a violation on 
purely objective, finite criteria.501  By this criterion, all facts are trimmed to fit the 
same procrustean bed of rules.  Reality – the “messy world of details,” which a 
human being serving as a police officer might consider when deciding whether or not 
to issue a citation – plays no part here.502  After all, there may be instances that justify 
traveling over the speed limit or running a red light.  Indeed, a red light might be 
circumstantially irrelevant to questions of safety.  While a human being might use his 
discretion to weigh all factors bearing on an actual situation, a computer system will 
not.  It only functions on the basis of the rules provided, and those rules, in order to 
apply in all cases, must deny individual circumstance.  This is a case of achieving 
perfect equality through perfect impersonality.503  Here the machine only acts 
according to facts deemed relevant a priori, becoming thereby the truly faithful civil 
servant, absolutely so.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500This amounts to a modern form of tax-farming because municipalities typically 
contract out these services in order to generate revenue.  The fact that challenging 
these citations places very real burdens on ordinary citizens plays into the hands of 
these municipalities in many cases.  Often, convenience figures most highly in such 
questions: will a person take time off from work to challenge a citation.  The balance 
of power, which is a balance of convenience, tips in one direction in such cases. 
501Cf. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: the Limits of Artificial Intelligence, 
New York, 1979 [1972]  Although dated in parts, Dreyfus makes a number of useful 
arguments. 
502H. Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, New York, 1994, p. 224 
503North, et al., ibid., fn. 244, p. 94, supra. 
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In point of fact, although red-light cameras might seem to be a minor affair or 
limited case, it is clear that the use of technology to carry out tasks now performed by 
human beings is expanding, not shrinking, and software, even now when artificial 
intelligence lies somewhere in the future, is taking on greater responsibility.504   We 
are reaching the moment when the idea of artificial moral agents or autonomous 
artificial agents is becoming real.  Thus, reliable, stable machines are likely to 
become liable persons, capable of making moral choices on our behalf.505  An 
algorithm, making choices impersonally on the basis of strict criteria, does by one 
standard deliver truly equal treatment for all because everything is reduced to uniform 
inputs: whether that kind of equality represents justice is doubtful because justice 
typically involves judgments formed through the application of general principles to 
actual circumstances, the discretionary moment.  Chopra suggests that it may be 
possible to punish software for unjust or erroneous choices, but punishing software 
seems quite distinct from the idea that a real human being might be found liable for 
wrongdoing.  Surely, there is a significant distinction to be made between punishing 
things and punishing people regardless of whatever argument can be advanced to 
show that certain kinds of software qualify for legal personality: human beings, after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504The use of big data represents an empirical shift from identifying causality to 
identifying correlation.  This would have its own implications, the more big data play 
a role in automating processes, such as identifying candidates for Internal Revenue 
Service audits. R. Satran, “IRS Data Web Snares Mostly Low- and Middle-Income 
Taxpayers,” U.S. News and World Report (May 1, 2013), 
(www.money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual-
funds/articles/2013/05/01/irs-data-web-snares-mostly-low--and-middle-income-
taxpayers); V. Mayer-Schönberger and K. Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will 
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think, New York, 2013 
505W. Wallach and C. Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, 
Oxford, 2009; S. Chopra and L. White, A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial 
Agents, Ann Arbor, 2011 
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all, are not apps, and apps are not people.506  In any case, in some domains 
automation effectively addresses problem of discretion posed by Davis, although it is 
doubtful he would see that as a boon, given his views on “the extravagant version of 
the rule of law.”507  As mentioned, new vistas for these and other technologies surely 
loom over the horizon.  Apart from the implications of technology for the potential 
automation of more bureaucratic tasks, the very fact that some of these tasks can be 
taken on by software does suggest that official role itself does not imply any organic 
capacity for officials to serve as political actors.  I argue, rather, that such capacities 
inhere to the human beings occupying those roles, not the roles themselves.  
Thompson suggests that officials have responsibility, not merely because they 
are officials, but because they are persons.  In other words, their status as human 
beings means that they cannot be mere cogs in the machinery of government.508  I 
agree with this insofar as it stresses the importance of a quality that transcends the 
mere condition of employment.  Occupying a position within a government agency 
entails certain duties and functions, both implicitly and explicitly.  That much is clear, 
but it is not enough.  It too easily collapses into a surrender of personal values to 
those of the organization.  One’s personhood is prior, and it means that, as human 
beings, officials bring a quality that is more than mere service.  They are not 
automata or “living tools.”  But personhood alone is insufficient, in my view.  Nearly 
anything can be a person, even software, if we follow Chopra’s reasoning.509  Instead, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506J. Larnier, You Are Not a Gadget, New York, 2010 
507Davis, op. cit., p. 28ff. 
508This, of course, is the implication of Taylor’s scientific management principles to 
government agencies.  Taylor, op. cit.   
509Chopra, op. cit., Chs. 1 and 5 are of interest here. 
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one’s status as a citizen provides a more relevant grounding on which to base an idea 
that officials can exercise discretion as they see fit.  This is because citizens are 
members of the political community, particularly in democracies.  As such, the 
emphasis on citizenship highlights the connection to that community and to its laws, 
particularly the foundational laws (leges imperii), constitutive of that community.  
The political theory tradition offers two ways of conceptualizing bureaucrats as 
political actors, duty-bound to exercise discretion.  First, the magistracies as 
understood by traditional thinkers from Plato through Machiavelli offer a way of 
conceptualizing modern officials more powerfully, as citizens, who retain their moral 
capacities as citizens.510  Second, protestant theorizing about the capacity of minor 
magistrates to take action on the civic community’s behalf sheds light on how to 
reconceptualize official duty in modern democratic polities. 
Because individuals have citizenship prior to any role that they might take on, 
citizenship offers a transcendent framework for justifying the exercise of discretion.  
It also implies, contra Saint-Just, that becoming a bureaucrat does not mean the 
abandonment of one’s status as a citizen.511  Thompson, of course, was correct to 
emphasize that moral capacity is an essential quality of personhood, but this might 
suggest no more than simple flight or prayer, withdrawal or passivity in the face of 
injustice.  Mere personhood is fundamentally private.  One may simply go home in 
the face of injustice as Socrates did when ordered by the Thirty to participate in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510Thompson is critical of role itself because it overshadows the responsibility that 
attaches to individuals as persons. “Ascribing Responsibility,” and “Moral 
Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands,” American Political 
Science Review 74.4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 905-16   
511Saint-Just obviously understood the implication of citizens serving as government 
officials; for that reason, he insisted that they ceased to be citizens. 
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arrest of Leon.512  A robust conception of democratic citizenship, however, includes 
among its essential qualities participation in sovereignty and the capacity for 
action.513  Echoing Aristotle, who stressed the fact that citizens were distinguished 
from other residents of a state by their capacity to participate in public offices, 
Rousseau asserted that men were citizens “when they participate in sovereign 
authority.”514   The participatory tradition, as we have seen in our discussion of the 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Machiavelli, shows citizens holding office as active 
members of the political community.  Indeed, citizenship on this understanding is not 
mere membership in a political community for census purposes, nor is it a passive 
activity at all, although it is true that many citizens may not fully live their 
citizenship.  Even the citizen who does not participate remains potentially fully 
active.  And citizenship in this sense of activity, or, to echo Arendt’s notion, in the 
sense of the vita activa, is in its very nature a kind of political liberty that echoes 
ancient ideas.515  It differs from ancient ideas of liberty too.  The fact that social status 
itself no longer implies political limitations in the way that it clearly did for earlier 
thinkers means that citizenship is in the present day a more broadly conceived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512Apology in H. Tredennick, ed., Plato: The Last Days of Socrates, Penguin Classics, 
Harmmondsworth, 1982 [1954], p. 65  Cf. Applbaum on “Pareto-Inferior 
Constraints,” op. cit., pp. 1502  
513For the development of the modern idea of citizenship, see R. Brubaker, 
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, 1992. 
514Politics 3.1, pp. 61-3 [1274b32ff.]; Social Contract, p. 93 (1.6) = Derathé, op. cit., 
p. 362, see also Rousseau’s fn. 6, ad loc., which rejects Bodin’s notion of citizenship 
and stresses the political nature of citoyen. 
515Arendt, Human Condition; Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with 
that of the Moderns,” in Fontana, op. cit., pp. 307-28; cf. O’Neill, op. cit., pp. 392-3: 
“Unshackling the bureaucracy from the rule of law need not be a prescription for a 
lawless bureaucracy.”  Quotation from p. 393  The spectre of chaos, always invoked 
to justify bureaucratic servility, is ethereal as best.  
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political concept, theoretically speaking, at least.516  Therefore, the fact that 
individuals take jobs within the bureaucracy of a democratic government need not 
imply per se that they cease to be citizens first and foremost.  This, of course, was the 
theory that to some extent underpinned Jacksonian patronage.517  But we need not 
enter completely into the merits or failures of such a system to acknowledge here that 
citizenship itself comprehends as an essential quality the capacity to judge and to act.  
One’s participation as a constituent member of the sovereign nation need not be 
negated by the assumption of one’s role as a postman.  I would argue that in terms of 
earlier thinkers such as Cicero and Machiavelli, or Plato and Aristotle, officials were 
seen first as citizens and second as magistrates.  Thus was citizenship and magistracy 
combined, the implication being that one depended on the other, each bearing on the 
other.  Obviously, this understanding contradicts the absolutist tradition that, since 
Bodin, has seen members of government as servants of the sovereign, the logical 
consequence of which was Saint-Just’s formulation to the effect that officials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516To be sure, political equality is partly an ideological pretense, partly a mythos to 
flatter ourselves.  Cf. Tocqueville’s observation: “Dans un pays où il n’est pas 
impossible que le pauvre arrive à gouverner l’État, il est plus facile d’écarter toujours 
les pauvres du gouvernement, que dans ceux où l’espérance du pouvoir ne lui est pas 
offerte; l’idée de cette grandeur imaginaire, où il peut être appelé un jour, se place 
sans cesse entre lui et le spectacle de ses misères réelles.  C’est un jeu de hazard où 
l’énormité du gain possible attache son âme en dépit des probabilities de la perte.” 
(emphasis added) L’Ancien Régime, p. 60 
517The spoils system was controversial in the United States, although it was for a long 
time the method for staffing the government.  The strongest arguments against it 
historically seemed to come from notions of efficiency that ultimately derived from 
economic and business rather than political and social considerations.  C. Fish, The 
Civil Service and the Patronage, Harvard Historical Studies 9, Cambridge, 1920; W. 
Turn, “In Defense of Patronage,” and J. Pollock, “The Cost of the Patronage System,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 189 (Jan., 1937), 
pp. 22-34 
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effectively ceased to be citizens.518  But his conception implies what he saw as 
integral to citizenship: participation in sovereignty, a contradiction that had to be 
resolved through absolute distinction between citizen and public servant.  But, if we 
deny the distinction, we have a basis for bureaucratic discretion that transcends role. 
Apart from an official’s status as a citizen, there is a tradition in political 
theory that his status as a magistrate also provides a basis for independent action, 
contrary even to the wish of the sovereign.  This tradition comes from protestant 
resistance theory of the 16th century.  Many strands gave rise to this tradition, ranging 
from the elaboration of Roman civil law, ideas adumbrated vaguely by Calvin in his 
Institutio Christianae Religionis, to the religious conflict, particularly following the 
St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre in France, but these details need not detain us.519  
Indeed, it is worth pointing out that Bodin’s Six Books of the Republic represents one 
side of a debate about authority and obedience within the political community.  In 
many respects, Bodin and the Huguenots represent two sides of an argument about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518Not that this perspective has gone away completely: what else does it mean to 
speak of legislature and bureaucracy as a case of principal and agent, if not that the 
agent is some kind of other, functioning according to its own requirements.  This kind 
of analysis calls for regulatory remedy, just as Saint-Just demanded.  See, for 
example, McCubbins, M., et al., “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 3.2 (Autumn, 1987), 
pp. 243-77 
519H. Strohl,  “Le droit à la résistance d’après les conceptions protestantes,” Revue 
d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses 10 (1930), pp. 126-44; R. Benert, Inferior 
Magistrates in Sixteenth-Century Political and Legal Thought, U. of Minn., 
dissertation, 1967; J. Franklin, ed., Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth 
Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza, & Mornay, New York, 1969 and Jean 
Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory, Cambridge, 2009 [1973]; R. Kingdon, 
“Calvinism and Resistance Theory 1550-1580,” in J. Burns, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Political Thought 1450-1700, Cambridge, 2004 [1991], pp. 193-218  For 
the critical passages in Calvin, see H. Höpfl, ed., Luther and Calvin: On Secular 
Authority, CTHPT, Cambridge, 2006 [1991], pp. 82-3 (4.20.31-2)	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the nature of the state and its relation to the subject, both influenced by the violence 
taking place around them.  While Bodin stressed stability, going so far as, on the one 
hand, to recognize a theoretical right of magistrates to take action contrary to 
instructions, on the other hand, to confine that right to the realm of theory in the 
interest of avoiding chaos, theorists like the author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos 
sive de principis in populum populique in principem legitima potestate (Vindiciae) 
argued that magistrates were the individuals whose office gave them a specific duty 
on behalf of the community to resist sovereigns that behave unjustly (tyrannus 
exercitio).520  It is to this theory of resistance that we now turn, Mornay’s Vindiciae 
contra Tyrannos and Beza’s Right of Magistrates (Du droit des magistrats sur leurs 
subiets) in particular.521 
While there are distinctions to be made among officials, some being of the 
court and directly dependent on the prince, others being created by the Estates or by 
municipalities, but, in any case, not being of the court, the basic question answered by 
this line of reasoning is whether or not magistrates or state officers may not only 
engage in passive resistance to their princes, but even take positive steps to thwart his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520In writing of tyrants, theorists distinguished between usurpers, i.e., princes who had 
no legitimate title, and whom all were free to resist, from legitimate princes who by 
their actions (exercitium) became tyrants.  Obviously, the latter category posed a 
thornier question when it came to who could resist and under what circumstance 
because these princes originally held title rightfully. 
521The authorship of the Vindiciae is complicated and of no interest here.  I will 
accept for the sake of convenience Mornay as the author.  Franklin takes up the issue 
in his collection (pp. 138-40), and Kingdon briefly touches it at p. 212.  See also 
Benert, p. 162, fn. 2.  There is a Catholic resistance tradition as well, but that will not 
be the focus here.  For an overview, see J. Salmon, “Catholic resistance theory, 
Ultramontanism, and the royalist response, 1580-1620,” in J. Burns, ed., The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, Cambridge, 2004 [1991], pp. 
219-53  The 1579 edition of Beza’s work is available through 
http://books.google.com 
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wishes.  And, if a magistrate may so act, why?  First, there is an important difference  
between mere subjects and officials.  This was not particularly novel.  Calvin, who 
had not fully worked out his allowance for magisterial resistance, cautioned that 
private individuals were to suffer injustice and await God’s relief: “…we are not to 
imagine that it is we ourselves who are called upon to inflict it (viz., vengeance on 
unbridled tyranny).  All that has been assigned to us is to obey and suffer.  Here as 
always, I am speaking about private persons.”522    In a similar vein, Beza was careful 
to caution against opening the floodgates (ouvrir la porte à toutes malheureuses 
seditions & conspirations) for anyone ordinary person to resist flagrant tyranny.523  
Private persons (personnes du tout privées/aucun particulier) had no right “to use 
force against a tyrant.”524  Resistance must be according “to one’s rank (selon son 
degré).”  Even Mornay, whose tracts most aggressively argued for resistance retains 
the view that mere private persons could do no more than either leave or quietly pray 
for God’s intervention because, as he reasoned, while magistrates were endowed with 
the power to act (ius gladii), private individuals only had “the sword of the spirit.”525    
We are not yet in a world where citizens compose a civic community participating in 
sovereignty.  To be sure, Hotman, Beza, and Mornay all argued on the basis of both 
their reading of history and the comments on legitimacy afforded by the Digest that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522Institutio 4.20.31 = Höpfl, op. cit., p. 82; see too E. Barker, “A Huguenot Theory 
of Politics. The ‘Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.’,” Proceedings of the Huguenot Society 
of London 14.1 (1930), pp. 37-61 
523Kingdon observes that Huguenot resistance theory “was in no way democratic, for 
the general population, especially in the larger cities, had shown itself quite willing to 
help implement a policy of extermination (i.e., during the St. Batholomew’s Day 
massacre).” op. cit., p. 207 
524Magistrates 6 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 110   
525Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 154ff. 
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princes held their power by virtue of the people seen as a collective entity contracting 
with the prince, but this did not mean that, as individuals, subjects retained any 
authority to behave in their own interests outside the sphere of private relations.526  A 
private individual might engage in self-defense against another private individual, 
but, once power had been conferred on the prince, an individual’s capacity as a 
private man to revoke that act had ceased.  Mornay’s illustration of the relationship 
between state, magistrate, and ordinary people makes the point:  
Now we are not speaking here of private individuals, who are not to 
be regarded as the basic parts of a community any more than planks, 
nails, and pegs are taken as the parts of a ship; or stones, beams, and 
mortar as the parts of a house.  We are speaking rather of a province 
or a town, which is a part of a kingdom in the same way the prow, 
deck, and rudder are the parts of a ship, or the roof, walls, and 
foundations are the parts of a house.  And we are also speaking of 
the magistrate who is in charge of that province or town….527 
 
This appears to mean that private men, who in any case were not yet citizens in the 
modern sense, are simply the raw material of which a political community is 
composed. 528  It is the institutions or the magistrates that give the community its 
form; it is the institutions or magistrates that give the ship its direction or the house, 
its shape.   If such a metaphor had the significance that Mornay clearly ascribed to it, 
how could a subject do any more than remain passive in relation to those who acted 
as rudders and prows?  Private men could do no more than passively endure tyranny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526Digest 1.4.1 analyzes the emperor’s legitimacy thus: “…the populace commits to 
him and into him in its own entire authority and power, doing this by the lex regia 
which passed anent his authority.” It is possible, incidentally, to seen in the 
distinction between the people, taken collectively, and private individuals, taken 
individually, an idea that anticipates Rousseau’s distinction between the general will 
and private interest. 
527Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 152 
528On the various statuses held by persons before the full development of citizenship 
in France, see Brubaker, op. cit., pp. 35-9 
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or take flight.529  After all, a man could only answer his particular calling: “[e]ach 
individual is bound to serve God in the vocation to which he is called.”530 
Furthermore, according to this analysis, subjects were effectively under the 
protection of government officials.  In other words, magistrates and princes and the 
Estates were interpreted as guardians of subjects.  Their duties were cast in terms of 
the Roman legal concept of tutela, much as Cicero himself has argued in his own 
work.  Recall that tutela meant that the guardian was to act in the interest of his ward.  
Cicero had suggested that proper government entailed magistrates having a particular 
competence and duty to protect the interest of ordinary citizens in a legitimate 
republic.531  Thus, argues Mornay, magistrates themselves have a particular charge 
“to protect the people’s rights and privileges and make sure that the king himself 
commits no crime against the people nor neglects his duty towards them.”532  Like 
guardians, magistrates were bound by a special duty to protect the interests of their 
wards.533  Note that wards, being the incompetent, the youth, or women, historically 
needed guardians in Roman law precisely because they themselves lacked the 
competence in law necessary to administer their properties or protect their interests.534  
That principle, transferred to the conception of magisterial office, meant that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529“Private persons, finally, have no excuse to obey sacrilegious commands.  But 
beyond this they have no right whatsoever to take up arms....” Vindiciae in Franklin, 
Constitutionalism, p. 158 
530Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 154 
531See, Ch. 3, p. 98, and for the comparison with the vilicus, see p. 99, supra. 
532Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 162 
533Cf. Magistrates 6 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 112, which speaks of the duty 
of magistrates “to safeguard those within their care.” 
534Cf. Beza’s argument for the Estates to intervene when he declares, “And it would 
surely be monstrously unfair to deny to an entire nation what equity concedes to 
private persons such as minors, women, and the simpleminded….” Magistrates 6 in 
Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 125 
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magistrates too had a special duty by virtue of their office to protect ordinary 
subjects.  In comparing ordinary people to wards, Mornay himself explained thus:  
A ward cannot bring an action except through his guardian who acts 
as its author, even though the ward is the real principal and the 
guardian is taken as the principal only insofar as he promotes the 
welfare of the ward.  In like manner the people cannot act except 
through the officers to whom they have transferred their authority 
and power….  The people, I say, have given their sword to these 
persons for that purpose and have submitted to their governance and 
care.535 (emphasis added) 
 
This conception of the private individual as mere ward dependent on the protection of 
his magistrate, it seems to me, is transformed once we see magistrates and citizens as 
persons fundamentally on the same footing.  In other words, the distinction between 
the magistrate and the private man is effaced once democratic theory insists that the 
government and the people are the same.  Ours is no longer a political arrangement 
that limits each individual to his “vocation” or confines him to act in according to his 
social rank.  Citizens, in fact, partake of sovereignty and have, in a sense, moved up 
the ranks vis-à-vis their officials: they are no longer merely private.  In any case, 
these 16th century thinkers argued that, if anyone were in a position to act on a 
community’s behalf, it was the kingdom’s officials, not its subjects. 
But there was more justification for magistrates to take action than their status 
as guardians looking out for the community’s interests.  Magistrates are bound to 
uphold law by virtue of their oath, an oath sworn, according to Beza, to the 
sovereignty itself.  The distinction here is important: Beza is not emphasizing an oath 
sworn to a particular king; he is arguing that the oath itself binds the magistrate to the 
state itself.  Indeed, it is this sworn obligation that further distinguishes the magistrate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 195-6 
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from the private individual, who swears no such oath.536  Mornay effectively echoes 
this point when he emphasizes that French magistrates swore an oath to the kingdom, 
taken to be the people as a whole, not to the actual monarch.537  This oath, according 
to Benert, made magistrates agents of the people and guardians of their interests.538  
In effect, it gave them a duty-bound position independent of and joint with the prince, 
but faithful to sovereign power itself, i.e., the regime and the community.  Mornay 
himself concludes that in dire cases magistrates are obligated by virtue of office even 
to use force against the king.  This duty stems not merely from their position as 
guardians of the ordinary people, but also from the oaths sworn to uphold the laws, 
which were understood not merely as positive or civil, but also as divine, natural, and 
fundamental laws.  Failure to act, in fact, means sharing in a wicked monarch’s evil-
doing.  One may not merely, Mornay argues, turn away.539 
The looming question, of course, is what specifically justifies a magistrate’s 
turning against his king.  We understand the grounds for his capacity to act, but what 
legitimates magisterial resistance?  Violations of divine law offered one answer.  The 
conflict between the demands of higher and man-made law has always posed a 
problem, as it does today when trying to decide whether someone is a legitimate 
whistle-blower or merely a criminal.540  This was the theme of the Antigone by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536Magistrates 6 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 112 
537Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 164 
538op. cit., p. 176; cf. Calvin’s emphasis on oath when he says that magistrates should 
not connive in the misdeeds of their monarchs. Institutio 4.20.31 in Höpfl, op. cit., p. 
83 
539Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 190-1 
540As Constant grandly puts it, “ Nothing justifies the man who lends his assistance to 
a law which he believes iniquitous.” On the Sovereignty of the People in Fontana, op. 
cit., p.181 
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Sophocles.  Would Creon’s demand that Polyneices not be buried be obeyed?  
Antigone feels that religious scruples trump the king’s desires and makes a symbolic 
act of burial.  Creon suffers the consequences of his edict, perhaps to remind us that 
divine law takes precedence.  So long as the divine remained something real and part 
of political life, divine law too could be a fact to weigh when sorting out duties owed 
to the state.  As was mentioned above, private citizens in the tradition under 
consideration were not justified in resisting the monarch actively.  If a king were 
manifestly wicked or, in other words, a tyrant in act, their only legitimate choices 
were flight or prayer.  Magistrates, as guardians and partakers of sovereign power, 
however, could act and were at times duty-bound to do so.  While there was broad 
agreement among Christian thinkers that divine law superseded the manmade, what 
anyone could do about conflicts between the two was difficult to decide.  Although 
Calvin argued without much elaboration that “we must never allow ourselves to be 
diverted from our obedience to the one to whose will the desires of every king must 
be subjected….,” he seemed, nevertheless, to think that disobedience would be 
nothing more than passive resistance, even if that were to involve martyrdom: “I 
know that kings are not prepared to tolerate any defiance and that their answer is a 
messenger of death….”541  Beza argued that the community even could not obligate 
itself to a manifestly irreligious tyrant, suggesting as well that a government that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541Institutio 4.20.32 in Höpfl, op. cit., pp. 83-4  The statement about martyrdom in the 
service of God is particularly noteworthy given the fact that Calvin had the radical 
reformer, Michael Servetus, burnt at the stake in 1553, an act which Beza himself 
went on to defend.  On Servetus, see R. Bainton, Hunted Heretic, Boston, 1953 
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acted against natural and divine law was worthy of repudiation and condemnation.542  
It is worth pointing out, of course, that it was not for just anyone to take action in 
such cases, but rather for “those so authorized to act,” presumably meaning virtually 
any public official, but not private persons.543  Similarly, Mornay had said that one 
might resist kings who by engaging in unholy acts or prohibiting holy ones showed 
themselves “enemies of God and man”, but this was not a right of ordinary folk.  
Rather, this was a duty of those who possessed authority, meaning, naturally, 
magistrates or even other bodies such as the Estates.544 
These considerations meant that magistrates had an affirmative duty to act.  
Unlike ordinary subjects, who could leave the community, if circumstances became 
unbearable, magistrates could not simply go home.  In the face of his monarch’s 
wrong-doing, Mornay argued, conspiring with the tyrant made them liars, conniving 
made them traitors, and failing to defend the community made magistrates themselves 
tyrants.545  This special duty to act was an aspect of office precisely because 
magistrates were seen as guardians and protectors of the people.  They and the 
monarch together shared responsibility to look out for the interests of their wards.  As 
such, they had a duty emanating from their degré to take action, not merely to behave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542Magistrates 6 and 9 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 127-9 and 134-5 Whether 
or not a tyrant is manifest is important.  Our authors are conscious about the problem 
of errors of judgment.  Thus, Mornay warns “[w]here God has not spoken with his 
own mouth or through His prophets in extraordinary fashion, we must be extremely 
circumspect and sober.”  (emphasis added)  This is a very high bar indeed when 
considering whether or not to engage in resistance. Vindiciae in Franklin, 
Constitutionalism, p. 156; cf. Beza, Magistrates 6 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 
108 
543Magistrates 6 in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 124 and 127 
544Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 154 and 190 
545Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, p. 193 
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like stage-actors, as Mornay sarcastically remarked.546  In any case, it was their 
position as magistrates per se that theorists like Mornay and Beza took as legitimating 
their capacity to act on behalf of the community, in the defense of positive, man-made 
law as well as divine, natural, or fundamental law that existed prior to the workings of 
the state itself. 
If now we think of what this line of reasoning offers in the case of modern 
bureaucrats, we can conclude that bureaucrats themselves have a positive capacity to 
take action in the interests of justice.  Justice, as mentioned earlier, has no meaning, if 
not an idea outside of what positive man-made law can provide.  I have not ventured 
to say what the content of that law is, but it does seem that magistrates, or, in modern 
terms, bureaucrats, can refer to their own, personal convictions as a basis for deciding 
such questions.  At a minimum, they may refer to fundamental law (leges imperii) 
which establishes the state itself, as a means of determining what justice is.  Indeed, 
this is precisely the implication of any American official’s oath to the United States 
constitution.  It is not an oath to an agency, or an administration, or a legislature, or 
an Office of General Counsel.  Rather, it is an oath to the Constitution, which can 
mean nothing other than the idea that an individual official must ultimately rely upon 
his own judgment as to what constitutes justice on the basis of that document, as it is 
prior to any institution for which he works.  Two concepts stressed by the Huguenot 
theorists highlight this point: oath and tutela or guardianship.  They found that the 
oath sworn by an official meant that he was duty-bound to respond to whatever 
violated that oath.  To be sure, he should not be rash, nor, perhaps, should he act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546Vindiciae in Franklin, Constitutionalism, pp. 191-2 
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without consulting those whose opinions might be significant.  Moreover, there was 
room for error, as Mornay had warned.  Nevertheless, the official ultimately had to 
respect the meaning of his oath, if it was not to be reduced to mere ceremonial.  
Furthermore, magistrates themselves – and this echoes Cicero’s understanding – were 
guardians of the people’s interests.   
It is worth pausing on the matter of guardians as protectors of interests for a 
moment.  For it is not immediately clear why the simple fact of holding office might 
justify this position.  To be sure, there is the argument that magistrates in some sense 
participated in sovereignty.  But more than that, there is the very idea of knowledge.  
Magistrates, in fact, might be in a better position than private individuals to know the 
circumstances.  This is precisely the significance of the notion, conceded by Bodin 
himself, that magistrates should advise monarchs as to the implications of their 
decisions.  Unless magistrates were in a position to know something relevant, why 
would anyone think that there advice could have any bearing on the case?  Yet, this is 
the salient point: magistrates have the knowledge and judgment which would 
undergird any magisterial claim to independent judgment of facts.  Those 
circumstances are often no different today.  Indeed, they are all the more relevant, 
both as a source of power, as Weber feared, and as a potential source of redress and 
judgment.  In other words, modern bureaucrats are well-placed in a way that private 
individuals, even citizens, are not, to act as a corrective to poor decision-making and 
policy implementation precisely because they might actually know the circumstances.  
Thus the police officer on the beat.  For him, context is everything because he may 
understand both the law and the facts. 
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The modern concept of citizenship only strengthens the position of the 
magistrate.  Constant correctly noted that ancient and modern liberty differed.  It is 
important not to be misled by ancient concepts that no longer have a relationship to 
modern circumstances.  The ancient civis or polites participated directly in 
government, but at the price of comparatively little privacy.  Constant overstates the 
case, but he is right in noting that modernity renders the citizen an utterly private 
person who effectively delegates the quotidian substance of his political rights to 
someone else in exchange for a liberty of non-interference.  This is a theory of 
republicanism.  But it does not eliminate the fundamental fact that citizens are the 
basis of power, even when they delegate.  That is to say, they have something to 
delegate, which is their sovereign capacity.  This participation in sovereignty, which 
the Huguenots saw as something integral to magisterial office, is inalienable, even if 
citizens today can and do delegate it for periods of time, as when they elect 
legislators.  Legislators do not act as sovereigns by nature, but sovereigns by 
delegation because sovereignty itself resides within the nation and the individuals 
who compose it.  In institutional terms, legislatures function on behalf of the 
sovereign, but are not inherently sovereign, although legislators as people must surely 
retain some part of it.  I would argue that bureaucrats too, as modern citizens, retain 
this dimension of their personality.  On the one hand, tasks are delegated to them, as a 
subordinate corps, by legislatures or by the executives, but in any case they remain 
themselves citizens, participating in sovereignty.  If one wants to think in Rousseau’s 
terms, they compose part of that body that produces the general will and collectively 
they can even check excesses of the general will because of their corporate interest 
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(volonté de corps).  This means that individual officials retain, for purely political 
reasons that have a long history, some power to exercise discretion on the basis of 
their own judgment. 
A body of ethical thinking about bureaucratic discretion currently falls back 
upon the idea that roles are decisive when it comes to determining an official’s 
discretion.  This is partly justified on the implicit grounds that to argue otherwise 
would invite any and all willy-nilly to second-guess legislatures and second-guess 
legitimate officials.  The fundamental question to be answered there is whether or not 
this is important.  To be sure, if we think that the people have stepped into the shoes 
of the monarch, it seems natural to assume that their will should be put into action.  
Yet, this, in fact, is not the correct way to see the matter.  Modern democracies are 
not monarchies of the people. They are systems of mass participation: the people and 
the government are the same.  This was never the situation with monarchies.  With 
monarchy, it was people versus the prince.  Once we accept that the people and the 
government are one, we should look to political theory that acknowledges such a 
tradition, one in which magistrates are also citizens.  The ancient republics offered 
this, and they understood that magistrates operated according to their own judgment 
on behalf of the civic community.  Where the ancient republic fail to inform us is in 
the social dimension: they did not function according to our understanding of social 
and political equality.  But we do, and that means that all citizens can expect their 
fellows to occupy official roles.  The Huguenot theorists suggested, rightly, that 
magistrates were duty-bound to defend the civic community because of their oaths 
and their status as guardians of the people.  This situation has only been strengthened 
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as we have seen that citizens themselves, who participate in sovereignty as an a priori 
birthright, now hold office.  As a result, there is a certain logic and justification from 
political theory that modern bureaucrats judge the justice of matters and take action 
accordingly.  When we think that in the United States officials swear their oaths to the 
Constitution, it is difficult to imagine those oaths having any substance if not in this 
very sense: that they will judge the rightness of an act or policy on the basis of their 
own considered opinions.  It strikes me that this is the implication of the participatory 








As we have seen, absolutism has dominated thinking about the relationship 
between sovereign and bureaucrat.  Bodin’s theory, expanded by Rousseau, among 
others, forged for democratic governments the reins whereby the people could take 
the bridle of state and direct its administration wheresoever it pleased.   To think 
otherwise has consistently represented a threat to popular will however expressed.  To 
be sure, this theme has undergone variation.  Although he did not originate the idea, 
Rousseau posited a distinction between decision and execution.  In political terms, 
this was cast as a bifurcation between legislation and execution, then politics and 
administration, and more recently principal and agent, but, despite linguistic changes, 
the distinction has remained fundamentally the same, the idea consistently reflecting 
an almost primordial division of labor between officials as slaves and citizens as 
masters.  I do not quibble with the logic that a sovereign has some right to expect 
administration to honor its decisions.  But we have often lost sight of the fact that this 
is fundamentally an absolutist legacy, not a democratic one.  Indeed, it is this 
perspective that in the democratic context has presented bureaucrats as members of 
some body, alien and separate, even, inimical, to the political community, a view that 
can be held only if one overlooks the fact that bureaucrats themselves are actually 
citizens and members of that community. 
What the absolutist tradition has pushed aside for too long is what I will here 
call a republican tradition that looked upon magistrates as citizens holding office and 
acting on the basis of personal convictions that in some measure were bound by the 
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condition of sociality.  As we have seen, this tradition acknowledged a vibrant, 
sometimes parlous political community where citizens took turns ruling and being 
ruled, but ultimately in which office-holders themselves implemented policy as they 
judged actual circumstances.  Huguenot resistance theory stressed the particular duty 
of officials that came from their position as guardians of the people.  Stressing the 
Roman concept of tutela, they argued that only officials were in a position to counter 
the acts of a ruler who acted wickedly.   Moreover, their oaths gave them additional 
justification to act on behalf of the people because they were bound by them to 
uphold the law, civil, foundational, natural, or divine.    But this was not a call for 
action under just any circumstances or according to any whim.  Dire circumstances, 
such as tyranny or violation of higher law, called for active resistance. 
This literature incorporated an important distinction.  Neither the ancients nor 
the Huguenots were advocating democracy in modern terms.  These were men 
concerned with the elites, those socially qualified to hold office.  Private individuals, 
as Beza or Mornay emphasized, could only pray for God’s intervention or flee an 
intolerable situation.  Cicero for his part hardly envisioned humbler folk such as the 
tradesmen and hirelings of their betters, stepping into the shoes of office.  Indeed, 
ancient magistrates typically were in a position to rely on inferiors in the execution of 
their duties, and as bare a state as Athens provided government slaves to help citizen-
magistrates carry out their functions.  If Bodin advocated a logic that saw magistrates 
more as government servants whose will must bend to the sovereign’s, the Huguenots 
pushed back, suggesting that magistrates were persons possessed of real power to be 
exercised on behalf of the political community.  Modernity, however, presents new 
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circumstances because in democracies citizens themselves are conceptually equal, 
each ultimately partaking of sovereignty, and each empowered to act within the 
political community.  This differs fundamentally from ancient democracy.  
Arguments over the relative democratic quality of the Roman Republic do not, for 
example, claim that the ordinary man, despite the right to vote in assembly or to 
attend contiones, was fully equal to the nobilis.  Indeed, Cicero himself made it clear 
that his ideal Republic was one in which the best sorts of men held office on behalf of 
their social inferiors: moral, social, and political quality tend all to reflect each other 
in his Republic.  Citizen status was different for ancients than it was for moderns.  
But that difference is important because now, as a matter of democratic ideology, all 
citizens are equal before the law and able to act politically.  It is when we think of 
modern officials as modern citizens who retain their capacity to act that we can 
combine this Republican tradition of magistracy with the modern tradition of 
citizenship.  In other words, as I have argued, citizen officials have more than the 
kind of passive discretion that comes from the absolutist tradition, meaning that they 
can do more than pray for God’s intervention or resign from office when they would 
otherwise be impelled to act.  In fact, their citizen status gives officials, regardless of 
rank, a capacity to act that is integral to their prior condition of citizenship.    
This is theory.   Sociology and other disciplines, not to speak of simple 
common sense, show that human beings are not mere slaves, no matter what Weber 
suggested would be the bureaucrat’s professional devotion to duty.  But, to be fair, 
Weber surely knew that himself; it is a bit of a caricature to pretend as if he believed 
that his self-consciously idealized concept was some absolute reflection of reality or 
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an “iron law” that would allow any observer to know in advance how any individual 
bureaucrat might behave.  His fear that bureaucracy itself was a threat shows that he 
knew reality did not always mean that bureaucrats were self-effacing instruments of 
their political masters.  I hasten to point out the fact of someone’s subordination has 
never warranted his total obedience, whether he was a client of another man or a 
slave.  Roman comedy, for example, is rife with examples of the slave who is smarter 
than his master and capable of outwitting him.  But mere empiricism is not the same 
thing as justification.  The fact that people do not always do what they are told is not 
the same as saying, as I do, that disobedience might be integral to their status and 
integral to their condition within the polity.  Constant put the matter well when he 
argued that the total subordination of a lesser official’s will to his superior’s was in 
some sense antithetical to liberty because  
…if you prescribe for the officials of authority the absolute duty of 
an implicit and passive obedience, you let loose upon human 
society instruments of arbitrariness and oppression which any blind 
or furious power may unleash at will.547 
 
In his chapter “On the Responsibility of Subordinates (agents inférieurs),” Constant 
made two important observations.548  First, if subordinate officials could be 
punishable, they must then have responsibility.  In other words, they must have some 
capacity to act on the basis of their own judgment if they are to be held accountable.  
Otherwise, they could simply point to the accountable superior for all wrong-doing.  
Second, even if some might choose to act, the majority will not.  He well understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547Principles of Politics (11) in Fontana, op. cit., p. 245 = Roulin, op. cit., p. 1146  
This obviously anticipates Weber’s fear and is a regular theme among those who 
worry about the tension between bureaucracy and democracy. 
548Principles of Politics (11) in Fontana, op. cit., pp. 244-50 = Roulin, op. cit., pp. 
1146-53 
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that the argument frequently trotted out to the effect that allowing for official 
judgment and discretion would turn everything into a chaos would actually not be the 
general result.  If common sense suggests that people generally do not always follow 
every order to the letter, it also suggests that most of the time many are perfectly 
happy to do just that.  It was not, after all, a crowd of informants who came rushing 
forward to reveal wrong-doing at Abu Ghraib.  Most people, in fact, prefer not to take 
action or put themselves at risk.  This has often been precisely the problem: the 
unwillingness of those capable of knowing and acting actually to do so.   The danger 
has always been surfeit of passivity, not action.549 
Indeed, the issue of action or active resistance is perhaps all the more acute in 
areas where the legislature or the people cannot, in fact, monitor the government 
effectively.  Oversight, after all, is a critical device by which the sovereign ensures 
that its will is executed.550  Where secrecy prevails, but oversight does not, officials, 
if anyone, are most apt to be in a position to know and to act.  Knowledge is the 
critical matter.  Although her book about Congressional oversight is no longer 
completely accurate, Zegart makes a compelling argument that the balance of power 
between the watcher and the watched, in this case, the intelligence community, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549Vitoria’s discussion of when a soldier may refuse orders is interesting because he 
clearly believes that only certain types of men are in a position to judge the justness 
of a war, but he is also unsatisfied with the possibility that this might allow a man to 
engage in moral wrong-doing on the authority of another.  On the Law of War 22-6 in 
A. Pagden and J. Lawrance, edd., Vitoria: Political Writings, CTHPT, Cambridge, 
2003 [1991], pp. 307-9 
550This corresponds to Keane’s concept of monitory democracy.  But that idea falls 
apart the more the public or its agents lack access to information. Keane, op. cit.  
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effectively broken.551  Members of Congress lack the incentives, members of the 
public lack the means, and the intelligence community, as she argues, holds most of 
the cards.  This is a situation that evokes the idea of regulatory capture, in which 
those who regulate depend on the regulated for all or most relevant information.  
Most recently, ProPublica and This American Life published the results of their 
investigation into the defective oversight conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.552  Their findings showed that regulators repeatedly succumbed to the 
pressures of having to maintain good relations with the banks in order to gain a 
minimum of information pertinent to their duties.  The fact that an aggressive 
approach towards the banks could jeopardize these relationships and potentially cut 
off access to that very information meant that they, as, one might argue, a prudential 
calculation, softened their approach.  This is precisely the problem with regulatory 
capture, and it describes the problems that arise because of the imbalance of power 
between the overseen who know and the overseers who do not.  Imagine how the 
discovery process during pre-trial would function if the courts could not penalize the 
recalcitrant!  It strikes me that these are the very cases where officials cannot fall 
back on their “roles,” which might imply passivity, but must behave as citizens on the 
political community’s behalf.  The act of resignation, for example, is largely 
meaningless if the person resigning is a petty bureaucrat, and it is not surprising that 
advocates of this option often cite examples of senior figures who resigned.  But it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551Zegart, Eyes on Spies; on the role of secrecy in democracies and its relationship to 
political responsibility, see K. Robertson, Public Secrets: A Study in the Development 
of Government Secrecy, New York, 1982 
552J. Bernstein, “Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture Clash,” 
ProPublica, September 26, 2014, www.propublica.org 
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was their status as senior figures that gave their act meaning: the act spoke because of 
who they were, just as it would be silent because of who minor figures would be.   It 
is important to note here that in advocating resistance I speak of individual officials, 
not agencies, which must, as collective bodies created by the state, remain 
subordinate.  In both the case presented by Zegart and the one presented by 
ProPublica and This American Life, this means that citizen officials must fall back on 
an understanding of duty grounded in something higher, such as foundational law.  In 
other words, they appeal to justice before the political community. 
There are two significant gaps in my argument, and they represent areas 
calling for further research.  I have confined myself to arguing that officials as 
citizens have the capacity to take action on behalf of “higher purposes.”  Obviously, 
this echoes the concept of the whistleblower, although I am proposing here an 
argument for that kind of person on the basis of the republican tradition in political 
theory.  In a sense, it transcends the particular legislative concept of the 
whistleblower.  But the matter is more complicated.  First, there is the question of 
abused discretion.  Once officials have discretion, we cannot take for granted that it 
will always be used for noble purposes or to defend the community.  A corrupt 
official may help relatives, take bribes, coerce the weak.553 Second, one must wonder 
whether or not officials can be inculcated with the kind of mental equipment that 
might guide them in the use of their discretion. This is somewhat akin to the question 
of whether or not wisdom can be taught.  Thus we might ask whether or not it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553Deciding exactly what corruption is can be a problem.  See Scott, op. cit.  I might 
argue that, if we simply observed corrupt systems in sociological terms, we might, 
then, only see systems of redistribution.  Using a moralizing category like 
“corruption” can overdetermine our analysis and cloud the issue. 
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sufficient for officials to behave ethically if they have no idea why.  Is the appearance 
just as good as the substance? 
While not a perfect answer to the problem of abused direction, Constant offers 
what might be the only one.  Officials who use discretion must always face the courts, 
or the political community for justification.  They must be open about their acts and 
the reasons for them, and the courts or the political community on that basis can make 
its judgment of the matter.  I would also argue that corruption is not necessarily an 
obvious problem.   A supposed benefit of modernity is that Western states have to 
some extent been “emancipated” from society.  In other words, impersonality and 
rationality are usually upheld as positive achievements in the West precisely because 
these imply equality of all citizens before the law.  But I do not take for granted that 
equality and justice go hand in hand.  They may, but fairness is not justice.  Fairness 
implies a leveling out, a consideration for one’s political status purely, a kind of legal 
fungibility of persons that does not take into account who they are or their actual 
circumstances.  To the question of fairness, there are merely citizens.  Justice, on the 
other hand, is the matching of principles to individuals; it is sensitive to context in a 
way that mere implementation of rules is not.   
It is striking the degree to which arguments against corruption appear to take 
for granted the economic good that comes from its elimination.554  Often the issue is 
not that corruption per se is a problem, but that, if American business, for example, 
must eschew bribery as a method for securing a contract, then that method should not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554Rose-Ackerman, op. cit.; A. Wrage, Bribery and Extortion: Undermining Business, 
Governments, and Security, Westport, 2007 
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be available to anyone.555  In other words, the issue is not corruption, but securing a 
level playing field.  There is no particular reason, however, why economic good 
should take precedence over any other good, such as, the political good or the social 
good.  Economic good, being material and measurable, can be seen and felt and 
judged by objective criteria in a way that is difficult, to say the least, for political and 
social good.  But we should not lose sight of the fact that political good and social 
good have their own merits too.   An argument can be made that a person might 
achieve justice appropriate to his situation by bribing an official to obtain redress 
rather than by suffering the equal treatment required by the law.   Context does 
matter.  One cannot judge circumstances before they are known, which is precisely 
how and why rules often fail, only to be corrected or amended after acts of injustice 
accumulate sufficiently to attract attention, and this is why technology, which 
functions entirely on the basis of rules specified in advance, does not necessarily 
deliver justice.    
Nonetheless, there is no denying that the pervasive perception of corruption 
within government can undermine the faith of citizens in their government.  Diogenes 
was reported to have said upon seeing an official being led off for some theft that it 
was merely a case of “the big thieves leading off the little one.”556  One suspects that 
a similar sentiment underlies some of the statistics and comments reported in Almond 
and Verba regarding attitudes of Mexican and Italian citizens towards their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555Lurking in the background is the idea of merit, that the meritorious rise to the top, 
and those who lack merit sink to the bottom.  The idea of meritocracy has its own 
grim implications.  See, M. Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, Harmondsworth, 
1963 [1958]  
556Diogenes Laertius 6.45 
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government.557   On the other hand, reliance upon ascriptive criteria for the allocation 
of government services also might go together with richer social networks.558  I do 
not know if that is a social good or not, but I would suggest that its consideration 
would be part of an argument about abused discretion.  At any rate, the suggestion 
here has not been to do away with law or regulation.  The political community creates 
these directly or through its deputies.  But in those realms where an official makes 
choices that are proscribed or the result of pure discretion, Constant’s point that the 
case may ultimately be made before a jury is practical.  The Huguenot theorists 
seemed to envision that minor officials acting on behalf of the community would put 
their case to that community or God.  Modernity calls for putting a case for higher 
justice before the political community, that is, the court of public opinion, or the real 
courts.559   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557G. Almond and S. Verba, Civic Culture, Boston, 1965 [1963], pp. 70, 72, and 77-8, 
tables 3.2-3 
558My point in raising this question is not to suggest that we should work to reproduce 
Jacksonian democracy in America.  The past is the past.  But it does have relevance 
when considering states in Africa that are not fully emancipated from society.  Merely 
to label government in Bamako as corrupt simply ignores the actual circumstances on 
the ground and denies that each state may undergo its own developmental trajectory.   
Consider M. van Vliet, “Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and the Collapse of 
Democracy in Mali,” African Affairs 113/450 (2014), pp. 45-66 It is worth noting 
too, as Chabal and Daloz do, that colonizers also played a role in fostering a culture 
of “corruption” in Africa. P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as 
Political Instrument, Oxford, 1999  These points skillfully illustrated in Hampaté Bâ’s 
famous novel, L’étrange destin de Wangrin. 
559As a separate matter, I would argue that historically acts that we now refer to as 
bribery were endemic and natural to democratic systems, particularly where states 
were still embedded in their societies.  And I would emphasize Kelly’s suggestive 
observation that bribery in the late Antique period was a means for ordinary people to 
by-pass social networks to gain services.  It often does not occur to critics of Africa, 
but bribery itself may represent a way to gain government services without having to 
rely upon a powerful patron, one path, perhaps, towards the West’s much-vaunted 
bureaucratic impersonality.  For an interesting argument about social and political 
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As I mentioned, another matter that deserves full consideration is the question 
of how to get officials to do the right thing.  To put it differently, is it possible to 
teach ethics?560  Implicit in this question is the matter of appearance and substance: 
does it matter if officials know the right thing, so long as they do it?  To illustrate this, 
one might consider the problem of using one’s position within a bureaucracy for 
personal gain.  It is possible to list a number of acts that are illegal.  An official 
cannot conduct private business using his government computer.  He cannot use a 
government vehicle to take his wife to the opera.  He cannot use his position to solicit 
free meals from potential contractors.  Rules proscribing these particular behaviors 
may be laid out in advance, and officials can be trained to observe the particular rules.  
It is, therefore, possible to have an official who will scrupulously avoid letting 
potential contractors pay for his meals, but he may not have any particular idea why 
this is a problem beyond the fact of its being a rule.  If confronted with a situation not 
covered by a rule, he may not have the abstract principles to reason through the 
appropriateness of various courses of action open to him.  This is the distinction 
between training and education that Ricks discussed in his critique of the American 
Army.561  We may produce a cadre of officials who are very good at scrupulously 
following the rules, but powerless to do the right thing when faced with unanticipated 
choices.   Alternatively, we may, as in fact we do, find that officials will follow rules 
and procedure regardless of the justice of the outcome.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
patterns in Africa, see Chabal and Daloz, op. cit.  Their book should be read in 
conjunction with J.-F. Bayart et al., The Criminalization of the State in Africa, 
Oxford, 1999. 
560For an approach, see T. Piper, et al., Can Ethics be Taught?, Boston, 1993 
561Ricks, op. cit. 
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The question of mere habituation versus true knowledge is a concern of long 
pedigree.  I would argue, in particular, that Polybius in identifying the value of 
superstition (deisidaimonia) pointed the way for later thinkers who conceived of 
religion as a means to instill moral value and obedience within the political 
community.  What is superstition but the fearful – one thinks of the Arabic word, 
taqiya or “fearful reverence” in this context – dedication to rules and procedure.562  It 
has long been pointed out that superstition itself is a kind of thoughtlessness.  But this 
is precisely the problem.  There is an intrinsic relationship between fearful scruple 
and rule.  A person must be satisfied that the rule, or the process, contains the relevant 
criteria for addressing relevant situations.  Yet, rules themselves, because they are 
fundamentally reductionist, either encourage us to ignore the particulars that do not 
fit, or, when we cannot fit the matter to the rules, they leave us in a kind of helpless 
confusion, particularly as we do not have the underlying principles at our command.  
In other words, without the substantial reasons why there are particular rules and 
processes, we are often left without the equipment to respond as circumstances 
require.  In a sense, the situation not covered by the rules is like a miracle that defies 
explanation.  I have stated the matter starkly, although I understand that real life has 
more nuance, and the capacity to muddle through is always there.  But, if we consider 
that it is better to have an understanding of the principles underlying the rules, then 
we see that the project of inculcating values in our officials is different in nature, and, 
perhaps, in difficulty than merely habituating them to desired behavioral patterns.  
Indeed, this is precisely what Saint-Just had in mind when he argued that reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562Rendered as Gottesfurcht in A. Wahrmund, Handwörterbuch der neu-arabischen 
und deutschen Sprache, v. 1, Beirut, 1974, p. 339b 
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could discover all the laws needed to ensure that officials served as mere cogs 
administering policy like gears in a watch.  And he surely wanted them to function so 
out of a fearful certainty that punishment would follow any infraction.  I think that we 
do not want mindless cogs, but whether they can or should be educated with the 
necessary political values as opposed to mere rules of conduct poses a number of 
problems that merit study in their own right.  They are beyond the scope of the 
present discussion, which is why I have not addressed them.  Constant’s suggestion 
that the courts might be the only means to address questions of discretion may seem 
somewhat unsatisfying, but it also might be the best that can be offered.  Similarly, it 
is certainly possible that habituation might be the best to be hoped for.  In any case, 
education is obviously a matter that deserves study and consideration when pondering 
how officialdom might be equipped to exercise discretion. 
In Catch-22, Captain Yossarian refuses to conduct any more bombing 
missions.   Publicly his comrades criticize him, privately they draw inspiration from 
his act or even seek his help to do the same.  Eventually, he argues at one point, 
“[s]omeone had to do something sometime.  Every victim was a culprit, every culprit 
a victim, and somebody had to stand up sometime to try to break the lousy chain of 
inherited habit that was imperiling them all.”563  My argument in many ways is 
captured in this quotation.  It is often the easiest thing in the world to content oneself 
with the thought that someone else is responsible and to feel justified in following the 
rules because they are the given.  Absolutist doctrine demands as much of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563J. Heller, Catch-22, London, 2013 [1955], Ch. 39, p. 391The flipside of this is the 
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could do it; it required no brains at all.  It merely required no character.” Ch. 34, p. 
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bureaucrats, and to some extent we have often allowed that doctrine to be clothed in 
democratic garb because the notion that the laws of a legislature should be obeyed has 
been paramount.  I do not discount the value of that basic premise, but, as I have 
argued, we have allowed this idea, inherited from the world of monarchs, to obscure 
the tradition afforded us by republican thinkers.  Now, if we take Keane’s idea of 
monitory democracy seriously, it is clear that it depends for its health on the flow of 
information.  But what is to be done when information is not available, or the 
interests do not exist to monitor the government?  These are the instances, and they 
are real, where we should hope that officials take their oaths seriously, or take their 
own principles seriously, to act on behalf of the political community.  What I have 
attempted to show is that political theory offers a sound, traditional basis for 
incorporating such a concept of official duty into democratic communities.  If we 
were to educate officials regarding the political values of those communities, I would 
hope that it would include consideration of that tradition.  From time to time, only the 
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